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Abstract 
In this thesis, a congestion management method based on the merchandise surplus 
refund is presented, and is illustrated in a 5-bus system under the bilateral model. 
Furthermore, for the interconnected system consisting of several or more control areas 
and different transmission system operators (TSOs), the decomposition of optimal 
power flow (OPF) is studied, and a decomposition strategy is proposed to achieve 
optimum over the entire system while keeping the information exchange between 
neighbouring control areas at an acceptable level. Based on this decomposition strategy, 
an interior point method (IPM) is applied and then tested in a small system. This barrier 
function method complemented the previous works of several researchers, and it 
enables the TSOs at different control areas to calculate the OPF in parallel and 
coordinate through very limited information exchange. This method is compared with 
two existing methods, both on the algorithms and on the test system, and proved fast 
convergence and numerical stability. Finally, in order for researchers to study cross-
border congestion management methods, a test model is created based on the UCTE 
(the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) ultra high voltage 
transmission network. As it is based on public information, no commercially sensitive 
information is involved, and it inherits the physical characteristics of the real network in 
the respect of cross-border power flows. The verification of this test network is also 
done by _comparing the calculated PTDFs (Power Transmission Distribution Factors) 
against the published true values. 
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Introduction 
For a long time, the electricity power industry had been seen as a public service and 
thus been structured as a vertical monopoly. The requirements for system real-time 
security and the economies of scale in electricity production did support such a 
monopoly, but the problems of low efficiency and lack of incentives has been widely 
criticised. 
Experiences during the past twenty years have proved that the deregulation in 
power markets is feasible and also beneficial to the customers. However, electricity is a 
special commodity and thus electricity markets require special design. The major 
difficulties of electricity as a commodity are: (1) electricity cannot be stored on a large 
scale. (2) All the market participants in a market share the same transmission network, 
while the power flows obey physical law instead of "contract path". (3) The frequency 
in a synchronised system is identical everywhere, and the real-time energy balance 
needs to be maintained [1]. The second characteristics implies that the transmission 
network is a natural monopoly, and the system operator (SO) is required to provide 
transmission services to all the network users. Due to the first and third reasons, a 
balancing service must also be provided to ensure real-time system security. 
Transmission congestion problems occur when the transmission facilities have 
scarce transmission capacities and cannot accommodate the overall power flows 
incurred by all the network users wishing to transfer energy from one site to another site 
through the network. The system operator must prevent and resolve congestion 
problems in order to keep the transmission grid operating properly and to avoid 
damaging transmission equipment [2]. If the technical transmission limits are binding, 
customers have to pay more to get alternative energy from other generators to meet their 
o 1 
demands. Thus those out-of-merit generators have to be "constrained on" while cheap 
generators will reduce their output to ensure system security. As congestion makes the 
cheaper generators reduce the output, it results in low efficiency and lost of welfare. 
It is fair that the participants who caused congestions should pay for it. In this way, 
every participant has the correct incentive to avoid congestion. Moreover, transmission 
network can raise part of the fund for system expansion. However, the existence of loop 
flows in a grid makes it difficult to specify each party's payment. (Rather than 
following the pre-specified contracted paths, loop flows are the actual power flows 
passing through all the shunt connected circuits according to Kirchoff's current law. 
The distribution of power flows depends on the impedances of the shunt circuits.) 
This thesis will address the congestion management in the electricity market, 
especially the cross-border congestion management in interconnected systems. In 
Chapter 1, the electricity prices are analysed and associated with the underlying 
mathematical model, and different types of wholesale electricity markets are outlined 
and compared. Congestion management methods are reviewed. The concept of 
transmission rights is also discussed here. Cross-border congestion management 
methods are listed in Chapter 2, and the current situations in Europe and the US are also 
briefly given. In Chapter 3, a congestion management method is proposed and 
illustrated on a small system example. This method is based on the analysis of 
merchandise surplus (MS) in electricity markets, and is designed to give correct 
incentives to the market participants and the system operator (SO). The optimal power 
flow (OPF) calculation for interconnected system is discussed in Chapter 4, especially 
on how to decouple the calculation among control areas. Comparison has been made 
between two current approaches, and study is made on how to decompose an 
interconnected network for the OPF calculation. Based on this study an interior point 
method is suggested to modify current approaches, and it is tested in Chapter 5 in 
2 
comparison with the other two methods. Chapter 5 also gives test results on 
experimental small systems about these decomposed OPF calculation methods. In 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, a test network is built up for methodology study in the 
interconnected systems. This network is based on UCTE 1st synchronised area and is 
similar to the real system in the sense of cross-border power flows and network 
structures. Verification of the model network through PTDF comparisons is also given. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Electricity Market 
In an electricity power market, producers and consumers response to prices by 
adjusting their generation/ demand levels. If the prices can give the correct economic 
signals (both short-term and long-term) and if market participants can compete fairly 
and openly, the electricity system would be able to achieve high efficiency. As the 
operation of system changes from second to second, the prices will change with the 
operations, thus the close-to-real-time pricing (called spot pricing in economics theory 
[3]) is required to adapt to the changing situations in power system. A congestion fee is 
incurred when congestion on the bottleneck occurs, and the network users have to pay 
the fee for the scarce capacity if they still wish to use it. The mathematical model 
described in this chapter explains how the congestion fee is calculated, taking into 
consideration of the existence of loop flows in a grid. 
The power system has special reliability requirements. As all the market 
participants share the same network to transfer the energy, coordination between them is 
necessary to ensure the real-time system security and reliability. In the long run, both 
over-investment and under-investment should be avoided. An ideal market mechanism 
is expected to encourage competition and give the correct price signals. 
In the deregulated power market, congestion management involves setting up a set 
of rules that ensure sufficient control over generators and loads to maintain the power 
system security and reliability at an acceptable level, both in the short term operation 
and in the long term construction, and at the same time maximise market efficiency [4]. 
Issues like how to allocate the scarce transmission capacities, how to set the prices for 
use of the capacities, and how to use the revenues collected from capacity auctioning 
are different forms of congestion management methods, and they vary with the form of 
the markets. Therefore, congestion management methods will be discussed in the 
following sections in association with the practical markets. 
This chapter is focused on the fundamental sources of congestions, as well as 
congestion management methods in electricity markets. In order to avoid or reduce 
congestions, a congestion management mechanism must be established. In the long run, 
this mechanism must give incentives for network enforcements and expansions. In the 
short run, economic dispatch should be achieved under this mechanism [5]. 
In this chapter, the mathematical model of optimal power flow (OPF) is reviewed, 
and the components of electricity prices are interpreted from the calculation of this OPF 
problem. The electricity market models and financial arrangements are then discussed, 
and examples in several countries are given. 
1.2 The optimal power flow (OPF) problem 
[3] gives the underlying mathematical model for spot prices in the electricity 
market, and explains the price components associated with the mathematical derivations 
obtained from the optimal power flow (OPF) calculation. Besides, some researchers 
also suggested different OPF models. [6] suggested a minimum cost formulation as the 
objective function to solve the dispatch problem for a congested network. [7] explained 
the theoretical foundations of electricity pricing, and discussed how pool model and 
bilateral model define the transmission prices. Impact of market power was also 
discussed. [8] studied the models of generators, loads as well as static volt-ampere-
reactive (V AR) compensators, and their impacts on optimal power flow results. For the 
reason of simplicity, the OPF model in [3]is used to illustrate the works done in this 
thesis. It's worth giving a brief description of this model in this section. 
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In the following discussion, the objective function and the constraints of the OPF 
problem are given. For simplicity the inter-temporal dependence is not considered, i.e. 
the generation costs and customer benefits are not affected by their behaviours in the 
previous or future hours. If the coupling between multiple time periods like the start-up 
costs and the ramp rates of generators are considered, the calculation of spot prices will 
be more complicated, but the basic hourly spot pricing concepts will not be changed [3]. 
Therefore, the simple one-hour model will be used to display a clear picture of the 
spot pricing components. 
1.2.1 The model 
The objective of this OPF problem is to minimise the social cost, which is the total 
generation cost minus the customer benefit from using the electricity. 
Let g j be the output of the jth generator, j=1,2, ... 
d k be the demand of the kth customer, k=1,2, ... 
Then the generation cost can be expressed as: L C(g j ), where the C is the cost 
} 
function, And the customer benefit is: IB(dk ), where the B is the benefit function. 
k 
Therefore, the objective function is: 
Unlike the traditional regulated power system where the SO knows all the cost and 
benefit functions, the deregulated power market requires protection of these commercial 
sensitive data. However generators and customers may submit their bids which should 
reflect their costs or benefits. Assume the generators and customers bid their true 
marginal costs/ benefits to the SO, then the optimal dispatch objective is still as 
described in equation (1.1), provided that the c(gJ and B{dJ are functions of price and 
quantity bids. 
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Let Zj be the line flow of the ith transmission line, i=I,2, ... , then the line losses can 
be written as: IZ(zJ, where the I is network loss, and the constraints can be summarised 
i 
as: 
System energy balance constraint: L d k + L Z(Zi ) - L g j = 0 (1.2) 
k i j 
Total generation must equal the sum of system energy losses and demands at any 
time. 
System reserve constraint: L g j S L g;ax - G res (1.3) 
j j 
where the Gres is the system reserve capacity, and g;mx is the maximum output of the jth 
generator. 
In the electricity system, components might go out of operation due to technical 
reasons, therefore the system reserve capacity should be maintained even when the 
demand is high. 
Individual generator output limit: 
min max gj <gjsgj for 'Vj = 1,2,.·· (1.4) 
Line flow limit: 
for 'V i = 1,2,. .. (1.5) 
Where the z:ax and Zjmax are the limits of power flows at both directions of the ith 
line respectively. In order to obtain the standard form, this constraint can be re-written 
as: max d max z. S z. an - z. s z. 
l I I LC 
(1.6) 
The sources of the transmission limits include thermal limits on power lines, system 
stability limits[9], or other system operation limits converted approximately into line 
flow limits[10]. Typical limits are determined in [11] as: 
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• Interface power flow limits: the total power flow on a set of transmission lines 
between two areas does not exceed a certain value. This is related with voltage 
and stability limits caused by energy transfers between areas. 
• Thermal limits: if the transmission line is overloaded it will overheat, causing 
line sag etc. The thermal limits are dependent on the ambient temperature. 
• Contingency limits: due to the effect of parallel flows, if another transmission 
line near to the studied one is tripped off during operation, its loads will be 
shifted onto this line. The N-l contingency limits require the line can remain 
operate even the neighbouring line is tripped off. 
Here the line flow Zi are status variables determined by the control variables g j and 
d k • Additional constraints can be added here to represent the line flows: 
Network representation: 
Z. = h . .'g. - d .) 
1 I,j \ ] ] (1.7) 
where the g j and d j are generation and demand at the jth bus, respectively. hi,j is the 
contribution factor of the power flow in ith line caused by IMW of electricity injected 
at the jth bus and withdrawn at the slack bus. In DC power flow calculation, hi,j is a 
constant dependent on the network parameters and structure. In AC power flow 
calculation h.. is also dependent on the levels of generations and demands. Generally 
, I,j 
aZ. az. h = __ 1 = ___ 1 
i,j ag. ad. 
] ] 
(1.8) 
1.2.2 Solving the problem 
The Lagrangian function of the above OPF problem is: 
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Q = ~c(gj)- ~B(dk)+!l'( ~dk + ~l(zJ- ~gj J+ 
Ilcrit(I g j - ~ gr;x + GresJ + ~ Ilg,j (g j - g;ax )+ I Ilz.i (Zi - z;mx )+ 
J J J i 
I Ilcz,i (- Zi - Zi7 ) (1.9) 
i 
Where the lle,llcrit'llg,j,llz,i and Ilcz,i are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints. 
According to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the solution can be obtained by solving the 
derivative equations, and both the price and the quantity of electricity at each bus are 
included in the solution [12]. Here only two of the equations are listed because they are 
related closely to spot prices: 
a IZ(Zi) 
i I() az. 
----1 + /I . + /I . + /I. _ /I . __ I =0 
a I""cnt I"" g,] I""Z,1 I""CZ,I a g ji j 
(1.10) 
aIZ(Zi) 
. I( ) az. 1+ 1 + - __ I =0 
ad Ilz,i Ilcz,i ad 
k k 
(1.11) 
1.2.3 N odaJ prices and Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) 
For the swing bus s, the derivatives of line flows and losses with respect to the bus 
injection are 0, because the line flows are not affected by the injection in the swing bus. 
Therefore, equation (1.10) for the swing bus can be written as: 
aQ ac ac 
-a - = -a - - Ile + Ilcrit + Ilg,s =0==> Ile = -a - + Ilerit + Ilg,s 
gs gs gs 
(1.12) 
Furthermore, as the designation of swing bus can be arbitrary, we can appoint the 
bus attached with the system marginal generator (that's the last accepted running 
generator) as the swing bus, and we assume that the marginal generator is not running at 
its full capacity, so that the system reserve constraint and the generator capacity 
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constraint are not binding. Thus their corresponding Lagrange multipliers are Os, and 
finally we can get: P-e = aC(g J 
ag
s 
(1.13) 
Note that the I'tem ac (g j) . . I ( ) 
---..-;.- IS margtna cost MC of generation at any node j, and 
ag j 
it can be simply written as MC (g j ). That is the cost of increasing or decreasing one 
unit of generation at node j. Thus P-e = MC(g s) (1.14) 
Customers will take the electricity at their nodal prices, as long as the price doesn't 
exceed their marginal benefits. Therefore, if there is enough electricity supply in the 
system, the marginal benefit should be equal to the nodal price. The item aB(dk ) is the 
adk 
marginal benefit (MB) of using one unit of power at node k, written as MB( d k ) • 
Equation (1.11) gives the nodal price: 
aIZ(Zi) 
( ) . ~( ) az. Pk = MB d k = P-e 1 + ~d + ~ P-z,i - P-cz,i ad l
k k 
(1.15) 
If a customer is connected to the swing bus, considering equation (1.14), he will 
see the nodal price as: Ps = P-e = ac ag
s 
(1.16) 
because of the insensitivity of line flows to the nodal injection at the swing bus. Thus 
the marginal generator sets the nodal price as its marginal generation cost. ac is also 
ags 
known as "system lambda", A, as it reflects the marginal cost for the entire system to 
maintain energy balance. 
It becomes more complicated if the marginal generator is running at its full 
capacity limit. In this case P-crit and P-g,s are both nonzero, because the demand is so 
10 
high that even the marginal generator (and also the system overall generation) is short of 
capacity. However, equation (1.14) still holds, and for the swing bus, we can now have: 
aB ac 
ad = Ps = f..ie = -a - + f..i crit + f..ig,s 
s gs 
(1.17) 
The marginal benefit of this customer is now higher than the marginal cost of the 
marginal generator at the swing bus. Due to the technical constraints of generator 
capacity and system overall generation capacity, this customer cannot take any more 
electricity. Should the marginal generator capacity be increased by IMW, the customer 
would buy this extra IMW and create extra social benefit by the amount of 
( aB ac J . - - - . Therefore, the margInal opportunity cost (also called shadow cost) of ads ags 
these two constraints-(f..i °t + f..i )-is equal to (aB - ac J, and ~ g~ ad a 
s gs 
(1.18) 
For the buses other than the swing bus, network effects have to be taken into 
account. In general, the marginal benefit of customers at the kth bus sets the nodal price, 
as in equation (1.14). 
The setting of nodal prices defined by equation (1.14) is also called locational 
marginal pricing (LMP). In short, the short-run (i.e., assume that the embedded cost is 
fixed and that there is no system expansion) nodal prices have the following three 
component [13]: 
LMP ($/MWh)=energy component + loss component + congestion component 
The energy component, also known as the system lambda, is the energy-clearing 
price in a non-congested lossless system, and it is identical at all locations. The loss 
component is the marginal cost of system losses at this location. The congestion 
component reflects the marginal congestion cost at this location. If there's no 
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congestion on a specific line, the congestion rent of this line is zero. The LMP is the 
basis to market operation and the transmission congestion management. 
1.3 Market Models and Financial Settlements 
There are two basic forms of electricity markets, the pool market and the bilateral 
market. Although in real life, markets with combined structures are more common [14], 
they are developed from these two basic types [15]. 
In this section, these two different market models are discussed, and the financial 
settlement methods under the two models are also analysed. 
1.3.1 Pool model 
Bid 
Wholesale Pool 
Bid 
Figure 1-1 Pool Model Structure 
Figure 1-1 [16] gives the structure of the pool model of the electricity wholesale 
market. 
In the pool model, generators or other suppliers (the commercial enterprises which 
can inject power into the network) and customers (including distribution companies, the 
retail traders or large end-users) submit their price and quantity bids to the system 
operator (SO), and have the SO arrange the dispatch for them. The SO is responsible for 
selecting the optimal dispatch while keeping the constraints met, and making financial 
settlements for market participants[15]. 
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In a power pool, the supply bids can be technically complex (for example, stating 
the start-up and non-load costs for generation units), and the system operator uses 
optimisation calculation to decide the dispatch[9]. Under this dispatch, the energy 
prices, system losses and network congestions are solved at one time [9]. 
1.3.2 Bilateral model 
Figure 1-2 gives the structure of the bilateral model structure for electricity 
wholesale market. In the bilateral market, producers and consumers directly negotiate 
the price and quantity of energy transaction. Transaction agents submit the schedules to 
the SO in order to request for permission to carry out the physical energy transfer. The 
SO has no knowledge about energy prices in the trading, but it is responsible for 
determining the transmission limits, arranging the physical power deliveries, making 
necessary curtailment and maintaining real-time power balance in the spot market [18]. 
The bilateral model allows the market participants trade freely in the market place, 
however, due to the physical limits of the transmission network, this decentralised 
market often has to resort to post-trading adjustments such like curtailment or 
adjustment bids [19]. 
Figure 1-2 Bilateral Model Structure 
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A Power Exchange (PX) is a standard market place dealing with standard price and 
quantity bids, finding the trading counterpart for sellers and buyers [17]. A PX makes 
the financial arrangement and settlement, and the balancing services are left to the 
system operator. 
1.3.3 Comparisons 
It has been proved that, under perfect competition (assuming that no participants 
have the significant market power, and that correct price signals are available to the 
participants), free market competition can achieve the same perfect economic efficiency 
as under central dispatch [18]. Under such assumption, the bilateral model is equivalent 
to the pool model under perfect competition. However, the assumption of perfect 
competition can never hold in real world. There have been comparisons of the different 
market models such as [4]. 
In the real-time market, central coordination is required, because all the physical 
transactions share the same transmission network and interact with one another through 
loop flows. Pool model is thus desired for the real-time market. On the other hand, the 
forms of bids in the pool model may not give market participants enough flexibility as 
provided in bilateral negotiations, but it requires less trading cost and time to find the 
suitable counterparts and contracts [9]. 
In the forward markets, only financial contracts are traded, and there's no need for 
the central coordination. Therefore, bilateral model is favoured because of the great 
flexibility. The resulting energy trading in the forward markets cannot match exactly the 
real-time physical trading, and multi-settlement markets are organised to trade and clear 
contracts for different time frames. Such multi-settlement design is expected to be able 
to achieve both efficiency and security [9]. 
According to the experiences to date, markets with flexibilities for the participants 
to choose between bilateral contracts and the pool, have the better performance [14]. 
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1.3.4 Transmission Pricing 
Transmission pricing has been studied for a long time. [20] described a cost-based 
pricing based on the decomposition of power flows into transaction components and 
interaction components due to loop flows. [21] decomposed transmission prices into 
operating components and embedded cost components. [22] used a simple network to 
study the differences in prices and quantities under simplified models (used in many 
countries) and an exact model. [23] suggested a multi-period energy auction model 
which supports transmission congestion constraints and losses, as well as intertemporal 
operating constraints like start-up costs and ramp rates. [24] proposed a congestion 
management method to allocation the physical overload and congestion cost to 
individual transactions based on physical power flows. [25] gives an approach to 
decompose each nodal price into a set of components related with generation, 
transmission congestion, voltage constraints and losses, etc. [26] gives a method to 
compute transfer capability sensitivities. [19] propose a transmission pricing method 
suitable for the hybrid electricity market containing both bilateral/multilateral 
transactions and centralised dispatch. [27] compared several transmission loss allocation 
methods under the pool-based electricity market on the IEEE reliability test model. [28] 
proposed a multi-objective optimisation method to take into consideration both social 
welfare and the system security margins. This OPF method allows market operators and 
participants to control the system security level by controlling the weighing factors in 
the objective function. [29] evaluates the economic inefficiencies of a simple auction-
based dispatch method. 
Transmission services include operating, maintaining and expanding the 
transmission system [3]. Normally the long-term cost of transmission consists of four 
main elements: 
• Transmission losses caused by the power flow in the network; 
• Transmission constraints (i.e., congestion); 
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• 
• 
Balancing services to ensure that the network is robust (e.g. reactive power 
support, spinning reserve); 
Returns and depreciation of the capital equipments . 
The embedded cost recovery is not considered in short-term pricing. The balancing 
service requires central coordination of the system operator, and thus can be charged to 
all the network users as a flat rate [9]. Therefore the other two components are the focus 
in the short-run transmission prices: 
(1) Shadow price (also called the opportunity price) of congestion 
(2) Resistive losses cost 
Long-term transmission prices should not only recover the transmission cost but 
also send correct financial signals to market participants [30]. 
The nodal prices calculated from LMP are the by-products of constrained economic 
dispatch, and because of the opportunity cost (shadow cost) of transmission they 
comprise, clear economic signals can be sent to the market participants [31]. The short-
run nodal prices consist of information of the direct costs for generation and losses as 
well as the shadow costs for scarcity in transmission capacity. Thus the short-run 
transmission prices can be naturally defined as the differences between node prices, and 
the resulting transmission prices consist of marginal losses and congestion rents. On the 
other hand, given the nodal spot prices, they can be divided into a generation component 
and a network component [32]. 
Under the pool model, the market organiser (can be the power exchange-PX, or 
the SO) collects payments from customers at the local prices, and then distributes the 
payments back to generators at their local prices [33]. 
Under the bilateral model, the SO checks the power flows incurred by submitted 
transactions. If congestion is likely to occur, SO will either curtail the related 
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transactions or purchase congestion services from generators and customers. SO 
allocates losses and congestion costs to the transaction agents [15]. 
Marginal Transmission Pricing and congestion rents 
Under LMP, the transmission network users are charged the marginal transmission 
cost, which is the price difference between the nodes of energy injection and extraction 
(the source and sink nodes). The transmission charge can be written as: 
(1.19) 
The first item is the marginal social cost incurred by the marginal network losses 
which is caused by injecting IMW of electricity to jth bus and extracting it at kth bus. 
This item is often referred as the loss component in the transmission cost. 
The second item is the marginal shadow cost caused by the binding line flow limits. 
Moving 1 unit of electricity from bus j to bus k will give the line flow Zi an increment 
by (azi - aZi J, and if the line flow limit is reached in either direction, this moving of 
adk ad j 
electricity will incur a marginal opportunity cost of (flZ,i - flCZ,i). The second item is 
often referred as the congestion component in marginal transmission cost. 
The congestion component is the most significant component among the short-run 
elements. This means that the spot prices are highly volatile because of the occurring of 
congestions in real-time markets. 
Merchandise Surplus 
The total net payment from customers to the ~ool equals to I Pk d k , and the pool 
k 
will pay back the generators total amount of I P j g j . The net payment to the pool, also 
j 
called merchandise surplus (MS), is equal to: 
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(1.20) 
Considering that in the nodal price equation (1.14), the derivative aZi and 
adk 
aIz(zJ 
_i __ tend to make the price higher at sink buses (where the demand is higher than 
adk 
local generation level), and lower at source buses (where the demand is lower than local 
generation level), the MS is normally positive [34]. Chapter 3 gives a simple 2-bus 
system example to illustrate the MS>O. In fact, the congestion rents are the dominant 
component in the MS [3]. 
Embedded Cost Recovery 
It is generally recognised that because of the economies of scale in electricity 
industry, the sink cost of transmission network investments cannot be fully recovered 
from the short-run marginal transmission revenues discussed above [35] and [36]. One 
suggestion is to use the long-run marginal cost based pricing (i.e. taking into account 
capital costs and system expansion) (LRMC). In this method, the short-run operation 
costs including congestion and losses can be recovered through a flat rate, or a usage-
based algorithm, but without distorting the long-term locational signals[37]. However, 
the calculation of LRMC tends to be highly complicated and dependent on a number of 
assumptions on costs and scenarios of expansion [30]. 
Alternatively, a two-part price structure can be used where the short-run marginal 
cost (SRMC, i.e, capital costs and system expansion are not considered) of serving the 
user is the first part of the price, and the embedded cost recovery is the second part [34]. 
In this method, the investment costs are usually defined as a flat rate to all the network 
users to avoid distorting the short-run optimal pricing signals. Alternatively the second 
part of price can be defined through a commonly accepted revenue recovery calculation 
to calculate each user's share of the sunk costs [37]. 
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There is no definite preference between these two pricing methods. Short-run 
marginal pricing (SRMC) may not be able to give enough incentive to the investment 
[38], while the effectiveness of long-run marginal cost (LRMC) depends greatly on the 
cost allocation method applied, as well as the relation between generation and 
transmission costs [39]. Even under the LRMC, transmission system expansion might 
still require participation of a system regulator or a pool coordinator [38]. [40] 
compared several embedded cost recovery methods with a special emphasis on power 
flow based methods. Depending on which cost is more important, SRMC or LRMC can 
be used, and a well-designed transmission tariff should give correct signals for both 
short-term economic dispatch and long-term investment incentives [37]. 
1.4 Transmission Rights 
Due to the uncertainties in the power system, real-time spot prices are highly 
volatile. In a matured market, users can choose to either face the real-time prices or 
purchase contracts in advance to hedge the price fluctuations [41]. Transmission rights 
can be used to hedge the price volatility and lead to optimal dispatch [42]. In the long 
run, transmission rights are important to provide the right incentives for system 
expansions [33]. 
Physical transmission rights entitle the right holders to transfer energy through the 
network even when congestion occurs. This might give the transmission right holders 
opportunities to withhold the rare transmission capacities and to prevent other users 
from competing fairly in the market. On the other hand, financial transmission rights 
allow usage of the capacity from other users if they pay for it when congestion occurs. 
The revenue from sales of the transmission rights goes back to the transmission right 
holders. 
Therefore, the price of transmission rights can be seen as the price signal of 
constraints. Furthermore, the price signals can come in either of the two forms: 
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conversion of the limits into nodal prices that market participants have to face, or 
pricing out the constraints and then calculate out the contribution to these limits from 
market participants [10]. With these two forms of price signals, transmission rights can 
also be defined in the form of explicit or implicit (bundled with energy transactions) 
rights. Through managing the transmission rights, the system operators can exercise 
congestion management and give correct signals for both short-term and long-term 
market efficiency. 
Several forms of transmission rights have been proposed with the emphasis on the 
problem of loop flows. [43] suggested a method to price the congestion. [42] suggests a 
sequence of auctions on transmission rights in the point-to-point form and the flow gate 
form. Different congestion management methodologies are compared in [44]. 
Transmission rights can be classified into point-to-point rights, point-to-hub rights 
(entry/exit rights) and capacity reservation rights (link-based). Hogan [33] suggested the 
first two rights, while Chao and Peck [45] suggested the third form of rights. In this 
section, the two approaches are analysed and compared. 
1.4.1 Hogan's methodology 
Hogan suggested a set of implicit financial transmission rights based on LMP: [33]. 
In this approach, the transmission is defined as injecting power at one node and 
withdrawing it at another node. Such definition simplifies transmission pricing, because 
the complexity caused by loop flows in the network is avoided. 
These financial transmission rights are priced as the marginal price difference 
between two locations. Using the LMP model described in Chapter 1, the differences 
between nodal prices determine the transmission prices: 
(1.21) 
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Where the f.1 z ,i and f.1cz,i are the opportunity costs of congestion in the two 
directions of ith line, and Zi is the power flow on ith line. Instead of f.1
e
' which contains 
generation cost information, an average price at the balancing spot market can be used 
for the calculation because it is more "easily available. 
0 --------------------------'- .............. , 
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Figure 1-3 Point-to-Point Transmission Right 
The definition of point-to-point transmission rights is illustrated in Figure 1-3 [31]. 
The bus where the generator G is attached in Figure 1-3 is also called source bus, and 
the bus where the user D is attached is called the sink bus. 
These rights, due to the specification of source and sink buses, are not flexible for 
market participants. Also the calculation of the transmission right prices is not 
transparent. Such problems limit development of secondary transmission right markets 
[42]. Therefore, Hogan suggested an alternative definition of transmission rights called 
entry/exit rights [12]. By designating a common "hub" in the network, these point-to-
point rights can be easily transformed into entry/exit rights, as shown in Figure 1-4. 
Figure 1-4 
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Entry/Exit Transmission Rights 
In order to provide long-term hedge against price fluctuation and operation 
changing, Hogan also suggested the long-term transmission rights called Transmission 
Congestion Contract (TCC). These set of rights are long-run financially firm 
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transmission rights compatible with short-term locational marginal prices (LMP). The 
right holders are indifferent between using the physical capacity and receiving financial 
compensation through the congestion rents. If the right holder uses the capacity, he does 
not need to pay for this specific transmission. If he cannot use the capacity, he is 
compensated by the system operator with the real-time congestion rent. This is why the 
right is regarded as 'firm'. During real-time dispatch, the system operator makes 
decisions without consideration of the long-term Tees. It is only at the ex-post clearing 
stage that right holders get their financial compensation. Therefore, these Tee rights are 
"firm" only in the sense of financial rights instead of physical capacity withholding. 
A bidding model is suggested to allocate transmission rights. The object function in 
the bidding model is the auction revenue, and the auctioneer is trying to maximise the 
benefit from the auction[33]. This ex-ante auctioning of the transmission rights can give 
non-discriminatory access to those who values the capacity the most. An ex-post 
reconciliation process is also proposed to clears the Tees at the real-time prices. 
For example, in the network shown in Figure 1-3, the system operator runs the year-
ahead auction of the Tees. Assume the generator G obtained the Tee from G to D for 
a specific hour, and this Tee right allows G to transfer 50MW of electricity to D during 
that hour. When this hour comes, the demand D is higher than expected, and G is only 
allowed to transfer 20MW to D because of network capacity limitations. Therefore G is 
entitled to the compensation for 30MW at the congestion rent G~ D. Suppose the nodal 
prices at G and Dare £2/MW and £5/MW respectively, then under Tee, the SO 
compensates G for not being able to transfer the 30MW, and the price is £(5-2)=£3 
(losses neglected in this simple example). Therefore, although G has to provide D with 
50MW, he can buy 30MW at location D to fill the gap, for G was compensated with 
30*3=£90 for not being able to fully use his transmission right. Thus G is indifferent 
between using the transmission capacity or receiving financial compensation. 
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The computation of these set of financial transmission rights is based on an 
optimisation, and it has been proven that with a De approximation calculation, the 
revenue obtained from the Tees is enough to cover the congestion payments, provided 
that the set of Tees are compatible with a feasible power flow scenario [33]. If the AC 
load flow model instead of the De model is used, there may be greater payments than 
that needed for the total congestion payments, so there will be some leftover congestion 
revenue after the clearance of the Tee rights. Hogan also suggested that this 
contribution as well as the contribution from losses, can be used as part of the payments 
of the fixed network costs [33]. 
There is another important point that Hogan pointed out: the "displacement" power 
flows from 'expensive' to 'cheap' locations [33]. The displacement power flows are the 
counter-flows on the congested lines. As they are in the opposite directions of the 
congestions, they will increase the available capacities on the lines. However, right 
holders will get negative congestion rent if they do not exercise the capacity in the real-
time. That means they will have to pay for not being able to transfer their contracted 
energy along the counter-flow direction. This is fair because under this circumstance, 
other transactions have to be curtailed in order to maintain system security. Hogan 
suggested negative prices for these counter flow transmission rights in the auction, so 
that the right holders get payments from the grid for relieving congestions [33]. 
Hogan's approach is based on the centralised calculation and auctioning. It is worth 
noticing that a multilateral coordinated trading proposed by Wu[18] can achieve the 
same dispatch through decentralised trading. 
The design of multilateral coordinated trade is aimed at the separation of security 
and economy. The system operator maintains security by calculating, publishing and 
charging the transmission congestions. The sensitivity factors of congestion costs to a 
transaction are published, so that market participants can discover the profitable 
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transactions which can avoid congestion charges and therefore relieve the congestions. 
If necessary, system operator curtails submitted schedules without consideration of 
economIes. 
If no participant has significant market power, the whole system will reach short-
term economic efficiency under these multilateral trades. Under this mechanism, the 
security of the transmission network is public information which is open to every 
transmission network user, and cost-benefit information do not need to be disclosed to 
the system operator. Wu also suggested how to discover and arrange such trades, and 
how to calculate losses based on a DC flow model. 
1.4.2 Chao-Peck approach 
Chao and Peck suggested a definition of flow-based transmission rights in the form 
of capacity reservations [45]. The definition of transmission capacity right is [45]: 
A transmission capacity right entitles its owner to the right to send a unit of power through a 
specific transmission line in a specific direction and to collect economic rents associated with the 
transmission line according to the trading rule. 
The idea of defining these flow-based transmission rights is to avoid the numerous 
point-to-point rights proposed by Hogan. As there are normally thousands of nodes in a 
power system, their combination of point-to-point rights will require large amount of 
calculation. The Chao-Peck transmission rights are called flow-based or link-based 
transmission rights to differentiate from Hogan's node-based rights. Unlike the point-to-
point financial rights proposed by Hogan, this definition gives capacity reserve priority 
for each transmission line /transformer which is likely to be congested (called flow 
gate), and the capacity-reservation provides both financial hedge and physical 
scheduling priority. However, if the right holders do not schedule their energy 
transmissions in real-time, others can use the capacities free of charge (the use-it-or-
lose-it rule for capacity reservation in electricity markets). 
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In this approach, the tradable transmission capacity right enables the right holder to 
transfer power from one node to another, and the right is composed of a set of power 
flow paths P = ~j 11 s i, j s n} across all the binding power flow constraints .. In such a 
market, the right to transfer IMW from node i to j through the transmission network is 
unbundled into more fundamental capacity rights in different links, defined as a set of 
coefficients {Pi~ 11 s i, j, k s n}, where the value f3i~ represents the quantity of 
transmission capacity rights on line (i,j) that a trader needs to purchase in order to 
transfer one unit of power from bus k to the slack bus s [45]. In addition, this transaction 
will probably create several capacity rights because of the counter-flows it arouses in 
some constrained lines due to loop flows [17]. Therefore, the prices for some 
transmission rights might be negative to reward the relief of congestions. 
The transmission rights can be shown in Figure 1-5. The thick lines in Figure 1-5 
are the so-called "flow gates", i.e. those transmission lines or transformers which are 
likely to get congested. For each flow gate, the transmission rights on both directions 
are defined. 
One unit of energy transfer 0-7 D requires: 
1 3 
Figure 1-5 Flow-based Transmission Rights 
Under this link-based transmission right system, in order to carry out a transaction, 
the trader must purchase the rights in all the associated links for positive and negative 
directional transmissions. 
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Losses can also be attributed to individual trades, and the marginal loss charge was 
suggested [45]. For the energy transfer from a node k to the slack node, Ak is the 
compensation for the physical average network losses incurred by this energy transfer, 
and CfJij is associated to each specific line (i,j), as the difference between the marginal 
and the average transmission losses incurred by the power flow on this line. 
The system operator is in charge of defining all the transmission rights, and also 
organising the initial allocation well in advance of the real time. Once allocated the 
transmission capacity rights can be traded freely in the forward market. This forward 
market can be an exchange using auction or a bilateral market [17]. The right holders try 
to maximise their transmission rents, SUbjecting to each generators' willingness to pay 
for the rents (each generator's marginal benefit must equal to or greater than the sum of 
its marginal costs of generation and transmission rights). It has been proved in [45] that 
the final resulting congestion rents and generator dispatch are the same as those under 
optimal economic dispatch. 
In the forward market, right holders have the schedule priority. After the forward 
market closes and the real-time spot market opens, all the unused transmission rights 
will expire and the system operator decides on dispatch to maximise social welfare 
while maintaining system security. This use-it-or-lose-it rule helps to mitigate market 
power caused by withholding the capacities in real time. However, if a trader gets all the 
transmission rights in a specific flowgate, it has the market power in the forward 
markets since all the trades in the system need him to participate in [46]. 
In this arrangement, only congested links require financial settlements. This is 
different from Point-to-point rights, in which all [he nodal prices are subject to the 
congestions. Therefore, flow gate rights are more transparent in pricing out congestions 
than the point-to-point ones. Besides, it is suitable for transmission load relief (TLR) 
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protocols across multiple control areas by enabling a control area operator to calculate 
its economic impact on other control areas due to loop flows [47]. 
The main disadvantages of this method might be (1) the complexity of the tradable 
transmission rights and (2) the possibility of market power because of the ownership of 
a transmission line. If a trader is looking for the set of rights to support one trade, he 
need buy the set of associated rights on all the congested lines in the network. If a right 
holder owns all the rights on a transmission line, then he possesses a monopoly over all 
bilateral traders in the grid. Ruff [48] criticised this system, especially when under 
multiple contingencies. On the other hand, Oren etc. [47] claimed that direct trading of 
link-based physical transmission rights is needed to relief congestions. Stoft suggested 
an alternative congestion pricing method which can accommodate both Chao-Peck's 
congestion pricing and Hogan's nodal pricing [46]. This is based on the fact that under 
perfect competition, the same optimal quantity and prices will be revealed under both 
models. 
1.5 Gaming and Market Power 
The definition of Gaming, or strategic behaviour, is given as a type of behaviour 
that aims to increase profits without achieving real efficiency gains [49]. 
From the definition we can see, gaming is a kind of behaviour exploring the flaws 
of the market design or structure, trying to obtain more profit without making effort on 
efficiency improvement. Therefore, gaming should be prevented to encourage perfect 
competition and achieve the overall efficiency. 
Gaming can be easily exercised by the market participants with market power. 
Market power in wholesale markets can arise from ownership concentration, scarce 
capacities in the transmission networks, insufficient operational reserves (including 
spinning reserves and supplemental reserves), and poor market designs. Even without 
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dominant market power, a participant can still exercise gaming if there are not enough 
monitoring measures and if the design or structure of the market is flawed. 
Market concentration plays an important role in market power exercise. [50] 
analysed the fact that duopoly exists in British electricity spot market, although the 
phenomenon is not as serious as in theory. However, even if a market participant has 
small market share, he can still exercise market power if he has a dominant position 
(e.g. being located at a particular position, or being able to affect the system security) 
[51]. 
In the transmission product market, according to laskow's study [52], if a portfolio 
Genco in the importing region has market power, or a TransCo in exporting region has 
market power, holding transmission rights can enhance its market power. However, 
such effects depend upon the microstructure of the transmission rights market, i.e, 
transmission right allocation mechanisms and regulatory rules governing the market 
power. [53] pointed out that transmission right holding might result in reduction of 
available transmission capacity. 
Past experiences have revealed that the power system alone cannot eliminate market 
power or market manipulating simply through well-defined market rules. The structures 
of the specific markets (e.g market concentration, network structure) will also lead to 
gaming. The power industry is not expected to self-regulated. Therefore, market 
monitoring is necessary to ensure a fair environment for suppliers and customers. 
1.6 Electricity markets in the world 
Many countries have opened up their electricity markets since 1980s. The common 
characteristics of electricity markets in the world include separation of the generation, 
transmission and distribution services (unbundling), and a system operator (SO) to 
make sure non-discrimination access to the network [15]. 
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The characteristics of a matured deregulated market also include the extensive use 
of hedging contracts and a secondary contract market [15]. The contracts are used to 
protect market participants from the risk of electricity price fluctuations. For example, if 
a generator and a customer agree on a hedging contract of 50MW energy at the price of 
£4/MW, and in the real time, the energy price is £5/MW for this customer, then the 
generator will refund £(5-4)x50 to the customer. Contracts can be traded freely in the 
secondary market. The contracts to hedge transmission of energy in the real-time was 
discussed in 1.3. 
Several energy market structures were compared in [54]. In this section, the market 
structures and transmission prices in different countries will be discussed. 
UK 
Before the deregulation, the UK electricity industry was formally a state-owned 
industry, and the problem of inefficiency has caused a heavy burden on the government. 
Electricity bills were high, mainly because the generator plants were required to 
purchase British coal at high prices [55]. Eventually under Margaret Thatcher's 
privatisation policies, the electricity industry was privatised in 1989 [56]. All non-
nuclear state-owned power generators were privatised into four major generating 
companies-PowerGen and National Power in England and Wales, and ScottishPower 
and Hydro-Electric in Scotland [57]. The former twelve regional distribution boards in 
England & Wales were privatised, and customers were given the freedom to choose 
their suppliers. The National Grid Company (NGC) was created to own and manage the 
network in England & Wales. This electricity reforms in England& Wales are generally 
referred to as UK reforms [58]. 
Initially, the England & Wales market was based on the pool model, where NGC 
forecasts the demands and determines the dispatch of each half-hour using the supplier 
bids [59]. The last accepted bid sets the marginal price paid to all the online generators 
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[60]. Wholesale buyers and sellers must trade through the pool. NGC recovered its cost 
of transmission constraints through a flat uplift charge [ 6]. Besides, pool participants 
have the opportunity to hedge themselves against spot price fluctuations in the 
'contracts for differences' market. According to [61], 80-90% of the generation is 
hedged by the contracts for differences in the day-ahead market. 
This power pool has some design faults [57]. For example, as all the electricity must 
be traded through the pool at the uniform marginal price, portfolio bidders have the 
ability to set the marginal price, and submit very low prices for their base units to ensure 
winning the dispatch and get paid at the uniform marginal price [50]. Generally 
speaking, in a uniform price auction, sellers have common incentives to raise prices 
because they are all paid at the clearing price [9]. 
In 1997, British government decided to use a set of new design rules to replace the 
previous wholesale market design, including the Power Pool. This new market design is 
called the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), and it was implemented in 
March 2001 by Of gem [62]. They consist of three main features [63]: 
• . Forwards and futures markets (i.e. the market where electricity is traded 
well in advance of real-time in the form of contracts) 
• . A Balancing mechanism 
• . An imbalance settlement process 
The NETA are designed to promote greater competition, while maintaining a secure 
and reliable electricity system. The design of NETA is able to host private bilateral 
contracts as well as unilateral supplierlbuyer bids, giving great flexibilities to market 
participants. Market participants can also find their counterparts through the forwards 
and futures markets and the three Power Exchanges (PXs) [64]. In fact, most trading is 
done over the counter (OTC) via direct bilateral trade between participants. 
Figure 1-6 [65] illustrates the markets under NET A arranged by time horizon. 
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Figure 1-6 Traded Markets under NET A 
Note that the gate closure time (Le. the time between schedule notification and real-
time dispatch) in Figure 1-6 has been changed from 3.5 hours to 1 hour. The reduction 
in the gate closure period can reduce the risks of mismatch between notified schedules 
and real-time dispatches. 
NGC, the system operator, runs the balancing market and ensures secure operation 
of the system [63]. Of gem gives the definition of balancing services in NETA [62]: 
Balancing services are technical services purchased by the SO in order to maintain the reliability 
and security of the transmission network, by, for example, supporting system voltage and 
frequency. 
Generators and customers may indicate their willingness to increase/decrease the 
generations/ consumptions in the balancing market. NGC decides whether to accept 
these adjustment bids/offers to keep the system in balance in real time, or purchase 
balancing service from power exchanges or other short-term markets [62]. Under 
NET A, the prices in the balancing mechanism are determined by the accepted bids and 
offers (pay-as-bid). About 2 percent of electricity is bought and sold by NGC for system 
balancing [66]. 
Generators and users are described as 'out-of-balance' if they are not committed to 
their declared energy amounts in the spot market. This will incur additional balancing 
costs because NGC may have to buy or sell electricity at short notice to maintain the 
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system balance. Therefore, out-of-balance charges are applied on these participants 
according to the additional balancing costs [66]. 
The NETA is generally thought as successful. Wholesale prices have fallen 40% 
since 1998 when the NETA reform was proposed, due to several factors including 
increased competition in generation, over capacity and the NETA [66]. 
Asia-Pacific area 
China has launched a long-term restructuring of its electric power sector[ 67]. 
Generators are being largely separated from transmission and distribution services. The 
State Power Corporation (SPC) divested most of its generators and was split into 11 
regional transmission and distribution companies in December 2002. Electricity prices 
will still be regulated, but subject to major changes in tariffing. 
Japan has begun a reform program to improve the efficiency of its electric utility 
sector. The independent power producers (IPPs) were given entry into the wholesale 
market, but they were only allowed to bid outside the service area they are located[15]. 
Large industrial and commercial consumers are allowed by law to choose their 
electricity suppliers, and a power exchange will be established. 
The wholesale New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) is a voluntary pool market 
which can accommodate bilateral transactions as well as spot power exchanges. The 
spot clearing price for each half hour period is obtained from the central dispatch where 
losses, congestions and energy balance are taken into consideration simultaneously, and 
generators and demands at the same place use the same spot price [68]. A financial 
contracts market was created to hedge the spot price volatility, and to give incentives for 
grid expansion investments [69]. Decisions on network expansions and system 
operations are made by the system operator. The characteristics of NZEM is that 
customers pay for the losses at the energy exit point [70]. 
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The National Electricity Market (NEM) consists of a wholesale pool in Australia. 
The system operator, NEMMCo, operates the pool and makes dispatches based on 
generation/demand offerslbids. Large consumers can also trade directly with suppliers 
through bilateral contracts. A geographically uniform spot price is applied in the pool 
[70]. The NEM also provide a financial contracts market to provide hedges against the 
spot market trading risks. The Privatisation of generation and distribution assets has 
attracted investments on the system expansion [67]. 
The U oited States 
The 1992 Energy Policy Act and the 1996 FERC (the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission) orders [71] require non-discriminatory open access to the transmission 
system [72]. All transmission facilities should be accessible to the public, and non-
discriminatory transmission tariffs are required. A same-time information system was 
developed to give all users equal access to transmission information. 
The market design was left to the states. California, the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) are two of the different examples as the former failed in 2000-2001, 
causing the state government to step in and purchase power [73], while the latter was 
regarded successful and was used as the prototype for the nationwide Standard Market 
Design (SMD) [13]. 
California: California has two market places: the day-ahead power exchange (PX), 
and the real-time ancillary market [73]. In the day-ahead market, bids/offers for the next 
day are submitted to the PX. Large electric users could also contract directly with 
generators using bilateral contracts. The PX then matched buyers and sellers according 
to their offerslbids without checking the physical constraints, and the highest accepted 
energy price set the "market-clearing price" in that hour. After the matching, PX as well 
as other scheduling coordinators (SC) sent scheduling information to the Independent 
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System Operator (ISO) for transmission congestion and load balancing management 
[74]. 
In the real-time balancing market, the ISO purchases ancillary services including 
imbalance energy, reserves and congestion relieving, from generators. The prices for 
ancillary services were determined from auctions conducted by the ISO. Generally the 
ISO has a price cap for ancillary services, but if the ISO cannot get enough qualified 
ancillaries at that cap, "out of market" purchases for the ancillaries have to be arranged 
to ensure the system security, and prices for such purchases are not capped [74]. 
The inconsistency on the underlying calculations between the day-ahead market and 
the real-time market was a design flaw. Transmission users discovered the opportunity 
to over schedule in the day-ahead market to cause congestions, and then 'reduce' their 
declared usage to get payments for relieving the artificial congestion in the real-time 
market [71]. 
The use of price cap is only applied within the state area, therefore generators in 
California exercised gaming by exporting their generation to other areas, and then 
import it back as the 'out of market' purchase [71]. 
The California market didn't support forward trading[75], thus the retailers cannot 
hedge themselves against the spot price volatility [76]. To make things worse, the retail 
prices were maintained low by regulations, while the wholesale prices were not 
regulated. [15] 
Locational pricing is not used in either of the two markets. Instead, zonal pricing 
was applied in case of congestion [73]. The state was divided into several large 
transmission zones, and generators and demands at the same place use the same zonal 
price. The market participants can get away with such congestion charges by simply 
converting a spot trade into a bilateral schedule, and this lead to serious gaming 
behaviours [77]. 
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The SO provides "firm transmission rights" (FIRs) , which are financial rights with 
scheduling priority in California. The SO runs a separate congestion market to relieve 
congestions. 
PJM: PJM operates the world's largest competitive wholesale electricity 
market[ll]. It consists of two markets-the day-ahead market and the real-time 
balancing market. The day-ahead prices and the balancing (real-time) prices are all 
based on the concept of LMPs, which provides fundamental consistency between the 
energy price and the price of transmission. 
The day-ahead market is a voluntary bid-based market which can accommodate 
both spot market bidders and self-dispatch participants [13], providing all the 
transmission customers with flexibilities of the bids and thus equal access to the 
transmission network. The hourly day-ahead clearing prices are obtained from a 
security-constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch, given all the bids/offers 
and bilateral transaction schedules submitted into the day-ahead market [11]. Bilateral 
transactions are broken into entry/exit bids for the power flow calculations. 
The balancing market is the real-time energy market where the real-time clearing 
prices are calculated every 5 minutes based on the actual system operations. The 
underlying power flow model and operating constraints are consistent between the day-
ahead market and the real-time market, therefore the resulting LMP price signals are 
also consistent between the two markets[ll]. This fundamental consistency helps to 
promote economic efficiency through price signals and to avoid the gaming 
opportunities [11]. 
The financial settlement consists of two features: all the transactions in the day-
ahead market are settled at the day-ahead prices, including the day-ahead congestion 
charges. On the other hand, all the deviations from day-ahead scheduled quantities are 
settled at the locational real-time prices over the hour [11]. 
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The acronym FIR stands for the "fixed transmission rights" in PJM, but "firm 
transmission rights" in the California market [17]. In PJM, the FIRs are purely financial 
contracts and are applied to provide hedge against transmission price fluctuations and 
operation changes. PJM offers a monthly auction to process the residual rights. The 
FIRs are settled at the day-ahead LMP values [11]. 
South America 
Chile began restructuring its power sector in the early 1980s, and is generally 
regarded as the first nation to reform the wholesale electricity industry structure [58]. 
The law was established to ensure free entry and competition in generation, and a 
pricing scheme based on short-run marginal costs [67]. The wholesale prices are actual 
pool prices, plus a regulated LRMC capacity premium, while the retail prices are 
regulated. Short or long-term contracts co-exist with the contract purchases [70]. 
The deregulation has seen positive results. There is now a competitive power 
generation market. From 1986 to 1998, electricity coverage rates had increased from 
70% to 97% while transmission and distribution (T &D) losses decreased from 24% to 
7% [78]. Privatisation also attracted private investments (especially overseas capitals) 
on the system expansion. 
Argentina government has introduced a privatisation procedure since 1991. Access 
to the grid is open in order to encourage competition. The transmission prices are 
regulated, and the transmission companies are separated from generation service to keep 
their independence and thus ensure the non-discriminatory transmission access. The 
open electricity market has attracted foreign investments, and the domestic demand can 
be generally met by the generation capacity now [78]. T&D losses have been reduced 
from 26% in 1991 to about 7% in 1999. Service reliability has also increased mainly 
because of the technology newly introduced. [67] 
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Europe 
The Electricity Directive 96/92/EC requires deregulation of the electricity industry 
in European Union countries. According to the directive, the electricity markets of all 
current 15 member countries will be fully deregulated by July 2007 [67]. The 
restructure processes vary among the member countries. 
German market was completely liberalized in 1998, and all the end-consumers are 
able to choose their suppliers now. Transmission tariffs were defined by the agreements 
between the producers and industry consumers [15]. Customers, instead of the suppliers, 
bear the use-of-system charges, which depend on the voltage levels and load profile. In 
other words, the use-of-system charge doesn't vary with the choice of suppliers within 
Germany [79]. 
The electricity industry deregulation in Germany is thought to be successful 
because consumers have seen essential price reductions after the market opening. 
In contrast to Germany, the power industry in France is still regulated, and the state-
owned Electricite de France (EDF) dominates the market. Up to the summer 2003, only 
35% of market volume was opened to competition [67]. All the customers with annual 
electricity consumption above 7 GWh are able to choose their suppliers. However, there 
are steps forward towards deregulations. The independent network operator called 
Reseau de Transport d'Electricite (RTE) was established in year 2000 to assure fair 
access to the transmission network. In late November 2001, EDF/RTE was authorised to 
indirectly participate in the Powernext electricity trading market through a joint venture 
with other European TSOs[80]. Powernext auctions standard hourly contracts for 
physical delivery of electricity to business customers. Powernext aims to trade 10% of 
the French market by 2003-2004, and also to act as a price reference for the electricity 
market. Powernext plans to launch French electricity futures trading, which will include 
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hedging products for all power-related risk (like gas, electricity futures contracts, C02, 
weather derivatives) [15]. 
As the grid was originally designed for centrally optimised dispatch, it might not be 
able to accommodate all the commercial transactions at the same time. In many 
occasions the network is utilised near the limits [81], making the system security service 
more difficult. Congestion management is one of the most challenging tasks that system 
operators have to face under the deregulated circumstances. 
1.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the electricity prices are analysed using an OPF model, and different 
types of wholesale electricity markets are outlined and compared. A more complicated 
topic, i.e. the cross-border congestion management, will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The fundamental concepts illustrated in this chapter will help to understand the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 2 Cross-border Congestion Management 
2.1 Introduction 
In continent Europe, efforts are being made to achieve an internal electricity market 
(IEM) for competition and efficiency, and ultimately better service for consumers. 
The Florence Regulatory Forum was founded to develop the framework of IEM 
[82]. Cross-border power trade and congestion management are among the main topics 
of the Florence Forum [15]. According to ETSO (European Transmission System 
Operation), cross-border congestion management is the main factor for the efficient 
performance of the European market [83]. 
The US is also trying to achieve the nationwide electricity market. FERC has issued 
a framework called SMD (standard market design) [84]. The functions of regional 
transmission operator (RTO) are specified, and each region is required to conform to the 
framework with regional flexibility [71]. 
There are five key characteristics of an interconnected electric transmission 
system[85] : 
(1) The thermal limits of transmission lines 
(2) The real-time frequency limits 
(3) The line losses increase with the transferring distance 
(4) The phenomenon of parallel path flows 
(5) The siting of generators or substations should take voltage stability into 
consideration. 
Market participants are not supposed to care about physical power flows, thus good 
design of market rules is necessary to lead to an efficient and secure market. Aside from 
providing operational service to ensure security and reliability within their own control 
areas ("to keep the light on"), The TSOs also provide support to enable the opening of 
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electricity market, including grid access, cross-border tariffication and congestion 
managements (" to make the market happen") [86]. It is a challenging task to maintain 
the system security of the electric system and implement an effective strategy for the 
development of the interconnected system. During the debates on the SMD framework 
the problem of congestion management and transmission pricing have been deemed as 
critically important issues[44]. 
In this chapter, the proposed cross-border congestion management methods in 
Europe and USA are reviewed and compared. 
2.2 ETSO Cross-border Congestion Management Methods 
Review 
, 
The European power networks were initially connected for system reliability 
operation, then power exchange contracts (mostly long-term ones) were developed 
among the member countries for mutual commercial benefits. On November 25,2002, 
European Union energy ministers agreed to fully open the electricity and gas markets by 
July 1, 2007 [78]. Under market structure, the system operators on different control 
areas need to cooperate closely to ensure system security and reliability. Cross-border 
power trading has posed challenges to the existing congestion management methods 
based on the full knowledge of a control area. ETSO has summarised the general 
principles for the cross-border congestion management methods in the European market 
[82], and also gave evaluations on the several proposed mechanisms. The principles 
include[82]: 
• Fair and non-discriminatory 
• Economically efficient 
• Transparent and non-ambiguous 
• Applicable 
• Compatible with different types of trade and contracts 
The cross-border congestion management methods include non-market-based 
methods and market-based methods. Market-based ones are favoured because of the 
correct economic signals they send to market participants [82]. However, non-market-
based methods (e.g. curtailment) are still necessary to maintain real-time system 
security because of the two demand-side flaws described by Stoft [9]: (1) Users can 
consume electricity from the system at real-time without warning (2) Consumers are not 
sensitive to spot prices. 
The main non-market-based methods applied are first-come, first-serve, 
curtailment, etc, among which curtailment is thought to be necessary for maintaining 
system security [87]. This is a pure technical way based on the published NTCs (Net 
Transmission Capacities), and no economic incentive is given in this method. When the 
TSOs give approval to cross-border transactions, they can exercise this method to 
ensure transmission limits are not exceeded. However, there may exist conflicting 
curtailments when multiple congestions co-exist [87]. Moreover, the NTC values are 
not stable and are strongly interdependent in the meshed network [88]. 
In this section, several market-based cross-border congestion management methods 
in Europe will be reviewed and compared. 
2.2.1 Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) calculation 
Congestion management requires the calculation of available capacities on the 
transmission lines/transformers. Tabors suggested a set of cross-border capacity rights 
and calculation of transmission capacities [89]. [90] studied and compared several 
methods of available transmission capacity determination. In this section, the Available 
Transfer Capacity (ATC) calculation in ETSO area is summarised. 
The transmission capacities are defined as NTC (net transfer capacity) and ATC 
(available transfer capacity). Market actors use NTC and ATC to anticipate and plan 
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their cross-border transactions, and TSOs use these two notions to manage these 
transactions [91 ]. The calculation procedure is given in [88]. The definition of NTC is 
given as [91]: 
NTC: the maximum exchange programme between two areas compatible with 
security standards applicable in both areas and taking into account the technical 
uncertainties on future network conditions. NTC=TIC-TRM 
Where TIC stands for the total transfer capacity, and TRM is the transmission 
reliability margin. The "program" value is referred to as a commercial transaction of 
injecting a certain amount of energy at one place and withdrawing it at another place 
[91]. 
The calculation of TIC value has to be based on a specified power system scenario 
(called Base Case). This base case is generally agreed by all the related TSOs. 
TRM is determined by each TSO for local system security. It is related to the real-
time operation. The value of TRM may vary with the seasons or power system 
modification. 
From the calculation of NTC we can see that NTC may also vary when TIC or 
TRM varies. NTC specifies the allowed transaction between two areas, and it is not a 
physical power flow limit. Therefore it is dependent on the choice of the base case and 
the security rules. During different time frames the NTC value will change. In each 
allocation time frame, there exist two notions-AAC (the Already Allocated Capacity) 
and ATC (the Available Transmission Capacity). AAC is the total amount of allocated 
transmission rights (can be capacity or exchange programme), and ATC is the available 
exchange programme after each phase of the allocation procedure. In short, ATC=NTC-
AAC [91]. 
The definitions of transfer capacities can be summarized in Figure 2-1 [91]. From 
the definitions we can see that the NTC and ATC etc are directional and time 
dependent, i.e., they have different values in both directions of transactions, and 
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different values in different time horizons. In a highly meshed network like the 
European network, the NTC and ATC are strongly interdependent, requiring the 
allocation of them to be closely coordinated among the involved TSOs. 
OMW 
Planning 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
ATC+ 
AAC+ 
AAC- • T 
ATC - • • • 
t 
i Direction A~B 
I Direction 
• B~A 
Figure 2-1 Transfer Capacity Definitions 
2.2.2 Cross-border transmission pricing 
Cross-border transmission pricing should be market-based, have cost-reflective 
transmission pricing mechanisms, and should be simple, transparent and efficient[92]. 
ETSO summarised the components of transmission costs[37]: 
• Asset costs, including capital investment costs and the costs of operating and 
maintaining these transmission assets; 
• System operation costs, including balancing service costs, congestion resolving 
costs and transmission losses recovery. 
Due to the diversity of the member countries, uniform competition rules might lead 
to structural distortions [93]. Unlike "normal" bottlenecks within the control area of one 
TSO, interconnectors (equipments used to link electricity systems) involve two TSOs. 
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For cross-border transactions, as each involved TSO will ask for a transmission fee, the 
sum will be generally much greater than the local transmission fee. This "pancaking" 
may prohibit cross-border tradings. The problem of cross border tariffs seems the major 
obstacle for exchanges within the internal electricity market. 
In order to provide correct signals the transmission line capacities are available on 
the UCTE website. The investment incentives are specially important as congestion on 
the European interconnections exists and is expected to increase in the future [94]. 
2.2.3 Cross-border explicit auction of interconnection capacity 
The explicit auction can be shown in Figure 2-2 [95]: 
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Figure 2-2 Cross-border Explicit Auctioning 
In the explicit auctioning, the energy and transmission rights are unbundled. The 
available transfer capacity (TAB in Figure 2-2) is explicitly auctioned, and network 
users bid for the interconnection capacity [95]. The bids are ranked by the bidding 
prices from high to low, until the capacity is fully allocated. Normally buyers are 
charged at the marginal price instead of their bid price, because of the "no congestion no 
rent" principle for congestion charges-if the interconnection is not congested, network 
users should be free to use its capacity [96]. The marginal price is set by the lowest 
accepted bid (pAB in Figure 2-2). The shadow area in Figure 2-2 shows the revenue 
collected from the explicit auction. 
The advantage of separating the energy and transportation is that clear signals can 
be sent to market participants[64]. The disadvantage of it comes from the inefficiency 
due to the added operation complexity [95]. 
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The co-ordinated explicit auctioning can only be organised by the TSOs who have 
the full information of their networks. Also it requires close coordination between TSOs 
and the PXs [97]. TSOs are expected to perform the system technical operation 
function, while power exchanges are in charge of market financial functions. Both of 
them are relevant to congestion management, and close coordination between them is 
essential for market efficiency and security [97]. 
The European electricity markets have great diversities from country to country. 
Therefore, different auction mechanisms are used in different TSO areas, bringing about 
difficulties in achieving overall market efficiency. If the auctions are not effectively 
synchronised, the results from separate regions might not converge. Besides, bad 
coordination among different auction systems might lead to distorted price signals [98]. 
If a strong interrelationship exists between several interconnections, there may exist 
disputes about the allocable capacities [99]. 
For these reasons, the auctioning must be co-ordinated and be able to accommodate 
both bilateral cross-border trades and power exchanges. The transmission capacity 
reservation must be coordinated among all the interconnected parties to allocate the 
scarce transmission capacities of several interdependent transmission lines between 
different zones. The transmission rights to be auctioned can be area-to-area transfer 
rights, or inject/withdraw power between one control area and a specified global hub 
(the entry/exit right, also called zone-to-hub rights). These two options are compatible 
with each other, provided that the netting rules are generally agreed (netting means that 
the transmission rights opposite to the direction of congested power flows are 
supported, so that the overall power flow can be reduced). The entry/exit model is 
flexible for the users, and the area-to-area rights are more stable and confidential. Thus 
both options are acceptable [100]. 
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If there is no congestion, all the bids are secured, and market participants can use 
the capacities free of congestion charge. Otherwise marginal congestion charge applies 
to them. The capacity allocation procedure contains 3 steps: publishing-bidding-
clearing. The TSOs publish all the security limits and PTDFs. The coordinated auctions 
are organised simultaneously by the TSOs. The clearing process is to maximise the 
overall value for the market, in other words, to minimise the transmission cost [85]. 
It is preferred that several auctions on transmission rights should be organised 
during a period (the multiple-round auction), as it is transparent in revealing the 
economic values of each round [85]. 
The co-operation between TSOs for congestion management is expected 
throughout all the key stages from the calculating (i.e. a commonly agreed power flow 
scenario as the base case load flow, and network security analysis) to the financial 
clearing and settlement of costs. 
In order to ensure the firmness of transactions for the purpose of netting, a bottom 
price is set for the auction, so that the participants are really serious on their bids and 
attach enough values to their exchanges. Unused rights are lost during real-time (use-it-
or-Iose-it). At the forward right markets, reselling them is possible, but must be made 
through the auction office to prevent market power incurred by capacity withholding. 
The revenue collected from the auctions should be firstly used for the re-dispatch costs. 
The remaining amounts are firstly divided between the TSOs. However, as TSOs are 
monopoly and are not allowed to retain these revenues, they finally pass the revenue to 
their control areas. 
Long-term contracts will reduce the available transmission capacity and thus 
reduce the transmission market liquidity. However, the inherent access rights should be 
retained for consistency, and they should also be subject to the 'use it or lose it' rule. In 
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the future, new long-term contract holders have to face the risk of uncertainty in 
transmission capacities. Hedging contracts can be used to cover this risk. 
On the TSO's side, if the allocated transmission products are not available due to 
the real-time uncertainties (e.g. unexpected system disturbance, outage of the network 
components), the TSOs should arrange to buy-back the rights. However, TSOs should 
not be discouraged from making full use of the transmission capacities under this 
arrangement. Therefore, in the early allocation rounds the SO will retain some 
capacities at hand to leave flexibility for the power flow uncertainties. Besides, different 
levels of firmness on the TSOs are allowed (e.g. cost socialising, cost recovery by a 
portion of capacity auction revenues, or even no guarantee). 
Coordinated auction has been used in the Netherlands-Belgium-Germany 
interfaces. The loop flows are taken into consideration in the form of interactions 
between minimal contract paths. However, as this approach is still based on the virtual 
contract paths instead of physical paths, system security problems and inaccurate price 
signals might occur if it is extended to the highly meshed UCTE network [101]. With 
good design, it is economically efficient and is compatible with existing long-term 
contracts and can be used for both bilateral trading and spot market exchanges. 
2.2.4 Cross-border implicit auctioning! market splitting 
In the cross-border implicit auctioning, the energy is bundled with transmission 
rights. Figure 2-3 shows how the cross-border implicit auction works [102]: 
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In the implicit auction, an organised power exchange (PXs) is required in the 
importing area (area B in Figure 2-3) [95]. Due to the limited capacity in the 
interconnection from area A to B (TAB in Figure 2-3), the spot price in area B is higher 
than in area A. Thus generators at are~ A bid for exporting their outputs to area B. This 
bid is on energy product instead of transmission capacity. Bids in area A are ranked 
from lower prices to higher prices, and the lower price bids are accepted until the 
transmission capacity reaches its limit TAB. The highest accepted bid sets the price 
pAB for energy exported from area A to B. The shadow area in Figure 2-3 shows the 
revenue from implicit bidding, which is (PB - P AB )x TAB . 
Market splitting can be seen as a special form of implicit auctioning [102]. The 
standard market splitting can be shown in Figure 2-4 [102]. In this method, several 
geographical bid areas are defined by the permanently congested bottlenecks. The total 
demand and generation in the whole market area determine a system price without 
consideration of the congestions, then the TSOs compute power flows and identify the 
constrained lines. If congestion occurs, the bid areas on both sides of the bottlenecks 
apply different spot prices and form different price areas. The PXs in both areas are 
required to organise the energy dispatch, calculating the spot prices in their areas. In 
Figure 2-4, the PA and PB are calculated system prices without consideration of the 
energy exchanges between area A and B, while the P A' and PB' are the actual clearing 
prices taking the energy exchange into consideration. The revenue from market splitting 
is shown as the shadow area, which equals to (PB' - PA' ) x TAB . 
This method gives clear signals to all the participants. It is used in the NordPool 
area [103], where the radial network structure facilitates application of it. The radial 
network structure can ensure that there are no power flow interactions among 
interconnections across different areas. In a highly meshed network like UCTE network, 
the standard market splitting is not applicable because of the interdependence among the 
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available transmission capacities among several neighbouring control areas. However, 
ETSO has proved that the generalised market splitting method taking PTDFs into 
consideration can be developed into a general implicit auctioning[102]. In other words, 
the standard market splitting is a special case of implicit auctioning[104]. 
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Figure 2-4 Market Splitting 
The coordinated implicit auctioning should also be able to accommodate bilateral 
transactions across the borders, so that different market mechanisms in different control 
areas can be compatible. The power exchanges coordinated closely to allocate the 
available capacities because of their strong interdependency. Location-to-Iocation bids 
are split into entry/exit bids and submitted separately to each bidding area PX. The 
capacity sharing between bilateral trade and implicit auction can be done through 
several options [85]: 
• A priori allocation of transmission capacity-not market-based 
• PX buy transmission capacity for use in the spot market-no level play field for 
PX and its customers 
• Bids for transmission capacity compete with bids/offers for energy in spot 
markets-this is fair but requires harmonising of transmission tariffs among the 
markets. 
In implicit auctioning/market splitting, the possible congestion revenue is retained 
by the TSOs as the profit made from its "brokering" activities. If the profits are not 
limited, TSOs will have perverse incentives to cause congestions. However, part of the 
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revenues can act as incentives for the TSO to make more capacities available, and to 
make precise forecasts of available capacity, etc [95]. In Nordic system, a regulatory 
cap is put on the income of TSO, so the revenue cannot become a real profit[105] 
.However, as the re-dispatch incurs costs, TSOs tend to "move" internal congestions to 
the tie-lines as they would otherwise have to pay for the congestion solution in their 
own control areas [106]. 
2.2.5 Counter trade/re-dispatch and cross-border co-ordinated re-dispatch 
(CCR) 
Counter-trading is another market-based congestion management method. It can be 
illustrated in Figure 2-5 [107]. 
The interconnection A ~ B is available to all the market participants wishing to use 
it. However, if the total requested capacity (RC) exceeds the available capacity (AC) 
and A ~ B will get congested, the TSO is liable to conduct counter-flow transmissions 
at the direction B~ A. The counter flow contracts are available in the markets. The cost 
of these counter flow energy transactions, however, will be recovered through charges 
to those who requests A ~ B capacities [95]. 
Capacity Request 
~ .. ------------~-  
Counter Flow 
Figure 2-5 Counter Trading 
The measures to relieve congestions based on changes of the generation or load 
pattern are called re-dispatch [100]. In the re-dispatch, a TSO modifies its generation 
schedule in its control area in case of congestions. Ideally the costs of dispatching the 
expensive generators in demand areas should be recovered through the congestion 
charges to those market participants responsible for the congestion. However in reality, 
the costs are generally charged to all the network users. For example in Nordic system. 
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costs are paid firstly by the TSOs at the real-time, then the TSO recover the payment 
through the transmission tariff to all the customers. 
The co-ordinated re-dispatching (CCR) involves several TSOs to jointly act on the 
generators on their respective areas. 
Re-dispatch and CCR are similar to counter trading, and the difference lie on two 
points: (1) there is a dedicated market for the re-dispatch instead of the ordinary energy 
markets, or generators signs long-term reserve-type contracts with their TSOs for re-
dispatching. (2) The cost of re-dispatch is socialised to all the network users. 
Compared with counter trading, re-dispatch and CCR are more flexible because of 
the dedicated market or long-term re-dispatch contracts, and they can respond to 
congestions in short notice [108]. 
Re-dispatch is specially suitable for real-time operation and require a completely 
independent TSO[108]. It can facilitate optimal use of the network and doesn't require 
all the control areas have the same market mechanisms, thus it should be widely used 
[109]. In reality, this method is currently only used as a preventive tool, mainly because 
the cost allocation requires extensive power flow calculations and is a topic of 
disagreement between the neighbouring TSOs [99]. 
2.2.6 Conclusions 
The above cross-border congestion management methods were evaluated by ETSO 
[83]. Here the brief summaries of these methods are given: 
• Explicit auctioning: this method is efficient in allocating the scarce capacities to 
those who value them the most, and is transparent in providing correct 
information. However, it cannot ensure the full utilisation of the available 
transmission capacities if the auctioning is not organised well. Close 
coordination among the TSOs is essential in the calculation, simultaneous 
auctioning and clearing of the capacity rights [108]. Market power may be 
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• 
• 
aroused because of the location of those generators at the congested areas. 
Therefore, market power monitoring must be applied. Besides, TSOs must be 
unbundled from energy supplying so that non-discriminatory access can be 
available [110]. In the mid-term, explicit auctioning is a more acceptable option 
for capacity allocation. 
Implicit auctioning and market splitting can send economic signals to all the 
market participants through the different prices on the different ends of 
interconnections. The technical difficulty is the definition of bid zones, because 
there must not be any permanent congestions within the zones, and the 
congestions occurring at the borders of the zones should have fixed positions. 
Cross-border implicit auctioning also requires close coordination among the PXs 
in a meshed network. 
Counter-trading or re-dispatch are suitable in meshed networks with relatively 
minor congestion problems, and are also appropriate for capacity allocation. 
This method doesn't require the interconnected systems have the same market 
structures. However, it requires a high degree of independence of the TSO to 
prevent discriminatory arrangements, and also require the congestion costs and 
extensive power flow calculation. In the very short term and real-time, counter-
trading or re-dispatch are the most appropriate methods for congestion 
management. Means should be taken to prevent the market power issues posed 
by the few number of flexible generators [108]. 
• Curtailment is still necessary in the current situation to ensure system security. 
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2.3 Implementation of cross-border congestion methods in 
the European Market 
European electricity markets have great diversity [110]. The market is fully opened 
in Germany, while the wholesale market is still absent in Belgium or France. In the 
Netherlands, the system operator also owns the largest generation company [79]. 
Congestion management might be the most important issue in European market 
[111]. Of the 24 interconnectors in the European Union, 12 are permanently or 
frequently congested, 5 are occasionally congested [99]. 
It is stressed that the cross-border congestion management should ensure [147]: 
• Non-discriminatory access to interconnections--effective competition 
• TSOs must ensure the maximum capacity usage while maintaining the network 
security based on a set of common criteria 
• Different congestion management mechanisms in member TSOs should be 
coordinated and harmonised 
• Transparent and simple 
• The pricing and revenue distribution must give the correct short and long-term 
signals--economic efficiency 
2.3.1 The situation of congestion management in the European electricity 
system 
The electricity markets in Europe are at different stages of liberalisation, and a 
variety of transmission charging and congestion management methods are being 
used[l12]. Therefore, the cross-border congestion management should take into 
consideration different market structures and th~ level of information exchanges. Due to 
the highly meshed network structure, the cross-border transmission charges should be 
harmonised, and the European Commission has proposed the inter TSO compensations 
for cross-border power exchanges[l13]. The compensation payments should be based 
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on the long-run average incremental costs (LRAIC). Although market based congestion 
management will give locational signals, at present the short term congestion charges 
are usually not included in a harmonised tariff structure [37]. 
TSOs are expected to develop efficient congestion management procedures, giving 
appropriate economic signals, both in short-term operation action, and in long-term 
investment decisions. However, if a uniform cost-reflecting transmission tariff 
throughout UCTE network is to be applied, the technical cost calculation requires a 
European hub, and unified access rules as well congestion management mechanisms. 
Considering the diversity in the current European markets, it seems unrealistic for a 
single European transmission market in one step [37]. Therefore, the European 
Commission proposed the focus on "regional integration" for a transaction period and 
then convergence to an integrated pan-Europe market [101]. The co-ordination among 
TSOs are strongly required to ensure proper and quick convergence of regional 
electricity markets into a single European market (the IBM) [114]. 
The Day Ahead Congestion Forecast (DACF) has been adopted by members and 
was put in operation in 2002. This daily load-flow forecast enables the members to react 
in time for security of supply and a better use of system capacities. The temporary cross 
border trade (CBT) mechanism has also been proposed [115], because of the dispute of 
member TSOs on the CBT and the fact that no agreements have been achieved by all. 
The final internal energy market package has been adopted by the European Council 
and the European Parliament[114]. 
Currently, non-market-based capacity allocation mechanisms like first-come, first-
served or pro rata rationing are still working on the major borders. They are regarded to 
be unfair and inefficient, but TSOs can easily manage the borders without violating the 
security limits. 
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Non-market-based congestion management methods are regarded as lacking 
incentives and inefficient, therefore this category was strongly objected to by all the 
member countries. It has been agreed that the congestion problems should be solved in a 
non-discriminatory way and be based on market-based mechanisms[112]. The 
allocation of capacity should be market-based and designed to give correct locational 
signals to both producers and customers[116]. 
As for the capacity allocation, use-it-or-Iose-it principle is widely applied in 
member countries. Netting of opposite flows should be applied to an appropriate extent. 
In order to suppress market power, there should be a limit of how much capacity a 
market player can obtain. But currently no such limit is applied in the member 
countries. 
Re-dispatching is applied very little on the interconnectors, mostly just as a 
preventive measure. The dispute is over who should pay for the re-dispatch cost. ETSO 
gives the definition of counter measures for congestion management including topology 
actions and re-dispatch [100], and also proposed several options to allocate the cost of 
re-dispatch[ 109]. 
2.3.2 Example: The Nordic Market and Market Splitting 
The Nordic market as the world's first international spot market, is generally 
thought to be successful [103]. The NordPool is able to accommodate both bilateral 
trading and unilateral bids. In fact most of the energy trading are through bilateral 
transactions. Several markets are organised including forward market; one-day-ahead 
market and the last minute regulation market. Here only the congestion management 
mechanism is discussed. The congestion management is divided into different time 
stages as the following [117]: 
1. Auctions, maintenance planning, etc 
2. Capacity calculation by TSOs (36 hours ahead) 
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3. Bidding procedure 
4. Price and capacity announced by Nordpool-price is fixed for each hour 
5. Day of dispatch 
6. Real-time (counter-trading in case of congesiton) 
The stages (1) to (4) is planning stage, while from (5) to (6) is "in operation" stage 
[118]. 
In stage 2, the capacity calculation is based on the internal dispatches at both ends 
of the border. If the bids from stage 3 will cause congestions, the bidding areas are 
separated into different price areas. A system price will be used for all the bidding areas 
if no congestion occurs. Due to the calculation procedure in stage 2, those internal 
congestions can be "shifted" to the border by the TSO by setting a favourable internal 
dispatch. The main incentive is that TSOs can retain the congestion revenue from 
market-splitting while having to pay the congestion cost for internal re-dispatch. 
Market-splitting requires at least one spot market operated in each bidding area and 
no permanent constraints within bidding areas. Every bid and offer is related to one and 
only one bidding area, and the entire system covered by bidding areas. ETSO has 
summarised a number of obstacles to market splitting including [104]: 
• In this highly meshed network neither the locations nor the capacities of 
congestions are permanent 
• The NTCs (Net Transmission Capacities) are interdependent. 
• Cross-border bilateral transactions should also be accommodated. 
• The electricity markets of member countries need harmonising. 
ETSO has proposed a new methodology that can extend market splitting to meshed 
networks through PTDFs and BCs (bottleneck capacities). The extended method is 
explicit auctioning, also called "partial market splitting" in comparison with the 
'"standard market splitting" where the limits between the bidding areas are transfer 
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capacities calculated ex-ante [102]. Therefore market-splitting can be treated as an 
implicit auctioning method. The following discussion will generally use "implicit 
auctioning" instead of "market splitting". 
2.4 Congestion Management in the US 
In the US, the standard market design (SMD) is issued by PERC [71] as guide to 
healthier electricity markets and cross-border transactions. Unlike the situation in the 
Europe where the member countries discuss on the future market rules for the internal 
electricity market, and the market designs and structures vary from country to country, 
the US PERC have the right to regulate markets in all the states and thus can give a 
uniform framework while allowing for regional flexibilities. 
The proposal of SMD is aimed at solving the inconsistent rules across the US. 
SMD is expected to provide more standarisation in regional markets, better market 
pricing and better market safeguards. The harmonised markets can facilitate tradings 
throughout the US, and lower transaction costs. However, regional flexibility is also 
retained. 
The SMD is trying to avoid the market design flaws revealed from past lessons. 
During 2000-2001, the California market failed as the prices rose to a very high level, 
and the crisis spread throughout the West. Investment in infrastructure was extremely 
difficult. In 2002, Enron failed because of its market manipulation, and brought about 
the doubt on market credibility. Under this circumstance, SMD is proposed in the hope 
of bringing about efficient competitions and providing stable supply to the customers. 
In this section, the past lessons of market designs are studied first, so that the 
motivations of SMD are easily understood. Then several features of SMD are presented. 
2.4.1 Past Lessons 
At present, there are five 1SOs (independent system operator) operating the 
California, PJM, New York, New England and ERCOT markets [71]. The California 
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market was known for the market failure in 2000-2001. It is worth taking a look at the 
design flaws of these present markets and compare them with the SMD. 
• The day-ahead market and real-time market 
The day-ahead market in California was not security-constrained. That is, the day-
ahead schedules were not checked for their physical feasibility due to the constraints. In 
the real time market, California ISO had to pay the congestion fee to market participants 
for relieving congestion. Therefore, a market participant can declare a day-ahead 
schedule to cause congestion at no cost, and then get paid for cancelling this schedule at 
the real-time market. 
• Seams problems 
Seams are generally referred to as differences in market rules between regions, 
pancaking tariffs for transferring of energy from one region to another (i.e. the trader 
has to pay a transmission fee to each involved system operator), having to obtain 
congestion rights in several regions for a transaction, etc. [119]. The slight differences 
between markets can cause serious seams problems. The MW -laundering problem 
happened in California and the trading barriers in the Northeast are two examples. 
A price cap is exerted in California market to prevent extremely high energy prices. 
However, this price worked only on the generations within this market. As a result, the 
local generators export electricity to outside markets and then import back the energy to 
evade the price cap. This is caused by the inconsistent rules in neighbouring markets. 
The MW-Iaundering was stopped after west-wide mitigation measures were applied. 
The rules on ramping rate are different in PJM neighbouring markets. PJM allows 
ramping to accur every fifteen minutes, while in New York and New England, the 
ramping is limited to occur on the hour, but not within the hour. As a consequence, the 
seller in PJM is allowed by PJM rules to ramp up generation within the hour, while it is 
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rejected by the buyer in New York because it cannot ramp down the local generation at 
that moment. 
• Zonal pricing 
FERC believes that the zonal congestion system is not as effective as nodal 
congestion charges under LMP. The zonal method has been used in California, P JM 
(changed to nodal pricing later), Texas (ERCOT) and New England, to avoid the price 
complexity. However, market participants are more likely to game congestion in a zonal 
system than in a nodal pricing system [77], because it is not easy to identify who caused 
the congestion. For example, a customer wants to shop around for 50MW for a specific 
peak hour. He knows that if he bids into the PX he might have to pay for the zonal 
congestion fee because of the high demand in this zone. Instead, this customer managed 
to find a generator within its zone who promises to supply the 50MW. This bilateral 
transaction will not be charged for causing the inter-zonal congestion. In contrast, this 
customer always pays for congestion if it occurs, despite whether he choose to purchase 
energy from the pool or from a generator. 
Another technical problem with zonal pricing is that it difficult to determine in 
advance the zones as power flows have been constantly changing. 
2.4.2 Standard Market Design (SMD) 
SMD is mainly based on the successful PJM market. It specifies the same set of 
rules for all the network users [120], and the system is expected to take effect by 
September 30, 2004. The components of a standard transmission market are shown in 
Figure 2-6 [2]. 
The major elements of SMD include the Independent Transmission Provider (ITP) 
to prevent discrimination by transmission owners, tradable Congestion Revenue Rights 
(CRRs) for flexible transmission service, transmission pricing refonns, open and 
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transparent energy spot markets, congestion management based on LMPs, market power 
mitigation and monitoring, and resource adequacy requirement. 
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Figure 2-6 Components of Standard Transmission Market 
Here several features of SMD are discussed: 
• The day-ahead market and real-time market 
The day-ahead market and real-time market under SMD are based on a nodal 
congestion management mechanism and LMP. The day-ahead schedules must be 
checked for transmission constraints in the day-ahead market, and be physically feasible 
and financially binding. The introduction of the day-ahead market (some ISOs do not 
organise the day-ahead market currently) is to hedge the real-time risks. 
Compared with California arrangements, the congestion will be reflected in the 
nodal energy prices under SMD, and there is no need for the separate congestion 
relieving payment. 
• Seams problems 
The SMD rules will solve many seams problems caused by inconsistent market 
rules in different markets. For example, a uniform bid price cap of $1000/MWh is used 
to avoid the MW-laundering. 
• Nodal pricing and LMP 
60 
Under SMD, the nodal pricing is used based on LMPs. Nodal pricing can send 
clear signals about congestion, and as the congestion rent is incorporated in the nodal 
prices, there is no need for a separate congestion charge. Short-term efficiency can be 
easily achieved under nodal pricing than under zonal pricing. The LMP is expected to 
signal the congestion for customers and encourage transmission and generation 
enhancement in the long term. 
• Characteristics and functions of the RTO 
The minimum characteristics and functions have been specified in the SMD 
platform [121]. Firstly, the RTO should be independent of any market participants to 
facilitate the non-discriminatory service to all. Secondly, the expansion of the RTO is 
encouraged to improve reliability and effectiveness, thus there are requirement on the 
scope and geographic structures. Finally, the RTO should have operational authority 
over all the transmission owners and should ensure the short-term reliability. The 
functions of a RTO include at least the following: (1) tariff administration and design 
(2) congestion management (3) solve the problems incurred by the parallel flows (4) 
provide ancillary services. (5) publish information on the OASIS (6) market monitoring 
(7) planning and expansion (8) interregional coordination. 
• System balancing service 
Stoft [9]has pointed out that customers normally lack price responsiveness. 
Besides, the system operational reserves are free-rider problem and participants have no 
incentives to undertake this task. Resource adequacy requirement should be met for 
system reliability. Under SMD, RTOs will carry out annual regional demand forecast 
and they are expected to make such forecast well in advance (e.g. 3 years). A minimum 
reserve margin of 12% is required. Penalties may be applied for overly purchase of 
power from spot market during shortage conditions. 
• Energy uplift and congestion uplift 
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For the reason of energy reserves and transmission congestion, energy uplift and 
congestion uplift are applied to compensate the cost for out-of-merit generation. Energy 
uplift is used to cover part of start-up and no-load costs if the nodal price is not high 
enough, and it is shared by all the customers. Congestion uplift is used for transmission 
system security when congestion occurs, but the cost is solely borne by the congested 
region under SMD. 
• Congestion management systems and transmission rights 
The SMD specifies a congestion management system based on LMP and financial 
transmission rights. Market manipulation will be monitored and mitigated. The 
allocation of congestion revenue rights (CRRs) to market participants will be divided 
into two stages. 
In stage I (the initial allocation), the allocation is based on the historical use, 
because the existing long-tenn contractual transmission rights have been given the 
priority to use the transmission network. Thus they can be converted into financial 
rights in this stage. These CRRs are financial hedging instrument that entitles the holder 
to compensation for costs associated with transmission congestion between two 
locations. 
In stage II (within four years of adoption of SMD), the allocation should be based 
through auctioning. Therefore, any entity interested can acquire eRR through the 
auction. At this stage, the access charge will be on the load-serving entities (LSE). This 
seems like a price lift to the LSEs, but in fact, due to the decrease of generation costs as 
the result of this cost shifting, the LSEs don't necessary have to face a cost increase. 
Any transitional power flows will not be charged for the access fee. For inter-regional 
transactions, the LSEs on the net importing area will pay a load ratio share of the 
embedded costs to the exporting RTO. This can avoid "pancaking" of cross-border 
transactions across RTO borders. 
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Participant funding will be raised for system expansion. 
• Transparency 
The Internet based OASIS (open access same time information system) can publish 
the available transmission capacities. 
• Market monitoring and manipulation mitigation . 
Market manipulation monitoring and mitigation methods are to be used under the 
supervision of FERC Office of Market Oversight and Investigation (OMOI) and the 
regional independent market monitoring unit (MMU). Each of the regional markets will 
be evaluated, and load pockets as well as areas need reinforcements will be identified. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, several cross-border congestion management methods are 
reviewed, and examples are given. In one word, market-based congestion management 
methods are favoured over non market-based ones although the latter are still necessary 
in the current situation to ensure system security. System operators are expected to 
coordinate with one another to achieve high efficiency while maintaining system 
security. 
In the next chapter, a new congestion management method is proposed to 
address the merchandise surplus problem. It is illustrated in a single control area, but the 
methodology can be extended into multiple control areas. 
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Chapter 3 A Congestion Management Method Using 
Merchandise Surplus Allocation 
3.1 Introduction 
An ideal congestion management mechanism should give market participants the 
correct incentives to relieve congestions. That is to say, under the mechanism, those 
participants who caused congestions should not be encouraged, while those who helped 
to relieve congestions should get their rewards. 
Some congestion management methods have been proposed and used in different 
markets, as discussed in 1.4. Due to the effect of loop flows, any transaction between 
two participants might in theory affect the transactions of all the other parties, and this 
poses challenges for specifying payment for any individual transmission network user. 
Hogan suggested a set of point-to-point financial contracts to hedge against price 
fluctuations and system uncertainties [12]. These contracts are based on LMPs [33], and 
the contract holders (right holders) are indifferent between using the capacity covered 
by their rights and receiving financial compensations. Chao and Peck [45] suggested a 
definition of flow-based transmission rights in the form of capacity reservations. It can 
be easily proved that point-to-point and flow-based rights are mathematically equivalent 
[46]. 
A new method of congestion management is proposed in this chapter. This method 
gives a set of rules to refund Merchandise Surplus (MS) back to the market participants. 
Firstly, the sources of MS are analysed, then the MS refund method is given, which is 
designed to punish those users who cause congestions, and to protect other users from 
being affected by the congestions. In this way, users who have caused congestion will 
pay full marginal congestion costs, while other users are compensated. This MS 
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allocation can be viewed as a kind of financial transmission right allocation. Under this 
mechanism, users have a form of financial rights-and-obligations to use the network. 
In section 3.1, the philosophy of this method is illustrated on a simple 2-bus 
system, and the MS refund method is described. In section 3.2, a 5-node example is 
given to illustrate the method. Section 3.3 gives comments and conclusions. 
3.2 Philosophy 
The users who caused congestion should pay the marginal congestion costs, 
whereas other users should not be affected by the congestion on their financial 
payments. That's the philosophy of the congestion management method proposed in 
this chapter. In order to have a better understanding of the MS refund method, the 
simple 2-bus lossless system shown in Figure 3-1 is presented: 
1----~L2l 
G2 
Gl Busl Bus2 I-------.;~ L22 
Figure 3-1 A 2-bus System 
The transmission capacity of the line between bus 1 and bus 2 is 100MW. For the 
reason of simplicity, assume that both generators have constant marginal generation 
costs and sufficient capacities. G 1 is the cheaper generator whose marginal cost is 
£5/MWh, and G2 is the expensive one whose marginal cost is £10/MWh. 
3.2.1 Case 1: No congestion occurs 
L21 and L22 are both 50MW. Both of them buy energy from the cheaper generator 
G1, so G1 produces 100MW. The transmission line is at the onset of congestion. G2 is 
not running at this time. 
The prices at node 1 and node 2 are p1=p2= £5/ MWh for this hour, and the 
payments from L21 and L22 are both p2*50=£250. Gl gets its payment at pI *100= 
£500. There is no merchandise surplus after the payments are made. 
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3.2.2 Case 2: Congestion occurs 
Now L22 increases from 50MW to 100MW, and L22 remains unchanged. Due to 
the limited transmission capacity, G1 is only allowed to generate up to 100MW, 
although it has enough generation capacity. In order to meet the demands, the local 
expensive generator G2 is running to produce 50MW of energy. 
The price curve against total load at bus 2 is the thick line in Figure 3-2. 
Price (£/MWh) 
1~~~r=J1 ~ :L2(MW) 
5 I --------: =L21+L22 
Figure 3-2 
100 150 
I 
I 
Price curve against demand 
Under the locational pricing, prices at node 1 and 2 are: PI =£5/MWh and 
P2 =£10/MWh. Thus the payments from loads at bus 2 are P2 * L2I =£500 and P2 * 
L22 = £1000 respectively. The two generators get their payments at PI . GI =£500 and 
System operator (SO) collects payments from loads and pays back to generators 
(under pool model), or charge traders for the transmission service at the nodal price 
difference (under bilateral model). Under either model the merchandise surplus is £500, 
which comes from the price difference between bus 1 and bus 2, i.e. the marginal 
congestion rent. The MS is shown as the shadow area in Figure 3-2. 
3.2.3 How to allocate the MS 
SO is not allowed to keep the MS, otherwise the MS will give incentives to the SO 
to create congestions. Comparing the nodal prices in case 1 and case 2, it is easily seen 
that the nodal price increase in bus 2 was caused solely by L22. However, L21 also had 
to pay the congestion price, although it didn't increase its usage of the line. In case 2, 
L21 paid extra fee (500-250=£250) compared with its payment in case 1. 
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Ideally, L22 should pay for the congestion costs, while L21 takes no responsibility 
for the congestion since its demand didn't change. Therefore, its extra payment should 
be refunded from MS. 
During the off-peak hour (case 1), both L21 and L22 pay at the price of £5/MWh 
for their demands, and the transmission network can accommodate the demands without 
difficulties. It can be understood that the network has been structured in this way that 
L21 and L22 are entitled to use their share of the transmission capacity [122]. When 
congestion occurs, they should still have the right to use their allocated transmission 
capacity at no additional cost, and the increase in nodal price due to congestion should 
not affect their allocated share. Based on this principle, the MS allocation methodology 
is given as following: 
The MS of £500 is refunded to transactions G 1 ~ L21 and G 1 ~ L22 according to 
their usage before congestion occurred (both are 50MW in this example). As L22 has 
increased from 50MW to 100MW, the new transaction G2~L22 should pay the 
expensive local generation fee at £10/MWh for the 50MW increment, for this 
transaction has caused congestion. After the MS refund, L21 is not affected by the 
congestion, while L22 pays at marginal congestion price for its increase in usage. 
This MS refund method as described above was designed to discourage the 
increase in demands at peak time. However, it also reduces the pressure on users who 
maintain their demands at peak time, so that they don't have to reduce their peak time 
usage. Therefore, the MS refund method also reduces the incentive for efficiency. 
3.2.4 How to allocate transmission rights 
In order to use the MS allocation method, each trader's 'proper' usage of lines 
should be defined, so that no congestion fees will be charged for that set of usage. All 
the 'proper' usages add up to 100% use of the congested lines. Therefore, users can be 
seen as being given a form of transmission rights through the share calculation and MS 
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refund. These financial transmission rights can ensure that traders' 'proper' transactions 
are not affected even when congestions occur. As there are only a few lines likely to be 
congested in a system, the calculation of refund will not be too complicated. 
The suggested method of allocating 'proper' usage must be compatible with pre-
existing point-to-point or flow-based transmission rights. It can be viewed as a method 
of allocating left-over transmission capacity, i,e, the difference between the full capacity 
of congested links and the capacity already allocated to different forms of transmission 
rights. If the left-over capacity is not allocated, the MS associated with it is shared by all 
the system users [85]. Under the proposal in this chapter, the left-over MS is associated 
with the transactions affected by constraints, and is therefore more cost-reflective. 
Sharing MS among all the users will lead to a form of windfall benefit, as the user who 
did not contribute to congestion fees still benefit from the reallocation of use-of-system 
charges. 
The leftover transmission capacity can be allocated in a number of ways: 
(1) Scale up all the existing transmission rights on the line proportionally to get 
100% total usage. For example, if L21 has the right of 10MW, and L22 has 15MW, 
their allocated MS refund rights are 40MW and 60MW respectively. This is simple but 
not necessarily fair. 
(2) Allocate the leftover capacity proportionally to those whose actual usage is 
above their transmission rights. Again suppose the capacity rights for L21 and L22 are 
10MW and 15MW, so the leftover capacity is 100-10-15=75 MW. When the real-time 
actual usage of both users exceed their Tee rights, for example, real-time loads L21 
and L22 are 60MW and 60MW respectively, the two loads exceed their rights by (60-
10)=50MW and (60-15)=45MW respectively. Therefore, the allocation of left-over 
capacity is 75*50/(50+45)=39.5MW to L21 and 75*45/(50+45)=35.5MW to L22. The 
total right for L21 is then 10+39.5=49.5MW, and the right for L22 is 
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15+35.5=50.5MW. After MS refund, congestion payments from the loads for this hour 
are: 
L21: £10*60-49.5*(£10-£5)=£352.5 
L22: £10*100-(15+47.2)*(£10-£5)=£347.5 
and their total payment can exactly cover the total generation charge, which is 
100*£5+20*£10=£700. 
The downside of this approach is that the allocations of left-over rights are repeated 
for every trading period, resulting in some sharing of congestion costs. Assume e.g. that 
L22 is increasing in the next trading period from 60MW to 1 OOMW. The full marginal 
cost of this increase is (100-60)*£10=£400. The allocation of left-over rights will give 
75*(60-10)/[(60-10)+(100-60)]=27.8MW to L21 and 75*(100-15)/[(60-10)+(100-
60)]=47.2MW to L22. Note that the allocation to L21 has decreased while the allocation 
to L22 has increased. Hence the payments by the loads are: 
L21: £10*60-(10+27.8)*(£10-£5)=£411.1 
L22: £10* 100-(15+47.2)*(£10-£5)=£688.9 
Compared with previous right allocation, the increase in fees for L22 is £688.9-
£347.5=£341.4, which is less than the full marginal cost of £400. Clearly some of the 
cost of increased demand from L22 has been placed on L21 which did not increase its 
demand. In this method, when actual usages cause congestion on this line, the exceeding 
users are able to take advantage of such right allocation method, paying only a portion 
of the increased cost. 
(3) Cut-off point of filling up the line limit. This method suggests using historical 
operation data to allocate the leftover transmission capacity. Those who actually filled 
up the capacity gap get the rights. For example, again suppose the existing rights for 
L21 and L22 are 10MW and 15MW. Assume that the loads change from time to time, 
and the full transmission capacity of the line (100MW) is reached at a cut-off point 
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when L21=5MW and L22=70MW, and there is an additional new load L23=25MW , 
which had not acquired any transmission rights. The entitled usages of the transmission 
capacity are OMW for L21 (because its 10MW existing right is enough to cover its 
usage), 75*(70-15)/[(70-15)+(25-0)]= 51.6MW for L22, and 75*(25-0)/[(70-15)+(25-
0)]=23.4 MW for L23. These allocations are fixed during the following peak-load 
period when the line is congested. 
The advantage of this approach is that it encourages the off-peak utilisation, 
because the additional transmission right allocation is effectively based on off-peak 
usage. The disadvantage is that it may cause a rush to get in just at the instant when the 
line is getting congested. This problem can be solved by calculating the share based on 
the average use of the congested line over the whole off-peak period, rather than just at 
the instant when the line gets congested. 
Option 3 has one additional advantage over option 2 in that the right allocations are 
fixed. This means any increase in the load incurs a full marginal increase in its 
congestion costs. Under option 2, the allocations are re-calculated for every trading 
period, which means that sharing of costs is the potential consequence. 
3.2.5 Extended to the Meshed Network 
The simple example shown above is a radial network where loop flows don't exist. 
In reality, meshed networks are more general, and the proposed MS refund method 
should be extended in the presence of loop flows. Additionally, there might be more 
than one line congested in the network. 
For each congested line, a set of usages are allocated to all the traders. Besides the 
existing long-term transmission right, each user gets the additional allocation of left-
over rights using one of the options 1-3 introduced above. These are line-by-line rights 
(like Chao-Peck's rights), but Hogan's point-to-point rights can also be accommodated 
70 
through the application of PTDFs, which can reflect the power flow influence on a line 
from a point-to-point trade. The allocation of MS follows the steps given below: 
1. Allocate usages (%) of the first congested line to all the bilateral traders. 
2. Repeat the same procedure for all the congested lines and thus get different sets 
of usages for different congested lines. 
3. When real-time congestion occurs, collect the MS. 
4. Decompose the MS into individual congestion rents in relation with individual 
congested lines. Refund each rent to all the loads based on their allocated usage of that 
line. 
3.3 Illustrative Example 
In this section, a 5-node network shown in Figure 3-3 is used to illustrate our MS 
allocation method. For the reason of simplicity we use DC power flow and consider 
only real power. Losses are ignored here. 
Bus 1 
Bus 2 
Bus 5 
Figure 3-3 A 5-node system 
Use p to denote the price, and q to denote the quantity, then the generation bid 
where the output levels of generators are given in MW. 
3.3.1 Case One-only one line (5th line) is congested 
The line flow limit of 5th line (bus2~ bus 5) is 80MW. Assume the rights are 
allocated by scaling up all the long-term base load transactions (option 1). The 
transactions and their impact on 5th and 6th line (bus 3~ bus 4) are given in Table 3-1: 
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Trades PTDFs on line 5 PTDFs on line 6 
(MW) (PTDFsil (PTDF6i) 
Bus1~3: 40 0.11429 -0.34286 
Bus 2~3: 60 0.14286 -0.42857 
Bus2~5: 40 0.72698 0.15238 
Bus 4~5: 60 0.54603 -0.30476 
Table 3-1 Base load transactions and their PTDFs 
Allocate shares of usage on the congested line 
The long-term base load transactions shown in the first column of Table 3-1 are 
used to determine the allocated usage of the congested line (line 5) from each trader. 
The total of their allocated usages should be 100% in order to make full use of 
transmission network while keeping it not congested. 
For the 5th line, the overall influence of these long-term transactions is: Power 
Flow= L (Transaction i x PTDFs,i ) = 74.98<80MW. Thus, under the long-term 
i 
contracts, the 5th line is not fully used. Under the option 1, all the bilateral transaction 
quantities can be increased proportionally until the 100% overall usage is reached. This 
is called 'scaling up' of the trades. The scaling-up factor is 80/74.98=1.07, and the 
allocated usages of line 5 from the traders are 42.68MW, 64.01MW, 42.68MW, and 
64.01MW. 
Real-time dispatch and locational prices 
Given real-time loads L3=110MW and L5=130 MW the Optimal Power Flows 
(OPF) and nodal prices can be obtained. The nodal prices are shown in Table 3-2: 
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 
Prices 30.60 22.64 62.47 73.10 225.36 
Table 3-2 Real-time Nodal Prices (£/MW) 
According to economics theory, bilateral or multilateral trades can achieve the 
same re~ults as in the central dispatch, if each participant can compete freely [18]. Here 
the bilateral model is chosen, and several short-run bilateral transactions are compatible 
with the optimal dispatch. The SO calculate out their transmission payments based on 
the differences in nodal prices. The results are given in Table 3-3. 
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Trader 1~3 
Trade (MW) 22.98 
Pay (£) 732.46 
Table 3-3 
(3) MS refund 
2~3 2~5 4~5 4~3 
30.65 22.98 107.02 56.37 
1220.8 4659.2 16294 
-598.8 
Short-term Transactions and Transmission Payments 
System operator refunds the collected MS back to each trader according to its 
allocated usage, as shown in Table 3-4. 
Note that the fifth trader from generator 4 to load 3 has got no refund, because 
there was no allocated transmission right for this trade. 
Parties 1~3 2~3 2~5 4~5 4~3 
Trade (MW) 42.68 64.01 42.68 64.01 0 
Refund (£) 1360 2550 8651 9747 0 
Table 3-4 Allocated Rights and MS Refunds 
3.3.2 Case Two-two lines (5th and 6th lines) are congested under the real 
time dispatch 
In the above system, the flow limit of the 6th line is reduced from 120MW to 
95MW, this line will also become congested under the same real-time loads. The long-
term transactions and their PTDFs stay unchanged as given in Table 1. 
When both the 5th and the 6th lines are congested, the kth nodal price Pk consists 
of congestion rents for both 5th line and 6th line. The price difference between load k 
and generator j is sum of congestion rents to be paid by k and j for both 5th and 6th 
lines. Therefore the overall MS collected by SO is the total shadow congestion 
payments for 5th and 6th line. 
In this example, the MS consists of two components, and they need to be dealt with 
separately, for they are caused by different transmission constraints. A trade has 
different impacts on these two line flows, and thus it should get different refunds for the 
two different congestions. Therefore, for each congested line, a set of allocated off-peak 
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usage rights, and therefore a set of refunds of the related MS congestion component, are 
gIven. 
Allocated shares of usage on the congested lines 
The power flows on line 5 and line 6 caused by long-term transactions are 
I (Transaction i x PTDFs,i) and I (Transactioni x PTDF6,i) respectively. The values 
i i 
are 74.98<80MW for the 5th line and 1-51.621<95MW for the 6th line. Here the negative 
sign in the power flow of 6th line indicates the opposite direction of actual power flow 
from that specified. 
As discussed before, the transactions need to be scaled up to get the 100% usage. 
The scaling-up factors for these two lines are 80/74.98 and 95/51.62 respectively. Thus 
the allocated usages from all the transactions on line 5 and line 6 can be obtained, and 
they are shown in Table 3-5. 
Trader 173 273 275 475 473 
Use line 5 (MW) 42.68 64.01 42.68 64.01 0 
Use line 6 (MW) 73.62 110.42 73.62 110.42 0 
Table 3-5 Allocated Bilateral Trades for Use of the 5th and 6th lines 
Real-time dispatch and locational pricing 
Given real-time loads L3=110MW and L5=130MW, the real-time nodal prices can 
be calculated out, and the values are given in as shown in Table 3-6. 
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 
Nodal price 62.62 15.09 252.76 71.07 652.75 
Price by 5th congestion 62.62 36.09 168.73 204.11 711.10 
Price by 6th congestion 62.62 41.61 146.64 -70.41 4.27 
Table 3-6 Real-time Prices in Case 2 
The pnce difference between two nodes consists of two components, I.e. 
congestion rents for 5th and 6th lines. In order to refund the overall MS back to 
participants, the MS as well as spot prices should be decomposed according to the two 
congestions, i.e. two sets of nodal prices can be calculated out, each of which is caused 
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by one of the two congestions. Also MS is total of shadow congestion fees for 5th and 
6th line. 
If all participants can compete freely, their self-dispatch results will match the 
optimal central dispatch [18]. For example, short-term transactions can be: 
1 ~3: 55MW, 2~3: 26.67MW, 2~5: OMW, 4~5: 130MW, 4~3: 28.33MW. 
3.3.3 MS refund 
SO refunds each congestion component in the MS back to all the traders according 
to their allocated share of use. 
1~3 2~3 2~5 4~5 4~3 
5th rent 4528.5 8491 28806 32454 0 
6th rent 6185.3 11597 -2749 8247 0 
Table 3-7 MS Refund under Bilateral Model 
3.4 Conclusions 
When congestion occurs, all the nodal prices will change due to loop flows. The 
power system operation changes frequently, causing significant fluctuations in spot 
prices. Long-run transmission rights are proposed to provide hedge against transmission 
price fluctuations. In the method proposed here, the SO uses the MS to refund 
transmission right holders, paying back the congestion rents for the allocated amount of 
capacities. 
In this chapter, a new method of congestion management by using MS refund is 
suggested. Mter the MS refund, those users who were responsible for congestions pay 
at the expensive marginal generation prices, while the financial settlements of other 
users are not affected. The philosophy of this method is illustrated on a simple 2-bus 
system, and then the MS refund method is illustrated on a 5-node example. 
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Chapter 4 Decomposed Optimal Power Flow Problem 
4.1 Introduction 
In an interconnected transmission network, several control areas are synchronously 
connected through the cross-border tie lines, and each TSO is in charge of its own 
control area. Under power market environments, the information exchange between the 
neighbouring control areas is limited so that no commercially sensitive parameters are 
disclosed. This poses challenges to the system wide optimal power flow (OPF) 
calculation, which is essential in the study of cross-border congestion management 
methods. In order to achieve optimal use of the transmission network, the TSOs have to 
exchange some of their information while still keeping commercially sensitive 
information confidential. 
The OPF calculation often involves thousands of buses and is a large-scale 
nonlinear optimisation problem. Efforts have been made to decompose the global OPF 
problem into several local OPF problems corresponding to the control areas, and to 
minimise the volume of information exchange among the control areas. The control 
areas need to coordinate with one another to start running the decomposed OPF at 
certain times (for example everyone hour), and exchange the intermediate results, then 
update the OPF calculation. This loop is repeated until the results converge. Several 
methods have been proposed to address the interconnected or coupled OPF problem. 
[123] gave an approach to decompose the linear reactive power optimisation by way of 
grouping the buses into local and frontier ones. [124] presented an augmented 
Lagrangian relaxation method to decompose the generation scheduling problem. [125] 
suggested a decomposed OPF method based on Lagrangian relaxation, [126] applied an 
augmented Lagrangian relaxation method on the decomposed OPF calculation, and 
[127] suggested a decomposed OPF method based on interior point method. In general, 
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the key to a successful decomposed OPF method depends on the modelling of coupling 
constraints among areas, the choice of optimisation algorithms, and computational 
issues like the choice of starting point and upgrade of parameters. 
In this chapter, a system variable decomposition method is proposed, and an 
improved interior point method (IPM) to solve OPF problems is applied based on the 
decomposition and sparse matrix technologies. 
Firstly, the Lagrangian relaxation method, the penalty function method and the 
barrier function method are analysed and compared. Then a barrier function method 
which complements the existing barrier function method is proposed to address the 
decomposed OPF problem. 
For the reason of simplicity only real power flow calculations are studied here. One 
can extend this decoupled DC OPF model to a full AC OPF model, but whether the DC 
or AC model is applied doesn't affect the basic description of the several approaches in 
this chapter. The following three decomposition methods are illustrated using the DC 
model for easy understanding. In the DC power flow model we assume, transmission 
lines are pure reactance, and all the bus voltages are assumed as l.Op.u. 
4.2 Lagrangian relaxation method 
[125] suggested a co-ordinated OPF across multiple regions. The Lagrangian 
relaxation technique is used to remove those constraints involving variables in 
neighbour areas. After the Lagrangian relaxation, the OPF problem is decomposed into 
a family of regional OPF problems. Given an initial point, TSOs can upgrade the 
quantities and prices (Lagrange multipliers) based on the local information and the 
information exchanged with neighbouring areas. Both the primal variables (quantities) 
and the dual variables (prices) are needed in the iteration. Once the primal-dual solution 
converges the quantities and prices are obtained. 
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[129] suggested a unit commitment problem solution using Lagrangian relaxation. 
The step size is set to increase when the violation is large and decrease when the 
violation is small. 
[130] gives another Lagrange relaxation approach in DC OPF. In this method, the 
regional OPF problem cares only for the regional cost function instead of the global cost 
function, and the constraints involving the neighbouring areas (including the power 
balance constraints and the transmission limit constraints) are converted to regional 
separable constraints through the introduction of power flows on the tie-lines. The 
iteration procedure starts from a flat base case where the power flows on the tie-lines as 
well as the export prices are zero, or the operational values in the real world can serve as 
the initial point to avoid solution oscillation. The stopping criteria is that the tie-line 
flows obtained from the OPF results of the two neighbouring areas agree with each 
other. 
The Lagrangian relaxation here can be seen as 'pricing out' the cost of congestions 
caused by external systems for the local OPF calculations. This cost is determined by 
estimated shadow congestion prices and publicised PTDF factors. In this section, this 
approach is investigated, and an example is given in chapter 5 to compare this method 
with others. 
The introduction of dual variables into regional decomposition is very attractive 
because it makes full use of market information and makes the dualised optimisation 
problem separable. However, this method is not perfect, as we will see in the following 
sections. 
4.2.1 Lagrangian relaxation and regional decomposition 
For a TSO, the quantity and price bids of all the participants in other areas are not 
available. The solution proposed by Cadwalader and Hogan is to dualise the related 
constraints and make a Taylor expansion on the benefit functions of other areas. The 
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dualised Lagrangian function then becomes separable by regions. If the starting point is 
well chosen and if the Lagrangian function is convex, this method can give the correct 
optimum without having to expose the bids to other TSOs. 
A 
Let max L B i (y i) be the total benefit of the entire network, where the Y i is the 
i=l 
vector of bus net extraction in area i. It is sum of all the regional welfare functions, each 
is a quadratic function. 
L{y 1 , ••• y n ) = 0 is the power balance constraint (losses, generations and demands 
can be modelled as the yi). This is an equality constraint. 
Ki (y l'······Y n) S 0 is the group of transmission constraints in ith sub-network. All 
the possible limitations on the power flows, including thermal, voltage, stability, or 
other limits, can be modelled. The net injections are explicit variables (decision 
variables) in this function, while others (such as voltage magnitudes and angles) are 
treated as intermediate variables (dependent variables). It consists of both inequality 
constraints and equality constraints. 
Suppose Aj is the Lagrange multiplier of jth transmission constraint (that is, the 
shadow price of congestion on jth line), then A j is either zero when the constraint is not 
binding or positive when the constraint is binding. According to Lagrangian relaxation, 
this constraint can be removed by appending an item - AjK j (y 1 ,.· ..•• Y n) to the objective 
function. Therefore, all the transmission constraints in the areas other than ith area can 
be removed by way of Lagrangian relaxation. The resulting dual function provides an 
upper bound of the primal function, and at the optimal point the primal and dual 
function have the same value. Thus, once the dual problem is solved, the primal OPF 
problem is solved as well, and the 'duality gap' (the difference between the dual 
function value and the primal function value) shall be reduced to zero when the 
optimum is obtained. 
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In Cadwalader's paper, the dualised function still contains the unknown bids of 
other areas. The author then linearised the dual function at the starting point to obtain 
the first rank Taylor expansion. By upgrading the point towards the optimum, the dual 
function is solved. If the starting point is judiciously chosen, and if the dual function is 
convex, this decomposed approach can give a good result. 
4.2.2 Sub-gradient approach for the dualised optimisation problem 
For the loads in region i, the shadow congestion price induced by the constraints in 
regionj can be expressed as: OJ ji = J.../\lK ji • (4.1) 
It reflects the externality of congestion in transmission systems. The Lagrange 
multiplier A reflects the contribution of relaxing this constraint in the total social 
welfare. 
This price information is the key to regional decomposition because of the close 
connection between a binding constraint and its shadow price [12]. 
The sensitivity factor VKji reflects the influence of nodal injection in area i on the 
constraint in area j. These group of sensitivity factors are normally called PTDFs 
(Power Transmission Distribution Factors), and they can be published among all the 
TSOs. 
In the sub-gradient methods, one can adjust the Lagrange multipliers and primal 
variables interactively. The model can be described as below: 
Given the estimation of Lagrange multiplier Ilk and starting point xk ' the optimal 
solution of the Lagrangian function at Ilk can be expressed as Axk+1' consequently the 
Lagrange multiplier can be upgraded as: 
Ilk +1 = max (0, Ilk + a kC(xk+1 )) (4.2) 
Where the C(Xk +1 ) is the constraint function, and a k is the step size. The step size 
k 
should satisfy that when k ~ 0, a k ~ 0 and L a; ~ 00 • 
;=1 
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The choice of a k is important for the performance of all sub-gradient methods, and 
thus has attracted many researchers [129]. 
If proper initial point and step size are chosen, the dualised model can be expected 
to converge at the optimal point [131], where the value of Lagrangian function equals to 
the value of original objective function. However, there are some limitations in using 
sub-gradient methods, and they will be discussed in the next section. 
4.2.3 Computational problems 
In order to use sub-gradient methods in solving the Lagrangian relaxed problem, 
the dualised objective function must be convex and differentiable with the exception of 
some points where the gradient method is modified. In paper [47], the author indicated 
that the proposed method can only work when the dualised constraints are all expressed 
as linear functions. If, for example, sinusoid functions of power angles are involved, the 
Lagrangian function is not convex and thus the sub-gradient method will fail. The same 
limitation applies to the method proposed in [130]. 
Another problem is incurred by the Taylor approximation. According to the author, 
it may result in large and even unbounded adjustments. In order to address this problem 
a set of sensitivity factors were introduced to reflect the influence of prices on net 
extractions. In this way, the OPF problem has a sequential quadratic programming 
(SQP) model because second order Taylor expansion is applied. This approach can help 
to speed up the convergence provided proper estimation on the parameters was made. 
Even if the initial starting points and sensitivity factors are carefully chosen, there still 
exists the problem of how to choose the step size. In fact, sub-gradient methods have 
been proved slow in convergence performance, especially zig-zagging near the 
optimum [132], or even don't converge. 
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4.2.4 Application issues 
According to this method, the estimated shadow congestion prices should be 
exchanged during every iteration, and all the related PTDF factors need to be published. 
As PTDFs change with the operation, they need to be updated from time to time. 
Therefore large amount of information from other sub-systems are needed during each 
iteration. 
It has been noticed that the Lagrange Relaxation (LR) methods are likely to have 
solution oscillation difficulties because of the piece-wise linearisation approach. If the 
linearised sub-problem is sensitive to the multipliers, the solution will oscillate between 
minimum and maximum values with a slight change in the Lagrange multipliers [133]. 
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4.3 Augmented Lagrangian function method 
[134] gives another decomposed approach. According to this method, PTDF 
factors are not needed for the system decomposition. Alternatively, a pair of 'dummy' 
buses are added in the middle of each tie line. Penalty functions are then used to bring 
the 'dummy' variables together. Considering the fact that the number of tie lines in an 
interconnected network should be far less than the number of PTDF factors, and that the 
latter will change with the operation and thus require frequent update, Kim and 
Baldick's approach is more attractive in terms of information exchange. Moreover, the 
objective functions are always convex and are irrelevant to how the transmission 
constraint is modelled (Le. the popular power angle and network admittance model can 
be used). The augmented Lagrangian methods were used in unit commitment problems 
[133] and generation scheduling problems [124], and were then introduced in OPF 
through the design of system decomposition. 
In this section, the system decomposition method suggested by Kim and Baldick is 
illustrated, because this innovative idea was then widely used in many papers [135], 
[136] and [137], etc. and finally led to the interior point method (IPM) tested in this 
thesis. The problem with penalty function methods is also discussed later in this section. 
4.3.1 System decomposition 
In an interconnected transmission network, every TSO can only have the full 
information (including network structure and buyer/user commitments) within its 
control area. However, due to the interactions among the sub-systems in the 
interconnected network, optimal usage of the entire system cannot be achieved only by 
local information. The information about other areas has to be obtained from other 
TSOs through information exchange. 
In the market environment, the bids and bilateral transactions from market 
participants are confidential information and shouldn't be exposed to other parties 
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except the TSO in this area. Therefore, the central OPF model as described above 
cannot be used straightaway. Besides, such a large-scale OPF problem cannot be solved 
easily and quickly. 
Instead of calculating the large-scale central dispatch problem, we can solve the 
OPF through decomposition approaches. By studying the OPF problem, we can see that 
the variables in different areas are coupled only through the 'frontier buses' which are at 
the ends of tie lines. In fact, if we can split up the interconnected network by the cross-
border tie lines, the variables can be grouped into local variables and border variables. 
Take this two-system network shown in Figure 4-1 as an example: 
Figure 4-1 System Decomposition 
The xA and xB are local variables while Y A and Y B are border variables. 
If appropriate coupling variables are chosen, the two sub-systems as shown in 
Figure 4-1 can make their local OPF and then be jointed together to achieve the global 
OPF solution in the interconnected system. Interactive upgrading of the border variables 
and local variables during the calculation is needed. 
XA 
Dummy bus pair 
XB yB, XB 
Figure 4-2 System Decomposition by Dummy Buses 
Because of the introduction of the 'dummy' buses and the 'dummy' variables 
related with them, this approach is called augmented Lagrangian relaxation method. The 
decision variables now consist of both the original decision variables and the new 
'dummy'variables. 
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Baldick and Kim [126] give a decomposition scheme based on 'dummy bus' 
couples at middle of the tie-lines, as shown in Figure 4-2. Each dummy bus couple must 
have identical real and reactive power flow variables, voltage magnitudes and the power 
angles. Each sub-system consists of the' core' variables (local variables) and the 
'border' variables (dummy variables) [134]. 
Conejo suggested another approach using two pairs of 'dummy' buses to separate 
each tie-line into 3 segments [135]. This is similar to Kim's method. Wang [136] 
proposes another decomposition scheme as shown in Figure 4-3. In this method, the 
dummy buses are removed, but all the coupling variables, including real and reactive 
power flow variables, voltage magnitudes and the power angles, are retained. In other 
words, the buses at both ends of the tie lines can play the same role as the' dummy 
buses' in [126]. 
----7--® .. ... , " : A' B 
\ I 
" , 
'----'" 
XA XB yB, XB 
Figure 4-3 System Decomposition 
Compared with Baldick's method, this method doesn't require modification of the 
line reactance values. However, for each tie line, the two terminal buses have to be both 
compared separately, while in Baldick's method, only the dummy bus pair in the middle 
of the tie line are to be compared. 
The choice of coupling variables determines the information needs to be exchanged 
among the TSOs. Both the quantities and the prices of the coupling variables must be 
exchanged to get a global OPF solution [138]. 
4.3.2 Penalty function and regional decomposition 
Generally, the decomposed OPF problem for a two-area system can be described 
as: 
(4.3) 
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a and b are the areas. 
Subject to: all the local constraints discussed before, plus the coupling constraint: 
(4.4) 
The coupling constraint can be dualised to obtain the Lagrangian function: 
where the (J is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for coupling constraints. 
Instead of using general sub-gradient algorithms, which typically exhibit poor 
performance, this Lagrangian relaxed OPF can also be replaced with a sequence of 
quadratic sub-problems and subsequently updating of the Lagrange multiplier vector (J 
[139]: 
(Xk+l Xk+l yk+l yk+l) = arg min a , b ' a , b 
(4.6) 
C a (x:+1 )+ C b (X:+1 )+lJ T.t (y:+1 _ y:+l ) + ~ I~ ;+1 _ y: II' 
+ ~ Ily:+l - y; II' +c{y:+l - y :+1 r (y: - y:) 
where the ~ and c are scalar penalty constants, a is the step size during iterations, and IHI 
is the inner-product norm. 
Noticing the fact that the series of sub-problems are regional decomposable, one 
can easily deduce the optimisation problems for both areas: 
(4.8) 
( k+l k+I) • {c ( k+l) Tk k+I fJ II hI k 112 (k+I )T (k k )~ X b , Y b = arg mIn b x b - (J Y b +"2 Y b - Y b - C Y b Y a - Y b J (4.9) 
By introducing the second order penalty functions of the border variables into the 
sub-problem at each iteration, the convergence of the overall algorithm is improved. 
This method can also be understood in another way: the penalty terms (the second 
through fourth terms in equation (4.8) and equation (4.9) are the cost function of the 
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dummy variables. It is dependent on the values of the Lagrange multipliers and the 
previous values of the iterations. 
The choice of the penalty parameters is an important issue in penalty function 
methods. If the value is too large, ill-conditioning of the Hessian is likely to happen, 
causing difficulties for those optimisation algorithms relying on Hessian or a suitable 
approximation. On the other hand, if the penalty parameters are too small, the solution 
approach may not be able to converge to a solution that satisfies the coupling constraints 
[131]. In the next section, the choice of parameters in the series of sub-problems 
described in equation (4.6) will be discussed. 
4.3.3 The choice of parameters 
Two major approaches in decomposed OPF have been discussed in section 4.1 and 
4.2 respectively, both of which are sub-gradient methods. Compared with the 
Lagrangian relaxation method, the Augmented Lagrangian function method in this 
section has better convergence performance. Moreover, it can be applied in various 
power flow models, because the only constraint to be relaxed is a linear equality 
constraint. 
However, it is well known that in all kinds of sub-gradient methods, it is important 
to choose the starting point of the Lagrange multipliers appropriately, otherwise the 
convergence performance can be far worse [129]. 
The dummy variables are also bound in this way that at each iteration, there is no 
large deviation from the old values obtained from the other side of the tie line. 
The choice of penalty factors is problem-dependent. [134] gives an empirical 
equation to help reliable convergence in the OPF problem, that is: 
1 
a=-{J=c 
2 
(4.10) 
For most sub-gradient problems, the step size a has to be chosen at each iteration. 
In this constrained optimisation problem, a must be chosen to reduce the duality gap, 
87 
while at the same time reduce the constraint violations. [129] studied extensively the 
adjustment of the step size in sub-gradient methods. 
4.3.4 Application issues 
The method discussed in this section requires less information exchange than that 
in section 4.1. The initial values of the Lagrange multipliers 0" are obtained through co-
ordination among the TSOs. The quantity information of the dummy variables is also 
exchanged to act as the parameters of the local sub-problems. Once these local sub-
problems are solved by the local TSOs in parallel, 0" can be updated according to 
equation (4.7). The tuning of stepsize also requires co-ordination, normally exchange of 
certain aggregated information. Except some special cases, the step size needs to be 
adjusted at each iteration [131]. The step size can be made proportional to the estimated 
value of the duality gap [129], the duality gap and the maximum variable increments in 
all the areas should be published during each iteration. 
The augmented Lagrange method uses quadratic penalty terms to avoid the solution 
oscillation difficulties. The non-separable quadratic penalty terms are then replaced by 
the linear approximation around the solution obtained from the previous iteration. The 
quadratic terms of decision variables are added to the cost function as auxiliary 
functions to improve the convergence performance. In the test example presented in 
Chapter 5, the augmented Lagrangian relaxation method demonstrated good 
convergence. 
4.4 A New System Decomposition Method 
There have been a variety of methods of how to choose the coupling variables. One 
may think of using the real and reactive power flows on the tie lines as the coupling 
variables, which is similar to the 'market splitting' approach where the power flows on 
the tie lines are determined jointly by the neighbouring TSOs to make full use of the tie 
lines. However, a closer look at the market splitting [117] suggests that this method 
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only works well in radial network structures [82]. This assumption doesn't hold in a 
meshed network, where transition power flows travel among the sub-systems through 
the tie lines. 
In fact, in the decomposed OPF calculation, the network structure is broken down 
into individual control areas, and the local TSO cannot calculate out the interactions 
with other control areas without the knowledge of network parameters in other control 
areas. The power flows, voltage magnitudes and power angles of the frontier buses are 
determined jointly by both of the neighbouring sub-systems, and an injection at the 
frontier bus or the power flow on the tie line alone cannot represent the influence from 
the external system. This will lead to the divergence of the decomposed OPF, or 
converging to a feasible but not optimal result. 
In the following analysis, the power flow equations are re-written to give a better 
understanding of the choice of coupling variables. 
The OPF problem in the interconnected system can be written as: 
A 
min LCa (4.11) 
a=l 
subject to the equality and inequality constraints: 
g(p,Q, V,b) = 0 (4.12) 
h(P,Q, V,b)s 0 (4.13) 
for Va = 1,. .. ,A as the area number. 
The C is the total social cost in a control area, and it is normally expressed in a 
a 
quadratic form. 
The set of equations (4.12) are power balance constraints and they form the normal 
power flow calculation model. 
The inequality constraints equation (4.13) are operating limits, including generation 
limits, system reserve limits, transmission limits, voltage limits, stability limits, etc. 
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This large-scale central dispatch problem can be decomposed into several problems 
within individual control areas, so that the TSOs can solve these sub-problems in 
parallel. In this thesis, the interconnected system is split up by the cross-border tie lines, 
and the variables within each control area are grouped into local variables and border 
variables. For example, let's study the following two-system network in Figure 4-4: 
XA,YA 
XA,YA 
Figure 4-4 
XB,YB 
;'---7-E) , " 
, ' 
, A I B , , 
" ; 
.... _--, 
XB,YB 
System Topology Decomposition 
The x A and xB are local variables while Y A and Y B are border variables. Figure 
4-4 gives the topology decomposition, and the next step is to choose the appropriate 
electrical variables to represent the neighbouring control areas. 
Noticing the fact that equation (4.12) is the standard power flow equation, the 
system coupling variables can be easily chosen. Consider the standard power flow 
problem: 
P - p - p = U "U . "G .. cos c5 .. + B " sin c5 .. ) i - Gi Di i 7 J ~ lJ lJ lJ lJ (4.14) 
Q - Q Q = U "U .IG'·· Sl·n ~ .. - B·· cos c5 .. ) i - Gi - Di i 7 J ~ lJ U LJ LJ lJ (4.15) 
As each bus has four variables (P, Q, U and 8), given two of the variables, the other 
two can be calculated from the power flow equations. In other words, any two of the 
variables can determine the bus status through the power flow equations. 
In optimal power flow calculation, the real and reactive injections are decision 
variables which will be determined directly in the solutions, while the voltage and 
power angles are status variables dependent on the decision variables through the 
constraints. The status variables of the frontier buses are determined jointly by both of 
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the neighbouring sub-systems, and they also appear in the local OPF calculation. 
Therefore, the voltage magnitudes and power angles of the frontier buses can be chosen 
as the coupling variables, as shown in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6. The neighbouring 
regions can always be 'put together' without affecting any power flows as long as the 
coupling variables match with one another. In other words, if the coupling variables 
agree with one another, and all the local constraints are met, a feasible solution of the 
entire interconnected network is given. 
",---- .... , 
, , 
I \ 
n-rr-------------4-L I 
\ I 
Bus 1 
Figure 4-5 
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, , 
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Bus 2 
Variables available for TSO A 
Figure 4-5 shows the variables appear in the local OPF problem of area A. The x A 
is the vector of the internal bus variables, or the so-called "core" variables in [126] and 
closely connected with the frontier bus variables through the power flow equations, it is 
listed separately from x A • The frontier variables are [u 1 £51 U 2 £52 ], i.e. the voltage 
magnitudes and power angles at the frontier buses (bus 1 and bus 2). Similarly for TSO 
B, the frontier variables are also [u 1 £51 U 2 £52 ], as shown in Figure 4-6, and the 
Ul,(h P2,Q2,U2,(h 
,---- ... ,. .. , , 
I \ 
, ~+-------------~~ 
\ I , , 
, ,. 
'- --,-' 
Bus 1 Bus 2 
Figure 4-6 Variables available for TSO B 
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The aim of this decomposition approach is to separate the objective function as 
well as constraints. From the OPF model we can see that the objective function is 
regional separable. By studying the equality constraints for a "core" bus (equations 
(4.14) and (4.15)), we can see that the power flow equations only consist of the 
variables of buses directly connected to this bus. Therefore, the equality constraints in 
each control area are regional separable. 
The inequality constraints, including voltage limits, generation limits and 
transmission limits are also separable. 
The power flow equality constraints cannot be applied to the frontier bus on the 
other side of the tie-line, because the parameters of the lines connected to it are not 
known for the local TSO. However, a new set of equality constraints called coupling 
constraints can be used to replace the unknown power flow equations. For the two-
system network, the coupling constraints can be expressed as: 
A B ~A ~B UA UB ~A ~B U 1 = U 1 'VI = VI' 2 = 2' V 2 = V 2 (4.16) 
so that there is no mismatch between the two control areas. 
For simplicity we can re-write the coupling constraints as: 
(4.17) 
The equality and inequality constraints can be expressed as: 
(4.18) 
and h A (x A ,Y A) = 0 ,h B (x B ,Y B ) = 0 (4.19) 
These constraints apply for all the internal buses (core buses). 
The method proposed in equation (4.16) doesn't require any additional virtual 
buses and thus avoid modification of the line reactance matrix. The neighbouring 
regions can always be 'put together' without affecting any power flows as long as the 
coupling variables match with one another. In other words, if the coupling variables 
agree with one another, and all the local constraints are met, a feasible solution of the 
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entire interconnected network is given. Therefore, by maintaining the coupling 
constraints, the optimal results from parallel local OPF are also the global optimum. 
DC power flow calculation is widely used in network analysis. In DC power flow 
methods, all the bus voltages are assll:med to be 1.0p.u. Therefore, the coupling 
variables are the power angles at the frontier buses. 
This proposed system decomposition method explicitly requires the border 
variables in both of the neighbouring systems, and uses equality constraints instead of 
penalty functions to enforce the coupling relationship. It can be applied in barrier 
function methods as described in section 4.5.3. 
If the 'dummy buses' in the middle of the tie-lines are used instead of the 'frontier 
buses' (as in Baldick's approach [126]), the real and reactive power flows should also 
be included in addition to voltages and power angles as the coupling variables. In this 
thesis, Wang's topology decomposition approach is used because there's no need to 
change the network admittance matrix. 
4.5 Barrier function method (Interior Point Method) 
An effective way of solving OPF problems is the interior point method (IPM). IPM 
has attracted great interests because of its fast convergence characteristics and numeric 
robustness. Past experiences have shown that the IPM is very effective in dealing with 
large scale ill-conditioned networks, and is not sensitive to the size of the problems 
[140]. For a constrained optimisation problem, the IPM can ensure that each step of 
search for the optimum falls within the feasible region of the solution space. 
Among all the IPM methods, barrier function methods have been widely used in 
power system optimisation. Clements etc. [141] applied it in state estimation, [140] uses 
a direct IPM to find the load shedding scheme. [142] applied a predictor-corrector IPM 
in OPF using voltage rectangular coordinates. [143] gave a OPF method using barrier 
function techniques to address the dynamic OPF problem by decomposing the inter-
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temporal coupling among variables. Aguado etc. applied the IPM in interconnected 
networks [127] and [137]. [144] gives a multiobjective OPF to evaluate voltage security 
costs using IPM. 
A well-known figure to show the different approaches of IPM and simplex method 
is shown in Figure 4-7: 
X* 
Xl 
Figure 4-7 Search paths of IPM and Simplex Method 
Figure 4-7 illustrates the two different approaches. The simplex method takes the 
path from Xl through X 2 , ••• X 4 until X * , jumping from one border point to the next 
one, therefore the search direction in the simplex method is along the borders of the 
feasible region. On the contrary, the IPM starts from an interior point X ~ and searches 
through X ~, and it can reach the optimum X * within fewer iterations. 
Barrier function method is one of the most popular IPM method, and it is used in 
this thesis. In this method, KKT necessary conditions are applied in conjunction with 
barrier functions. The Newton iteration method is used to solve a set of linear equations 
and approach the optimum. A group of logarithm functions are appended to the 
objective function as the 'barrier' terms to enforce those inequality constraints. Then the 
search direction is obtained with Newton search in a certain neighbourhood determined 
by the barrier parameters and the 'central path'[14S]. The barrier parameters are forced 
to decrease during each Newton iteration until approaching zero, and the KKT 
necessary conditions are met. The IPM are used first in linear programming problems, 
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then extended to nonlinear optimisation problems. These path-following interior point 
methods have good convergence performance even in the worst case, because of the 
robustness of the underlying algorithm. 
For a large-scale nonlinear optimisation problem, the OPF problem for example, 
the barrier function methods can be applied as long as the objective function and the 
constraint functions are all twice differentiable. For the following power flow model, 
this requirement is met, so the barrier function method can be applied. 
As the path-following method is obtained by using Newton search, its performance 
is also influenced by the choice of starting point, like the ordinary Newton method. 
However, choosing an infeasible point as the starting point is allowed provided that the 
slack variables are nonnegative. 
In this section, an existing decomposed OPF approach based on barrier function 
methods will be analysed, and then an improved method is proposed and compared with 
the existing ones. 
4.5.1 Mathematical model of barrier function methods 
Consider this optimisation problem: 
mIn f(x) (4.20) 
subject to: g(x) = 0 (4.21) 
and h(x) s D (4.22) 
Use nonnegative slack variables to convert the inequality constraints into equality 
constraints: h(x) + s = D, s>O (4.23) 
Mter the conversion, logarithmic barrier functions are used to avoid dealing with 
the nonnegativeness of the slack variables s. This is done by appending the logarithm 
barrier terms to the objective function: 
k 
fb(X) = f(x) - Lflj lns j (4.24) 
j=l 
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Where the positive I-' j are constant within an iteration but upgraded during the 
procedure. If the inequality constraint corresponding to S j is binding, S j -70 and thus 
the barrier item makes fb (x) » f{x), therefore the new search direction will be 
prevented from going nearer to the boundary. So, the logarithm terms act as the 
'barriers' and change the search direction from pure Newton direction to a new one 
dependent on the barrier parameters I-' j • During the iteration I-' j is forced to decrease, 
so that I-' j -70 at the end of iteration procedure, thus x ~ x * if the iteration procedure 
converges. Different values of the barrier parameters for different slack variable can be 
seen as weight factors. 
Apply Lagrangian relaxation to all these equality constraints and we can get the 
Lagrange function: 
k 
L (I-') = f - A T g - Z T (h + s) - L I-' j In S j 
j=l 
(4.25) 
where the A and z are Lagrange multipliers associate with the constraints. During 
the iteration procedure Jl-70. 
Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are used to obtain the optimal solution. 
According to the KKT conditions, these Lagrange multipliers z must be nonnegative, 
and satisfy the stationary conditions: 
(4.26) 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
(4.29) 
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These equations are linearised to get a symmetric positive definite Hessian matrix, 
and then can be solved using Newton methods or predictor-corrector methods [132]. 
Instead of taking several Newton steps until converging to the optimal solution to the 
sub-problem with fixed Jl, at every iteration the f.l is reduced, and the problem is re-
linearised. This is the main feature different from conventional Lagrangian relaxation or 
augmented Lagrangian methods [132]. 
As the slack variables s are introduced to tackle the inequality constraints, there's 
no need to identify the binding inequality constraints in each iteration if the 
nonnegativeness of s is met. The price for this advantage is the increase in the number 
of variables, and the more complicated calculation of the linearised equations (4.26) 
through (4.29). 
4.5.2 Existing approach 
Barrier function methods are widely used in a variety of OPF models, for example, 
[142] and [146]. Aguado etc. applied the rPM in interconnected networks [127] and 
[137]. This idea is very appealing because of the robustness and fast speed of rPM. The 
decomposition is similar to Baldick's method where coupling constraints are enforced 
to achieve the final global optimum. [128] also gives a decomposed rPM to address the 
dynamic OPF problem. Both of the methods are based on Newton search direction for 
static point to meet the KKT conditions, and the linearisation of KKT conditions by first 
rank Taylor expansion is the way to decomposition. As both Aguado's and Xie's 
approaches finally lead to a border-blocked Newton equation set, only the former one is 
discussed here. 
Aguado's method can be illustrated using the same two-area system as that in 
section 4.2: 
(4.30) 
a and b are the areas. 
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Subject to: all the local constraints discussed before, plus the coupling constraint: 
(4.31) 
After converting all the local inequality constraints into equality constraints and 
appending the barrier function terms to the objective function, the dualised Lagrangian 
function can be written as: 
ka+b 
L (. ) = C a + C b - J.l ~)n S i + AT g + Z T (b + S) + (J T (y a - Y b ) (4.32) 
i=l 
Where the C a (.) and C b (.) are cost functions, g and h are equality and inequality 
constraints respectively. k a+b is the number of inequality constraints in area a and b. 
The ~ is a scalar whose value changes during the iterations, but keeps constant at each 
iteration. A single value of ~ for all the Si means no weigh difference among the 
inequality constraints. 
By Applying KKT conditions on the Lagrangian function Aguado obtained a group 
of equations [137]. They are then solved using Newton iteration. The step sizes are 
chosen so that the Si in each iteration are always nonnegative, therefore the new points 
obtained by the iterations always satisfy the inequality constraints. Furthermore, if the 
equality constraints are also satisfied, the new points obtained through iterations are 
always within the feasible region. Thus it is called an interior point method (IPM). 
Note that the Lagrangian function is separable because of the introduction of 
Lagrangian multipliers (j on the global coupling constraints. The resulting Newton 
iteration can be expressed as the following border-blocked matrix: 
(4.33) 
Where the u is a vector consisting of decision variables, dependent variables, slack 
variables and the Lagrange multipliers in this area, plus the coupling variables in this 
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area. U is the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian function in this area. r is residue of u or 
0", and it is a function of barrier parameter Jl. r is the incidence matrix between coupling 
variables and the u vector. During the iterations, the Hessian matrices are upgraded, but 
r is a constant matrix only determined by the topology. According to Aguado [137], the 
upgrade of 0" is obtained by an elimination procedure, thus: 
(4.34) 
Then the flu! and flu 2 can be obtained by back-substitution of flo. 
From the description we can see several disadvantages of this approach: 
• Due to the inclusion of slack vector s and its Lagrangian multipliers z, the 
feasible conditions can be ensured, but the size of variables in the Newton 
equations (4.33) is greatly increased in all the areas. 
• This approach requires inverting of the augmented Hessian matrix U. U is not 
always invertible, causing difficulties in obtaining the increments. Moreover, r 
are highly sparse matrices and thus the left item in equation (4.34) is often not 
available. 
4.5.3 A coordinated Barrier Method for Solving Nonlinear Programming-
an improved method 
Based on the observation of the existing barrier method, here an improved method 
is proposed. It has been tested in a 3-area 7 -bus system with good performance. 
Comparison between this method and the methods described in 4.1 and 4.2 will be 
given in Chapter 5. 
The proposal is based on the relations between primal and dual variables in the 
constrained optimisation problem. Similar to Baldick's approach, the border coupling 
variables are used. Unlike Baldick's penalty function method which relies solely on the 
'soft' enforcement of the violated coupling constraints, Aguado uses the IPM to make 
sure that in each iteration, the coupling constraints are strictly satisfied. In the method 
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proposed in this thesis, the approach Aguado suggested was also used. Unlike Aguado's 
method where the slack vector s appears in the Newton iteration and thus causes ill-
conditioning of the Newton equations when the corresponding constraints are binding, 
the method proposed here doesn't require inclusion of s in the Newton equation, 
therefore the computation performance is improved. Secondly, least-square solutions to 
the Newton equation are obtained instead of explicitly inverting the matrices. 
Let x be the local variables, and y be the coupling variables, equation (4.32) can be 
re-written as: 
Where the A is the number of areas, and K is the number of coupling constraints. 
In this global Lagrangian function, xa,Ya,sa are primal variables, and Aa,Za,(JK 
are dual variables. 
It must be stressed here that the number of inequality constraints must be greater 
than the number of independent (controlled) and dependent variables, but the number of 
equality constraints must not. Besides, all the objective functions and constraints should 
be twice differentiable to solve the KKT conditions. These requirements can be easily 
met in OPF problems. 
Aguado etc. and some other researchers [127] apply partial derivative to both sand 
z, and then make modification on the derivatives with respect to s in order to avoid ill-
conditioning when some of the slack variables approach a prematurely. However, due to 
this modification the Hessian matrix becomes asymmetric, causing computational 
difficulties when the size of the problem is large. 
In this thesis, a coordinated method is proposed with its Hessian matrix having the 
same dimension as ordinary Newton OPF. It also requires only moderate changes on the 
existing Newton OPF programs, and various constraints can be easily accommodated 
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without many changes to the program codes. Further studies are also done to investigate 
the applicability on interconnected system with different OPF tools in its sub-areas. 
The complementary conditions (i.e. SZ = tiE) are used other than the Newton 
equations to relate s to z. Besides, as the slack variables are explicit functions of the 
other primal variables, they are also treated outside the Newton equations. Therefore the 
size of Hessian matrix is largely reduced. Even at this size the Hessian matrix is not 
allowed to be known to other TSOs. Thanks to the highly sparse structure of the 
coupling constraint matrices, only the border variables need to be published to solve the 
global dual variables. This small amount of information exchange can ensure the 
solution always be available even though the matrix is not invertible during some time 
in the iteration procedure. 
The equality constraints are used in each iteration to relate local non-basic variables 
with basic ones. In the primal DC OPF problem, we can choose the nodal injections as 
the basic variables and power angles as the non-basic variables. 
Suppose v is the basic variable vector for the OPF problem, "( is the nonbasic 
variable vector (slack variables and dual variables not included), then the search is to 
find an optimum v* so that J* = VL I =0. If Newton search is used, the iterations can 
v v v' 
be expressed as: H!fl.v k +1 = J~ (4.36) 
where the H is the Hessian matrix and J is the Jacobian matrix of the Lagrangian 
function. As the local equality constraints g( v, "( )=0 are normally nonlinear functional 
constraints, the nonbasic variables cannot be expressed as the explicit functions of basic 
variables. Thus the Hessian matrix is augmented to accommodate the nonbasic 
variables. Let Ax = [fl.v fl.y], the augmented Hessian matrix can be expressed as: 
(4.37) 
.~"'(' t... '. , . .' 
'\.4, 
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Where the H is the Hessian matrix in respect with basic and nonbasic variables xx , 
x is the vector of basic and nonbasic variables (no slack variables or dual variables), g is 
the group of equality constraints, and l is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for equality 
constraints. 
In order to illustrate equation (4.36) and (4.37) let's have a look at the following 3-
bus system: 
Bus 1 
30 40 
Bus 3 
43MW 
120 
Figure 4-8 3-Bus System 
Assuming DC power flow is used, the OPF problem for this specific system can be 
written as: 
(4.38) 
subject to: 
no 
Active power balance: Pgi - Pdi - IBij sin(bi - b j )=0 for i = 1,2,3 
j=l 
where P gi : the generation at bus i 
P di : the load at bus i 
B .. : elements in the network admittance matrix. 
IJ 
b j : the phase angle of bus i. 
(4.39) 
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Generation limits: p . . :S P . :S P . (4.40) gz mm gz gz max 
Transmission capacity limit: Bij ·lsin(£5i - £5)I:s Li-jrnaX for Vi, j = 1,2,3 (4.41), where 
the line starting from node i to J. has the transmission limit L.. . 
1- J max 
In this example, the basic variable vector v = (p gl P g2 P g3 J ' and the nonbasic 
variable vector 1 = [£51 £52 £53 Y , both are subject to the equality constraints (4.39). 
Given the load at each bus, equation (4.39) can be simply written as g( v, 1 )=0, and the 
inequality constraints (4.40) and (4.41) can be expressed as b( v, 1):S o. By introducing 
the slack variable vector s, the inequality constraints can be written as: b( v, 1) + s = 0, 
and thus further written as: b( v, 1, s) = o. In this way the inequality constraints were 
converted into equality constraints. 
The Lagrangian function of this constrained OPF problem can be written as: 
3 6 
L(·) = I C i (Pgi)+ 1. Tg( V,1) + z Tb( V,1,S) - fl IZnsi 
i=1 i=1 
where the A and z are vectors of Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the 
inequality constraints and equality constraints, respectively. 
According to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the optimal values v* must satisfy 
J: = VLv Iv' =0. Using Newton search, the direction of the searching for v* can be 
expressed as equation (4.36). 
According to Taylor expansion of the equality constraints g( v, 1 )=0, the following 
equations can be obtained: g + (Vg~ v g T ( A vJ = o. Therefore, the augmented 
y \A1 
Newton search can be expressed as equation (4.37). 
[
Hvv HvrJ Hn can further be written as: H xx = H T H 
vr rr 
(4.42) 
The Newton search is trying to find solution for 
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VL =0 x (4.43) 
and g(x)=O (4.44) 
The variables flxk = [L\]>T AQT AVT AbT Y for AC power flow calculation, or simply 
flx k = [L\]>T Ab T Y for DC power flow calculation. 
Note that during the iteration, VL~ =0 might not hold because of the Taylor 
. ( h . DLk+I' I 0 h D k • ) k· expansIon t at IS, v x IS C oser to t an vLx IS , but g =0 IS always true because it 
was obtained by directly applying the equality constraints. Therefore, during the 
iterations the equality constraints are always met as long as the starting point is chosen 
to satisfy them. The same technique can be used on the global coupling constraints to 
find the same Newton increment on the coupling variables. By choosing the same 
stepsize for all the areas, we can ensure that the coupling constraints are always met. In 
other words, the series of interior points (because the inequality constraints always hold 
too) generated from this proposed global Newton search are always global feasible 
solutions. The next question is how to decompose the global Newton search. 
By applying equation (4.37) to a multi-area system as described in 4.4, the Newton 
iteration can be expressed as: 
Ak 
I 0 0 rT I Aa
k 
1 PI
k 
0 0 (4.45) = 
0 0 Ak r T Aa k p! A A A 
r1 rA 0 Aa
k qk 
h A [A ~J A 'lTa lr £or any area a. The residue flak is the function of aak and were tlaak = LUa tlA J 
a
k 
and ~eeps constant within one iteration. qk is the residue vector for all the coupling 
constraints. A; is the local part of Hessian matrix and A; = [ :g"'r V:] (4.46) 
r
1 
through r A are the incidence matrix for the K number of area coupling 
constraints. They are highly sparse constant matrix with the entry values at 1 or -1. 
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Once the Ok is obtained by coordination among sub-areas, the local increments can 
be calculated within the areas through parallel approach. The slack variables s and their 
corresponding Lagrangian multipliers z can also be computed within the areas. 
Again lets consider the 3-bus example to illustrate the multi-area decomposition. 
The small system is divided into two sub-systems, as shown in Figure 4-9: 
Bus 1 
I .; .. , 
30 40 
II 
Bus 3 
43MW 
120 
Figure 4-9 3-Bus 2-Area System 
The system-wide OPF problem can be decomposed into two sub-problems 
corresponding to the two sub-systems. For sub-system I, the sub-problem can be written 
as: min. C1 (P gl)+ C2 (p g2)' i.e min. C j (PgI)' where PgI = (P gl P g2 J 
subject to: 
P glmin S P gl S P glmax and P g2min S P g2 S P g2max 
Similarly the sub-problem for sub-system II can be written as: 
as: min. C 3 (p g3) i.e min. C Jl (P gIl ), where P gIl = [p g3] 
subject to: 
lOS 
A set of coupling constraints is introduced to coordinate the two sub-problems. In 
this example the coupling constraints are: 
(4.47) 
1 0 0 
It can be written as: (r I r II { '1 I ) = 0 , where r I = 0 1 0 and 
'YII 
0 0 1 
-1 0 0 
r II = 0 -1 0 , 'Y I = (bu b2! b31 rand 'Y II = (bw b2II b3II Y 
0 0 -1 
The Lagrangian function for the overall OPF problem can be written as: 
(4.48), where a is the Lagrangian multiplier vector corresponding to the coupling 
constraints. 
Considering that aL = ria, aL = r~a and aL = (r I 
a'Y I a'Y II aa 
r II { 'Y I ) , and using 
\ 'Yn 
A~ and A~ as the local part of Hessian matrix (see equation (4.46)), then equation 
(4.45) can be obtained. In this specific 3-bus 2-area example, equation (4.45) is: 
Ak 0 r lext 
T Aa k p~ I I 
0 Ak r lIext 
T Aa k p~ (4.49) -II II 
r Iext r lIext 0 Aa k qk 
where the r Iext = (0 r I) and r IIext = (0 r II ). 
Equation (4.49) has the same border-blocked structure as in Aguado's or Xie's 
papers, but with greatly reduced size. Secondly, this smaller size Hessian matrix is 
symmetric, thus the computation time will be reduced. Moreover, instead of directly 
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invert the local part of Hessian matrix A~, which is not always invertible during the 
iteration procedure, another approach is used to obtain the global variable increments, 
and we will discuss it in the next section. 
Compared with sub-gradient methods, this method does not generate a serious of 
nonlinear optimisation problems. The only iteration procedure is solving the linear 
Newton equations. Once the optimum is obtained it is a global optimum, which is the 
final result. On the contrary, in sub-gradient methods, the local optimums obtained by 
the TSOs are generally not compatible with one another, and the parameters of local 
optimisation sub-problems need to be upgraded to generate the new sub-problems. 
4.5.4 Application issues 
Inter-area coordination 
Given the Newton equations (4.41), the first step is to solve the global Lagrangian 
multipliers Aa k • Once they are obtained, all the areas can compute out the local 
variables by themselves and update all the primal and dual variables. If the iteration 
procedure converges, the global optimum is obtained. 
The solving of Aa k does not require full knowledge of the matrix Al through A A • 
One way is publishing the aggregated information in the form of r A-I rT , like the 
approach proposed by [137]. However, this might cause computational difficulties as 
the A matrices are not always invertible. Here another approach is proposed by 
exploring the specific sparse structure of the Hessian matrix. 
In equation (4.45), the A~ for each area a can be expressed as: 
c 0 E 0 
0 HOaoa Ik _ ag ga I ag Da I ao k ao k 
a a 
Ak= ET (- :~: rlk 0 0 (4.50) a 
0 (~~7 rlk 0 0 
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where the C and E are constant matrices and thus doesn't need to be updated during the 
iteration(for details please see the appendix). 
Given the left-hand matrix and the right-hand vectors in equation (4.45), the 
increments of primal and dual variables can all be expressed as functions of the bus 
angles and the Lagrangian multipliers of the coupling constraints (please refer to the 
appendix). Therefore, in the above 2-area example, by solving the equation 
Nk 0 I rT 1 AOk I rk I 
o N~I r T II AO~I = rk II (4.51) 
r I r II 0 Aa
k rk 
(J 
This equation set can be published and solved during each iteration. We can always 
get the least square solution with minimum norm for the equation set. It has been proved 
that such solution always exists and is unique as long as the left matrix in equation 
(4.44) is not a null matrix. More importantly, it reduces automatically to the exact 
solution during the iteration procedure. 
Furthermore, the increments of Lagrangian multipliers of the coupling constraints, 
i.e. the vector Aak, can also be expressed as functions of Ao; and AO;I. Therefore, 
aggregated information on each tie-line can be exchanged to obtain the Aa k , and then 
update the Ao~ , Ao~ and other variables. However, this approach can only be used 
when the search is within an approximation of the optimum, so that the solution does 
not diverge at the early stage. 
It is also worth pointing out that in the full Hessian matrix A= [H X; Vg Vg] o ,Hxx 
has the size of all the P and t5 in this area. Actually, the H xx can be obtained by 
modifying the widely used Hessian matrix in Newton OPF, because the matrix is 
organised in the same fashion as in the Newton OPF (see appendix for details): 
(4.52) 
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Any additional constraints can be easily adapted into the A matrix without a lot 
changes on the program codes. 
Choice of parameters 
• Barrier parameters: 
~i are set to be identical for all the Si because there's no preference among the 
slack variables. The ~ is made proportional to the complementary gap, which is the 
product of slack variables and their Lagrange multipliers. f.l = p. (ZT S )/ k , where the k 
is number of inequality constraints, and p is a convergence factor to force ~ 70 during 
the iteration procedure. Po =0.5 at the beginning of the iteration, and then it is updated 
as pk+l = max(0.1,0.95p k ). By reducing the value of p we are making the cut in the 
complementary gap. 
This choice is not problem-dependent and has been proved reliable in many papers. 
• Starting points: 
The choice of starting point plays an important role in finding the correct optimum 
through the iteration procedure. Improper starting point might even lead to divergence 
or to a different solution if it does exist. 
It has been suggested that a load flow program can be used to obtain the starting 
point, and that it can speed up the procedure. In our examples a general choice is 
applied, and it works well in several cases. The detail of this choice is: 
• Nodal injections p: a feasible solution if available, or a plain start Po = Prnin + £ 
to satisfy the inequality constraints, where the £ is a very small number. In this 
work, £ =le-4. 
• Power angles 8: a feasible solution corresponding to Po if available, or bo =0 for 
the plain start. 
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• Slack variables s: calculated from h( Po, 60 )+ So =0. If Sio =0, change the value as 
• Lagrange vectors: ZiO =1 + 11011 for every Zio' 
• Ao= £ and (JO= £ . 
Choice of step size 
The choice of step size in IPM is very straightforward. Once the increment 
directions are calculated out, the step size is chosen so that the slack variables s and their 
corresponding Lagrangian multipliers z are all kept nonnegative. Here we follow 
Momoh's method to choose the step size [131]: 
Le K . [LIS.] [LIZ.] t 1 =mln -;:- and K2 =min ---;:- , i=I,2, ... k. then 
{ I if K1 ~ -1 . h . . a 1 = (-1/ K1) if K1 < -1 IS t e stepslze for pnmal variables, i.e. P, b, s 
- { 1 if K2 ~ -1 . h . £ d I' . 
a2 - (-1/ K 2) if K2 < -1 IS t e step SIze or ua vanables, I.e. A, (J, Z 
Stopping criteria 
Check the barrier parameter ~ and the mismatch of the KKT, if both fl S £1 and 
IVLII S £2' stop. Otherwise continue iteration. The £1 and £2 are normally chosen 
between le-8 to le-3. In the examples in Chapter 4, £1 =le-8 and £2 =le-4. 
The extended Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are used to test the static points. If 
the starting point is chosen close enough, the iteration will converge to the correct 
result. 
If the above criteria are satisfied, the iteration converges at the optimum. If 
numerical problems cause difficulties in achieving them, the program checks the 
changes in the variables and objective value, and stops as soon as the changes are 
negligible. 
110 
Adjustment 
Considering the calculus errors, further adjustments must be made if the new point 
is too close to the border of the feasible region. 
If both Kl ~ -0.995 and K2 ~ -0.,995, the new point will fall reliably within the 
feasible region. Otherwise a conservative factor of 0.995 is used to reduce the step size 
from a 1 and a 2 to 0.995 a 1 and 0.995 a 2 • In this way, the next point is kept within the 
feasible region even with the existence of calculus errors on the Newton search. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, several existing decomposed OPF methods are analysed and 
compared. A system variable decomposition method is then proposed, and an improved 
interior point method (IPM) to solve OPF problems is applied based on the 
decomposition and sparse matrix technologies. 
The contributions from this chapter are mainly on two parts: section 4.4 gives the 
system decomposition model, including the topology decomposition and choice of 
coupling variables to reflect the neighbouring areas. Based on the presented 
decomposition model, an improved OPF method using interior point (IP) method is 
suggested in section 4.5.3. This method complements [127] and [1281's work, and it 
will be tested in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 Test the Decomposed Optimal Power 
Flow Methods on Small Systems 
5.1 Test on Cadwalader's method 
In Cadwalader's method, the PTDF factors as well as nodal and congestion prices 
are used to couple the interconnected systems. The performance of this Lagrangian 
relaxation method is problem-dependent. For a symmetric network given in [125], the 
published results were obtained with the software. But when the code was applied to a 
non-symmetric network such as the test system described in this chapter, divergence 
was observed. 
5.1.1 7 -bus 2-area system 
L1 L7 
1 3 4 
L6 
L2 L5 L8 
2 LA 
L9 7 
Figure 5-1 7-Bus Example 
The test system is shown in Figure 5-1. This lossless system is divided into two 
sub-systems where the upper system is zone 1 and the lower system is zone 2. In each 
sub-system, the local TSO does not know the bid curves in the other sub-system. 
Therefore, given the initial values, each TSO makes the optimal dispatch on his own, 
and the results including the quantities and prices are sent to the opposite TSO to update 
the sub-problem of optimisation. If the dispatches obtained from the two sub-systems 
converge, the global optimum is obtained. 
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Suppose generator bid curves are linear, i.e. p{q) = b + cq ,as shown below: 
b c 
Quantity 
Supply Curve 
Therefore the cost function is quadratic. The bid curve factors for these generators are: 
G1 G2 G7 
b 7.620 7.519 7.771 
c 0.0040 0.0028 0.0038 
Table 5-1 Generation cost 
The users have responses to the varying spot prices. The amount of energy they take out 
will decrease if the spot price is high. 
Quantity MW 
Demand Curve 
The system separation is shown in Figure 5-2: 
Area I 
P26 
P75 
Areall 
Figure 5-2 System Decomposition 
For area I, re-number the nodes as shown in Figure 5-3: 
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Ll L7 
1 3 
L6 
L2 
L8 
2 
LA 
LlD 
7 
Figure 5-3 Area I 
For area IT, re-number the nodes as shown in Figure 5-4: 
3 4 
2 
Figure 5-4 Area II 
Test Results-Global Dispatch 
Matlab software contains an optimisation toolbox which can tackle user-define, 
nonlinear optimisation problems. The algorithm used for medium-scale problems is a 
sequential quadratic programming (SQP) method. In this method, a Quadratic 
Programming (QP) sub-problem is solved at each iteration. A quasi-Newton method is 
used to estimate the Hessian of the Lagrangian. 
The global OPF model is a standard SQP model with the quadratic objective 
function and linear constraints. Therefore, the matlab toolbox function was applied to 
this test system, and proved good performance. For this specific system, it took 23 
iterations to converge at the precision of le-8, and the number of times to estimate the 
Lagrange function was 36 altogether. Figure 5-5 gives the value of Lagrange function at 
each iteration. 
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Figure 5-5 Social Cost Curve 
Test Results-Decentralised Dispatch 
400 
-400 00 
5 10 15 20 25 
Number of Iterations 
Figure 5-6 
30 35 40 
----- G1 
- - G2 
--- D3 
._ .. D4 
-- D5 
··0·· D6 
- G7 
GeneratorlDemand level 
H the two areas make parallel calculations and then upgrade the local OPF 
problems with the information from the other area, this procedure is the decentralised 
dispatch. Under Cadwalader's approach, this small system is tested, but the results from 
the two areas cannot converge. Figure 5-6 shows how the results oscillate with the 
iterations. As analysed in Chapter 3, the sub-gradient methods will normally encounter 
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such oscillation problem because of the high sensitivity of the results to the linearised 
sub-problems. 
5.2 Test Kim and Baldick's approach 
In this example, it took only 30 iterations to converge to the final result, so the 
performance is good. In each iteration, the optimums for the sub-problems are again 
solved using the matlab toolbox. 
The total costs (negative of total welfare) at area 1, area 2 and the whole system 
during the iteration are shown as below. These costs contain the "shadow" cost of 
mismatch between coupling variables, which are soft constraints in this process. 
-2 
- Cost in Area 1 
--+- Cost in Area 2 
~:t- Total Cost 
u 
~ -5 
-5.5 
-6 , 
-6.5 \~'~ ... ::l.r-B-~·,:···-c'>·-0-+··;:···':f·~·.c"··0 ... ,: .. ~··+4-".7-0-··:······:'·i 
5 1 0 15 20 25 30 
Number of Iterations 
Figure 5-7 Total cost 
The value of cost functions in area 1, area 2 and the entire system are presented in 
this figure. Notice that in area 1, the total cost firstly decrease and then increase, and 
finally went flat. This was caused by the drastic change of the coupling constraint cost. 
The number of iterations the matlab toolbox took to obtain the optimum for sub-
problems is shown below: 
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Figure 5-8 
10 15 
..... , Iteration number in Area 1 
- Iteration number in Area 2 
20 25 
t~urnber of Outer Loop Iterations 
30 
Numbers of iterations to obtain the optimums of sub-problems 
From Figure 5-8 we can see, although this OPF method only involved 30 times 
iterations (and thus 30 sub-problems in each area), it took several computation loops to 
obtain the solutions to sub-problems each time. 
The generations and demands on the buses vary with the iterations, and this can be 
seen from the following figure: 
600 ..... , G1 
,.---'------..... _- ---_._._------------------------------------------------_. __ ._----------------------/, .. /""" ...... _------------------------------------
-e' G2 ! 
= g~ I 
----- D5 : 
--- D6 I 
- G7! 
5 10 15 20 25 30 
Number of Iterations 
Figure 5-9 Generation/demand at each bus during the iteration 
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5.3 Test the IP method 
The IPM was tested with matlab codes written by the author. A 7-bus system 
similar to the one in section 5.1.1 is used, and the only difference is the additional 
generators at bus 3 through bus 6. As the separation of the 7 -bus system into 2 and 3 
sub-systems will be applied, at least one generator is needed in each of the sub-system, 
thus those generators had to be added. 
5.3.1 The 7-bus 2-area test system 
64 MW' 
1.00 p u 
8IJs1-_ ........ ~~ 
11 t,lI'oN 
18 MOoN 
11 MW 
74~MVv' 
AGe ON 
18 MVo! 
Bus 2 .,......-......:......:::j::I-......::---~-
174~M\ ... l AGe O~~ 
27 MW 
70 M\JV 28 M\oV 
25 MW 
'1.00 pu 
50liMW 
AGe ON 
Bus 6 "'"'1---..... -_ ....... - Bus 7 .... ~!;"".._-_-
Figure 5-10 7-Bus 2-Area System 
The bid curve factors for these generators are: 
Gl G2 G3 G4 G5 
b 7.620 7.519 6.800 7.840 7.600 
c 0.0040 0.0028 0.0200 0.0026 0.0200 
Table 5-2 Generation cost 
134~MW A.GC ON 
G6 
7.573 
0.0026 
;200 MW 
o MV R 
G7 
7.771 
0.0038 
The values of the Lagrangian functions area 1, area 2 and the entire system during 
the iteration are shown in Figure 5-11: 
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Figure 5-11 Lagrangian Values 
The outputs of the Generators during the iterations are shown in Figure 5-12: 
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Figure 5-12 Generator Outputs 
The angles are the coupling variables in this example, where DC power flow 
calculation is applied. The angles at all the buses (except the slack bus-bus 7, where 
the angle is set as 0) are shown in Figure 5-13: 
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Figure 5-13 Bus Angles 
The Lagrange multipliers associate with the coupling constraints (lambdas) are 
shown in Figure 5-14: 
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5.3.2 The 7-bus 3-area test system 
12 
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14 16 
Lagrangian Multipliers 
To test the impact of loop flows on this OPF dispatch method, this system is 
divided into 3 sub-systems. 
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Figure 5-15 7-Bus 3-Area System 
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The values of the Lagrangian functions in area 1, area 2, area 3 as well as the entire 
system during the iteration are shown in Figure 5-16: 
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Figure 5-16 Lagrangian Values 
The outputs of the Generators during the iterations are shown in Figure 5-17: 
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Figure 5-17 Generator Outputs 
The angles at all the buses (except bus 7, which is the slack bus) are shown in 
Figure 5-18: 
0.45 ~~------r----"---------'----""""'---~ 
0.4 
en O .. r-(j)',J~ 
:::J 
OJ 
-C. 
rn 
:::J 
0.3 
o L: 0.25 
~ 0.2 
OJ 
..-
ro O. '15 
(.I) 
ID 
g! 0.'1 / 
0{ 0.05 ~ 
It 
.' 
, 
" 
.L. 
, 
4 
Figure 5-18 Bus Angles 
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The Lagrange multipliers associate with the coupling constraints (lambdas) are 
shown in Figure 5-19. The equality coupling constraint of bus angle 6 works at the tie-
line between area 1 and area 2, also it works at the tie-line between area 2 and area 3, 
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thus there are two constraints corresponding to this power angle, and consequently two 
Lagrange multipliers. 
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Figure 5-19 Lagrangian Multipliers 
The Hessian matrix and barrier parameter are updated with each iteration, so there 
is no more "inner loops" of iteration during the upgrade. This will greatly reduce the 
computational time. By comparing the number of iterations in the 2-area and 3-area 
case, we found that under the same precision requirement, the number of iterations: 
!7BUS 
7 bus 
! Three-system I ~~ 
Table 5-3 Number of Iterations 
The OPF computation can be carried in parallel in each of the sub-areas and further 
reduce the computation time. In both of the case the OPF converge to the same optimal 
results. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, numerical tests were carried on the 7-bus system to test three cross-
border optimal power flow calculation methods: the sub-gradient methods proposed by 
Cadwalader and Hogan, the augmented lagrangian function method proposed by Kim 
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and Baldick, and the improved barrier function method proposed in this thesis. 
Although the test system used here is very small, the test results are still consistent with 
the theoretical analysis made in Chapter 4: the sub-gradient method didn't have a 
successful performance in this small system, and the numerical oscillation can be 
observed clearly. The augmented Lagrangian method performed well, showing 
numerical stability and convergence. The IP method as applied in 5.3 can converge 
within a small number of iteration, and the search path is always within the feasible 
regIon. 
The power flows on an interconnected network depend largely on the network 
structure because of loop flows. Therefore, any proposed cross-border congestion 
management method should ideally be simulated on the network before putting into 
practice. In the following chapter, a test network is built up using public information. 
Under the three methods, the information required from neighbouring areas can be 
seen in Table 5-4: 
Information PTDFs on Nodal prices Nodal variables Collective data 
exchange the tie-lines in other areas at the border 
buses 
Cadwalader's Yes Yes Yes A on the tie-lines 
Baldick's No No Yes a,~,c 
Proposed No No No N 88 and r8 on the 
IPM border buses, n. 
reflecting the 
coupling constraints, 
step size a 
Table 5-4 Variables exchanges among neighbouring control areas 
Chapter 6 Build Up A Test Network 
6.1 Introduction 
The deregulation and restructuring of a highly meshed interconnected network 
require a transparent and fair congestion management mechanism, which can provide 
incentives to improve efficiency. Apart from market structure differences in the sub-
systems, the topology of such network raises extra difficulties compared with radial 
network. ETSO (European Transmission System Organisation) has outlined the 
difficulty with congestion management in a highly meshed network [104]. 
Both the occurrence of congestion and the capacities of lines change significantly with nodal 
injections. Therefore, the values of NTCs (Net Transmission Capacities) across borders are strongly 
interdependent. 
The connection and parameters of a network have dominant influence on the 
occurrence of congestions. Therefore, any congestion management method would fail if 
the characteristics of the network are not taken into full consideration. The best way to 
test any methodology is to simulate it on the actual system model. 
Power market rules need to be designed carefully and tested in models before being 
put into practice [9]. Although a very simple model can be used to test certain market 
rules in terms of social cost minimisation, we still need a model network with moderate 
size and close-to-reality characteristics to test the congestion management methods, 
because such methods are dependent on the network structure and resource 
distributions. 
UCTE transmission network, which covers the west and central continental 
Europe, is a highly meshed interconnected network. According to the Florence Forum, 
market based congestion management methods should be applied on all the 
interconnections among member countries by 1 January 2003 [147]. However, several 
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reasons have delayed this procedure, among them the technical complexity was a major 
reason [147]. It is believed that simulation test of the proposed methods on the system 
model is necessary before putting them into practice. However, we met great difficulties 
when trying to obtain the actual data. Information such as power plant/load description 
or transmission line parameters is kept confidential by some network operators, for 
commercial data could be deduced from the above information, and therefore they are 
sensitive and not publicised. 
In fact, we can test methodologies on an approximate network rather than the real-
world one, and such a test network doesn't have to consist of a full range of true data, 
although it is expected to inherit major characteristics of the original network, so that 
the approximate power flows can be calculated on it. In this way, no commercial 
confidentiality issues would be raised, for this model system will be purely based on 
public available information. Such a model could be used to validate and benchmark 
different methodologies for assessing the effects of cross-border trades and we would 
hope that our model could form a first step in developing such a tool. 
UCTE has already stated its aiming at the information to be published in its 
website, including generation/load data, grid availability, and most importantly the data 
on the interconnections between countries[148]. However, the TSOs are given the 
freedom to provide or not provide the data mentioned above. At present, data collection 
is still a painstaking task as the availabilities and formats of them vary greatly with 
TSOs. 
This chapter gives details of the approach to build up the testing network. In 
section 1 the data are classified into several groups, and the methodology of collecting , 
them is also discussed, together with related assumptions. The processing of original 
data under several software environments is described in Section 2. All the original data 
came from public accessible information resources. 
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6.2 Classification of public data 
As geographic structure has distinct affects on the workability of congestion 
management methods, one has to test methodologies on the actual or a similar network. 
Thus, if we are trying to give suggestion on the congestion problems in the European 
system, we should simulate our solutions on the actual European model, or at least a 
model carrying major similarities. In this section, public data are classified and useful 
information was extracted from them. Several assumptions were used in this procedure 
to simplify the daunting work of duplicating the European network, and they are 
discussed in this chapter. 
6.2.1 Basic situation of European network 
The extra high voltages (EHV) of European transmission network consists of 
several voltage levels: 380 kV or 400kV (standard in UCTE, GB and NORDEL-
Organisation for Nordic Electric Power Co-operation) and those non-standard voltage 
levels varying from 220 kV or 225kV to 300 kV [149]. 750 kV is applied only in 
Hungary for a line [150]. 
UCTE (formally called UCPTE) has 21 member countries. Due to the war in the 
Balkans in the 90s, the UCTE area is divided into 2 synchronous areas, which were re-
connected via the asynchronous DC link between Greece and Italy [99]. The so-called 
"1st synchronous UCTE region" is composed of 18 continental European countries, as 
shown in the map [151]: 
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Each country is given a short term for the reason of convenience, as listed in Table 
6-1. 
Country Acronym 
Portugal P 
Spain E 
France F 
Belgium B 
Luxemburg LX 
Switzerland CH 
Italy I 
Netherlands NL 
Germany D 
Denmark (west, i.e. continental part) DK 
Czech CZ 
Slovakia SK 
Poland PL 
Austria A 
Hungary H 
Slovenia SV 
Croatia CRT 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (part) BIH 
Table 6-1 Acronyms ofUCTE 1st Synchronous Region Countries 
These acronyms were used in the database and system descriptions. Different 
market structures, regulatory rules and geographic structures co-exist in all the member 
countries. 
Recently the AC (Alternating Current) connections have been extended to Northern 
Mrica. The 1st synchronous UCTE region is also connected with UKTSOA (United 
Kingdom Transmission System Operators Association) and NORDEL via DC (Direct 
Current) connections. 
6.2.2 Classification of network data 
Compared with DC interconnections, AC transmission networks are more 
complicated due to the loop flow effect. That means the power flow in each line is 
influenced by injections from a large group of buses. Although some instruments can 
change power flows, such as voltage controllers, transformer tap changers and FACTS 
(Flexible AC Transmission Systems) equipments, their ability to change AC power 
flows are very limited so far. 
12l) 
As HYDC (High Voltage Direct Current) facilities are very expensive and thus are 
rarely implemented, the main part of the UCTE network is a highly meshed AC 
network. This made congestion management in this area more difficult, and also made a 
model network absolutely necessary. In the following sections the UCTE AC network 
(1st synchronised area) is studied and the model system was build upon those analyses. 
For the reason of simplicity, a lossless network is chosen as the model, and the DC 
power flow method will be used, which will require information including reactance, 
voltage levels and topologies of transmission lines. 
Apart from power flow information, geographic locations and the transmission 
limits are also important for cross-border congestion management study. Take the 
Nordic network as an example: it is to the credit of the radial geographic structure that 
market-splitting methodology as well as permanently divided pricing zones can be 
applied. Extending their experience into UCTE network will fail because of the highly 
meshed connections. 
The data we need to build up the network model can be divided into the following 
categories: 
• Transmission network data, including their electrical parameters, topologies and 
geographic locations. 
• Power plant locations, fuel types and capacities. 
• Load centre locations and capacities. 
Given the above data we can create a test network. In order to double check the 
similarity between the model and the actual system, the following data are also needed: 
• Actual power flow patterns, e.g. the total generation/demand of each member 
country at a specific time and the power flow on tie-lines at that time. 
• PTDF values of cross-border transactions on tie-lines . 
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6.3 Collecting public data 
We have contacted UCTE and the member TSOs (Transmission System Operators) 
for the above data, but the responses from them varied, and we failed to obtain any data 
from some key countries. Web searching also indicated that a complete system 
description (or even a medium-size network description of a member country) was not 
available. 
However, there exists some public information from which we can extract useful 
technical data to build up a model network. Such a network, due to insufficient 
information, cannot duplicate the actual system in every aspects, but as it will inherit the 
geographic structures, connections and approximate parameters, it will be a good 
example for study and therefore worth building up. 
The main information resources for building up the database are from: 
• The publicly available generation, peak load, power flow exchange and cross-
border lines information from UCTE website (www.ucte.org). 
• The generation/substation description list from individual TSOs. 
• The geographic information of population and industry from publicly available 
websites. 
• Technical reports from European Commission website concerning the cross-
border information. 
6.3.1 Transmission network data collection 
The transmission network is the backbone of the model system, and it took more 
effort than the nodal injection data. Although the electrical parameters of transmission 
lines are not directly available to the public, they can be deduced from the lengths and 
voltage levels of the lines, because typical reactance values per unit length for overhead 
lines are widely used by electrical engineers, given the voltage level and operating 
frequency. Transmission network maps are available from the websites of some TSOs, 
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therefore both the reactance and the connection were roughly given. UCfE also 
published its transmission network map [151], giving the voltage level, number of 
circuits of each EHV line, as well as its geographic location. Information like from-end 
and to-end locations can be extracted from this map. 
Based on certain assumptions, the transmission network description can be 
extracted from the map. This description consists of electrical parameter list, topology 
connection list and transfer limits. 
The transmission capacity limits among the countries were obtained from EC 
(European Commission) report [152], and the thermal limits of tie-lines were obtained 
from UCTE yearbook [153]. 
The following assumptions were used in building up the two lists: 
(1) Only those lines with voltage levels at above 220kV (including 220kV) are taken 
into consideration. This assumption is generally accepted for cross-country 
transmission network carrying bulky energy. Among the countries there are also 
several tie-lines operated at 110 kV. They have relatively small capacities and 
playa less important role in power interactions, the test network doesn't include 
them. 
(2) The resistance was ignored, because we only consider DC power flow method. 
Further assumption is that all the lines have evenly distributed electrical 
parameters along the full lengths. Thus the transmission line reactance was 
estimated by the length and number of circuits of each line, times the 
corresponding typical reactance value per unit length. This assumption will 
inevitably introduce some errors. For example, some long distance transmission 
lines may have series capacitors installed. The arrangement of phases and 
circuits also play an important role in determining reactance values. But such 
assumption is acceptable under general conditions. 
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(3) All the circuit breakers on the map are assumed to be closed under normal 
operation in order to make full utilisation of the whole network. In fact, they can 
be open, depending on the operation modes. For example, the 220kV line 
between Belgium and Luxembourg is not energised. This makes all the power 
flows deviate from the actual values due to the loop flow effect. 
6.3.2 Power plant data collection 
Power plant fuel types and capacities are related closely with their outputs, and 
therefore influent the power flows. 
This set of data has been especially sensitive ever since the privatisation, because 
they can reflect the marginal generation costs. In a paper analysing the duopoly in 
British electricity market, the author roughly estimated the marginal cost of fossil 
thermal generators by calculating the cost of the fuel times the energy conversion 
efficiency [50]. 
Since up-to-date information is not accessible, we had to turn to historic 
information published before the deregulation of electricity industry. From a technical 
aspect the historic data about capacities and fuel types have not been changed greatly in 
UCTE over the past twenty years, thus the power flow calculation based on the historic 
information can still reflect the present real network. A European fossil thermal power 
plants database [154], published 12 years ago, is available on the internet, and it was 
used in my work. 
Generators in the testing network are simply classified as hydro, fossil thermal or 
nuclear ones, so that no sensitive information is included. This classification 
information was also obtained from the UCTE map, where the description of a certain 
bus (i.e., whether it's a hydro power plant, a thermal/nuclear plant, or a transformer 
substation ). 
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6.3.3 Load data collection 
Load centre locations and capacities also have important influence on the power 
flows. Unfortunately there is not sufficient information. An important assumption was 
used to help estimate the load level, details of which will be given later in this chapter. 
The basic idea of it is that demand levels are related closely with local population and 
industry. 
The total demand of each UCTE member country is publicised in UCTE website 
(www.ucte.org).This total demand level was further distributed to all the load bus 
according to local population. This approach was based on the following two rules: 
(1) The demand from household users in a certain area is proportional to the 
population in that area. 
(2) The demand from industrial users in an area can be roughly reflected by the 
population there too, because population follows employment. 
The website www.world-gazetteer.com gives population of all the administration 
areas (e.g. provinces) in each country, thus the total demand of a country was 
distributed into groups of demands by administration areas. Due to the fact that a high 
voltage substation can be located between two cities, further division of regional load 
into city loads by population was not made. Instead, within each administration area, the 
load buses are assumed to have equal capacities. 
Comparison between this distribution method and actual demand distribution is 
needed to check the viability of such a load model. The example of Italy is given in 
table 3.1. In this table, actual area consumption list was available from the Italian TSO 
website (www.grtn.it), and the area population list was from www.world-gazetteer.com 
as year 2002 data. Column 4 and 5 are calculated by dividing the area 
population/consumption with national overall population/consumption, respectively. 
The correlation factor by comparing these two columns is also shown in the table, and it 
is as high as 91 %. The result revealed how closely the distribution of population is 
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related with the electricity consumption. Although this strong correlation might not 
stand in all the other countries, this method can still reflect the load distribution trend . 
.. "''''''''''''' 
--
............ ....., ...... " ........... 
region population (1000) COnSUml)tion (GWh Population r',,) Consumption f%l 
Abruzzo 1243.2 6105.9 2.210 2.186 
8asilicata 595.3 2351.7 1.058 0.842 
Calabria 1991.7 4582.2 3.540 1.640 
Campania 5648 14674.4 10.039 5.254 
Emil i 13- R om a g na 3957.4 23177.2 7.034 :::.298 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1179.4 8676.5 2.096 3.106 
Lazio 4972.2 19642.2 8.::n8 7.032 
Liguria 1559.5 6256 2.772 2.240 
Lombardia 8915.3 59583.9 15.846 21.332 
Marcrle 1462.7 6353.7 2.600 2.275 
Molise 316.3 1256 0.562 0.450 
Piemonte 4163.1 25095.1 7.400 8.984 
Puglia 3980.3 15756.2 7.075 5.64'1 
Sardegna 1598.2 10697.8 2.841 3.830 
Sicilia 4862.3 17392.2 8.642 6.227 
Toscana 3458.1 18594.3 6.147 6.657 
Trentino-,A,lto Adige 936.4 5173.3 1.664 1.852 
Umbria 814.9 5406.8 1.448 1.936 
Valle d'Aosta 119.3 819.7 0.212 0.293 
Veneto 4487 27724.5 7.975 9.926 Correlation 
total 56260.6 279319.6 100 100 0.910457 
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Table 6-2 Comparison of Italian Population and Electricity Consumption 
Finally, the actual power flow patterns are needed for double checking the 
simulated network against the real one. In UCTE website, we can get typical power 
flow exchanges among the member countries, which can be used to compare the 
similarity between the testing network and the real one. 
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6.4 Creating the Original Transmission Network Database 
using GIS 
One of the most time-consuming tasks is extracting out the transmission line 
lengths and their connections from the paper map. As the UCTE network consists of 
over a thousand buses, a database is needed to store and manage all the related 
information. 
6.4.1 Digitising under ArcGis 
A possible way to calculate the lengths of transmission lines from the paper map is 
using GIS (Geographic Information System) software. This type of software has build-
in information including the longitude, latitude and altitude of every spot in a map, 
therefore it can store and manage any spatial information from a paper map. However, it 
can not automatically recognise the transmission lines on the map (although it works on 
radial networks, it cannot work well with a highly meshed network), thus manual 
digitising is needed (i.e. plot all the lines and indicate their connections. The software 
will automatically number these lines and nodes, calculate the lengths, and store the 
topology of the network). ArcGIS was used to do this work, and it can also export the 
GIS database it manages to a general database, facilitating our further supplementary 
work on the test network. 
ArcGis uses the so-called 'spherical projection' to calculate the lengths of 
transmission lines. It calculates the integration along the line, whose location is given in 
spherical coordination. This method requires the actual geographic locations of the set 
of dots composing the line. Thus we need firstly register several points (at least 3) on 
the map as geographic sites defined by their longitudes and latitudes. After the 
registration all the points on the scanned map are related with their actual locations. Of 
course, the more points we register, the more accurate this coordination conversion is. 
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6.4.2 Format description of the original network 
Besides the lengths which were automatically calculated out by ArcGis, several 
more characteristics for the lines and nodes (such description is called 'field' in a 
database) are also needed for parameter calculation. 
In total, a line record consists of the following fields: 
FNODE: the node number where the line starts· ,
TNODE: the node number where the line ends· , 
LENGTH: the length of the line in km. 
VOLTAGE: 1 if the voltage is 220kV and 0 if the voltage is 380kV. 
CIRCUIT: number of circuits for the line. 
BORDER: 'Y' if this is a tie-line across multiple countries, 'N' if this line lies within a 
country. 
COUNTRY: short form of the country in which the line is located. This field is blank 
for a tie-line record. 
FROMCOUNTRY: only for tie-line records. The country where the tie-line starts. 
TOCOUNTRY: only for tie-line records. The country where the tie-line ends. 
CAPACITY: the capacity of this line. By default this value is '0', as we can see in the 
following example. This is obviously not true, but we ignore all the congestions within 
one control area and suppose the local TSO can manage them. Therefore, the only limit 
values we need to input are cross-border transmission limits. 
The capacities of all the tie-lines were given in UCTE year book[155]. These 
capacities can be line thermal limit values, or limit values determined by transformers/ 
substations restrictions. Voltage limits or stability limits are converted into capacity 
limits [10]. For example, the voltage constraints can be converted to interface active 
power flow limits [163]: given a fixed load demand, the system operator can determine 
how much active power can flow through the interface lines without violating the 
voltage stability. 
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Here is an example of part of the original line records from Switzerland's internal 
network: 
CAPACITY 
LIMIT 
0 
12 0.264326 1 IN Swiss 0 
26 31 0.478715 1 2 N Swiss 0 
16 22 0.574657 0 2 N Swiss 0 
14 16 0.306169 0 2 N Swiss 0 
4 11 0.464817 0 2 N Swiss 0 
2 4 0.44446 0 2 N Swiss 0 
Table 3-6-3 An Example of original line records 
In this database the bus numbers are used to indicate the starting and ending points 
of these lines. GIS uses another table to store the bus information. The bus records have 
only the following four fields: 
ARC: the number of the arc starting with the bus. 
[COUNTRY NAME]: e.g. SWISS. This column is the identification numbers of the 
buses. It corresponds to the FNODE flNODE in Table 3-6-3. 
X: the x coordination of this bus. This is the Cartesian coordination. 
Y: the y coordination of this bus. 
Below is part of GIS bus records of Switzerland internal network: 
ARC SWISS X Y 
49 1 8.286488 47.79544 
7 2 7.441521 47.68879 
2 3 7.282507 47.67054 
6 4 7.884427 47.65713 
37 5 7.072288 47.65051 
48 6 7.698944 47.58958 
42 7 7.165298 47.5748 
Table 6-4 GIS Bus Records 
Thus we can get the geographic locations of all the buses. This information is used 
later in PowerWorld Simulator to create a one-line display of the whole UCTE 
interconnected system. 
Nodal injections do not appear in this table, and they'll be addressed in the next 
section. We will designate the sign of injections as positive for generators and negative 
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for loads. The Origin of x-y coordinates is the top_left corner of the screen in ArcGis, 
while it is the bottom_left corner in PowerWorld. Besides, the coordinates in ArcGis are 
given in actual kilometres, but the "oneline screen coordinates" in PowerWorld are 
associated with the pixels of the display. In order to 'transplant' the network from GIS 
to PowerWorld, we need to establish the format conversion between these two 
environments. Below is the MicroSoft database query used for coordination conversion 
in this section. 
Create query by using wizard 
ExportLocationQuery 
XYconvertion 
Figure 6-1 Coordination Conversion 
NOM 
. ,z. 
The 'Queries' module in MicroSoft Access database enables batch processing of 
data and storing the results on a table. New coordinate values were calculated out using 
the query designed as Figure 6-1, where the constants: 
Xgul, Y gul: the x, y coordinates of the top-left corner of the display window in ArcGi . 
Xgul=-10.386207, Ygul=57.980912. 
Xglr, Y glr: the x, y coordinates of the bottom-left corner of the di play window in 
ArcGis. Xglr= 25.954773, Yglr= 35.416979. 
1 9 
Xpul, Ypul: the x, y coordinates of the top-left corner of the display window in 
PowerWorld Simulator. Xpul= -500, Ypul= 1500. 
Xplr, Yplr: the x, y coordinates of the bottom-right corner of the display window in 
PowerWorld Simulator. Xplr= 1500, Yplr= -500. 
Xsf, Ysf: the converting scales of x and y from GIS coordinates to PowerWorld 
. IX put - X plr I ~ I - Y I I 
coordInates. Xsf= IX -X 1=55.034, Ysf= pu pr =88.637. 
gul glr r gul - Yg1r I 
And the variables in the query are: 
X, Y: the x, y coordinates of the bus in GIS. 
GIS XlY distance: the distance between the specific bus and the origin (which is the 
top_left corner in GIS) in XlY coordinates. GIS X distance= Ix gul - Xl, GIS Y 
distance= Iy gul - yl· 
Xp, Yp: the x and y coordinates of the bus in PowerWorld. 
Xp=X pul + X sf x (GIS X Distance), Yp=Ypul + Ysf x (GISY Distance). 
For each country, a database was used to store the line table and bus table for a 
country. In addition an extra database was created for the cross-border tie-lines and their 
buses. Thus 18 GIS databases were built up in this section. Further work will be 
addressed in the coming sections on nodal power injection process and format 
conversion from GIS to general database, and finally to PowerWorld case file. 
6.4.3 Network Simplification during digitising of the network 
Some buses are connected with one another through very short transmission lines, 
and they can be aggregated into certain groups to simplify the network. These 
'equivalent' buses are set in this way so that their power flow exchanges with outer 
systems are kept unchanged after the network simplification. This procedure also helps 
power flow computation, because too-short transmission lines in the network might 
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cause ill-conditioning in power flow calculation. Here is part of the bus groups being 
simplified in Italy: 
Giugliano & Patria & Levante & Frattamaggiore & S. Maria; 
Salamo & Montecorvino; 
Valpelline & the four substations nearby; ... 
The full list is omitted here. 
6.5 Electrical parameters calculation 
The preliminary network database obtained from the GIS environment only 
consists of information about line lengths and their topology, but the electrical 
parameters, including reactance of lines and the power injections at buses, are not 
calculated yet. In this section these useful data are derived to facilitate power flow 
calculation in next sections. 
This calculation and inputting can be done with either GIS or other general 
database software. We chose to general database environment (MicroSoft Access) 
because of its faster speed and excellent interface with other applications. Moreover, the 
new information inputted in this stage can also be loaded back into GIS database. 
6.5.1 Transmission line reactance 
The reactance of transmission lines were calculated out by MicroSoft Access Query 
. h' '. x- {I * 0.311 n[, V = 220kV 
USIng t IS equatIon. - 1* 0.281 n[, V = 380kV 
Where I is the length of this line, and n[ is the number of circuits of this line. For the 
single circuit 220kV and 380kV lines at 50Hz, the typical reactance are 0.31 ohm/km 
and 0.28ohm/km [155] respectively. 
6.5.2 Generation list 
Given the network, we also need the nodal injections for power flow calculation. A 
'snapshot' of the whole system (Le. the scenario consisting of the actual energy 
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outputs/inputs of all the power plants/substations) is not possible to be obtained due to 
the commercial sensitivity under the deregulated circumstance. The only way is to make 
a rough estimation for the model system. 
The assumption we used in this section is: 
The outputs of power plants are proportional to their installed capacities. 
This is not exactly the real case, but it can give a rough image of the power flow 
trend. The outputs of hydraulic plants are more susceptible to influence from the season 
in a year or the waterfall conditions. Fortunately thermal power plants (including fossil 
and nuclear plants) play the major role in UCTE network, and they have more stable 
energy outputs. 
Here is the load curve of Spain in year 2001[156]: 
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Figure 6-2 Spanish Load Curves 
From this curve we can see that the nuclear and coal plants have stable generation 
all year round (especially nuclear plants). In this sense our assumption can reflect the 
true scenario to a certain extent. 
Each power plant is related with a bus in the UCTE map, and the bus can be 
retrieved from the GIS database, where the bus record is identified by its ID number. 
Considering the fact that all the power plants are identified by their name (which are 
names of their places in most cases) in every generation list, one of the nece ary ta k 
in this section is to relate the names of the plants with the ID of the bu e . Putting th 
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names in the database enables us to check and upgrade the database easily in the future. 
The installed capacities of the plants can be also inputted into the database by the plant 
names. 
The finished bus database has the following fields: 
• Type: type of this bus. Possible values are 7, 8 or 9. The meanings are: 
7-transformer substations, 8-nuclear/fossil thermal plant, 9-hydraulic 
plant. 
• Capacity: the installed capacity of the power plant. For the substations, this 
column is left blank. The demand level will be addressed in the next section. 
• Place Name: the name of place. For the equivalent bus for a merged bus 
group (see 6.3.3), this column consists of all the buses, joined by a plus sign 
(+). Some plants are not given their names in the map, so their capacities are 
deemed as the lowest possible values that might appear in the map (that is, 
200MW for thermal plants and SOMW for hydraulic plants). 
• Note: any annotation of this bus description. 
• Net capacity: the capacity after merging several local buses (see also 6.3.3). 
• Index: the bus name in GIS database, i.e. its ID number in GIS. 
The difficulties with obtaining generation lists varied with TSOs in different 
countries. Data resources are: 
Generator lists obtained from some TSOs. 
Generator lists available on the websites of some power producers (member links 
of www .eurelectric.org). 
If the above two resources failed in a certain country, or the generator lists are 
incomplete, a list of European fossil plants (including their installed capacity and type 
of fuel) (SEI 1990) and a list of nuclear plants [157] are used as the last resort, because 
these two lists are not up-to-date ones. 
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Here is part of the table of Spanish buses: 
Poet 
.iRde-i 
1 
7 
R 1200 
2 
200 1 
R 1916 labono 91n 4 
R 470+5n1 I sar.()n4-ll1eiramll 1 mer~ed with load 10i3 5 
7 6 
R 200 . memed with load 200 7 
R 513 lada 5n R 
R 167+254+350 1 soto de ribera 671 \) 
7 10 
7 11 
7 12 
7 f3 
7 14 
R 1217 oasaies merged with load 217 15 
7 In 
7 17 g- 18 
7 19 
Table 6-5 Bus Record (part) 
In the Spanish bus table, the 'capacity' fields of all the type 7 and 9 buses are 
blank. The transformer substations (type 7) will be dealt with in the next section. As for 
hydraulic power plants (type 9), their capacity list is not available, thus the following 
approximation was used for the hydraulic plants, that is: each of the hydraulic plant has 
equal capacity. Thus the capacity of each of them can be calculated by: 
Capacity=total installed hydro capacity/ number of hydraulic plants, where the total 
installed hydro capacity can be found in UCTE year book [153]. 
Note: In this table only the installed capacity information was stored, instead of the 
actual power outputs, which require scaling-up/down based on the total actual 
generation. This is because that such original information (i.e. installed capacities) will 
not change with power flow pattern. Therefore, based on the same set of original 
information, different power flow scenarios can be tested on the network. If the installed 
capacity of a plant is changed, we can easily update the network by changing the 
corresponding figure in the table. All the scale-up/down work can be easily done by 
PowerWorld Simulator. 
Besides capacity information, cost curve information is also needed to run OPF 
(optimal Power Flow) and get the close-to-reality power flows. Although the true cost 
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curves are confidential, a typical cost curve can be used for each specific type of 
generator. 
6.5.3 Demand list 
Similar to generation buses, the demand buses should also be associated with the 
names of their places. These names are also stored in the node table. Table 6-6 gives the 
data of Portugal nodes, including both the generators and the substations. 
In this table, the Exceptions exist where the substation list is unavailable for some 
of the countries. In this case, estimation has to be made on the demand levels. 
node type input/ou!Put 
1 9 630 
2 7 1306 
6 7 1458 
7 9 180 
5 9 240 
3 7 63 
4 9 609 
9 9 186 
10 7 126 
12 7 100 
14 7 189 
15 9 336 
11 7 309 
13 7 126 
16 7 549 
17 7 126 
18 7 366 
21 7 1152 
20 8 584 
19 7 313 
22 7 656 
23 7 308 
24 8 900 
26 8 960 
Table 6-6 Demand List (part) 
Determining the demand level was more difficult than determining the generation 
level because most of the countries were unable to provide either a 'snapshot' of , 
demands or a capacity list of all the major transformer stations. In such case the 
assumption described in 6.2.3 has to be applied to get a rough estimation of the demand 
levels. To do it, the population distribution among all the administrative areas in a 
country was supposed to reflect the demand distribution among all the areas. 
Furthermore, all the substations within a certain area are supposed as having the same 
demand levels. The total peak-demand of any country can be obtained from UCfE 
yearbook [153]. 
6.6 Power flow calculation using PowerWorld Simulator 
Given the electrical parameters and the topology, PowerWorld Simulator can solve 
the power flow calculation with its robust and comprehensive engine [158]. In this 
section, focus is put on how to convert the data from database into a format that 
PowerWorld can recognise, and then further modifications on the testing network are to 
be done under PowerWorld Simulator environment. 
6.6.1 Converting of Database into IEEE CF file 
PowerWorld Simulator can read a variety of power system data formats, including 
IEEE Common format (CF), PTI Raw Data Format (*.raw) and GE PSLF Format 
(* .epc). 
03/11/02JOFORAU200.02000SAUSTRA 100.0 CASE 
BUS DATA FOllOWS 34 ITEMS (HEADER) 
1 1 1 1 2 1.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 277 0.0 380 0.0 3033.0 -3033.0 0.0 0.0 0 
3 3 1 1 2 1.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 733 0.0 380 0.0 3033.0 -3033.0 0.0 0.0 0 
4 4 1 1 2 1.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 200 0.0 380 0.0 3033.0 -3033.0 0.0 0.0 0 
17 17 11 2 1.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 137 0.0 380 0.0 3033.0 -3033.0 0.0 0.0 0 
22 22 1 1 2 1.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 380 0.0 3033.0 -3033.0 0.0 0.0 0 
8 8 
1010 
11 11 
12 12 
25 25 
-999 
1 1 0 1.0 -10.0 624.3636 0.0 0 
1 1 0 1.0 -10.0 624.3636 0.0 0 
1 1 0 1.0 -10.0 624.3636 0.0 0 
1 1 0 1.0 -10.0 624.3636 0.0 0 
1 1 01.0 -10.0624.3636 0.0 0 
0.0 380 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 380 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 380 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 380 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 380 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BRANCH DATA FOllOWS 39 ITEMS (HEADER) 
28 23 1 1 200.0 0.0179243 0.0 0 0 0 0 o 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25 28 1 1 200.0 0.0050774 0.0 0 0 0 0 o 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
31 22 1 1 200.0 0.0189716 0.0 0 0 0 0 o 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0 
0.0 0.0 0 
0.0 0.0 0 
0.0 0.0 0 
0.0 0.0 0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 14 1 1 2 00.0 0.0201785 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-999 
LOSS ZONES FOLLOWS 1 ITEMS (HEADER) 
1 AUSTRIA 
-999 
INTERCHANGE DATA FOLLOWS 1 ITEMS (HEADER) 
1 22 0.0999.99 A A 
-999 
TIE LINES FOLLOW 0 ITEMS (HEADER) 
-999 
END OF DATA 
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The above is part of the * .cf file used to describe Austria network. Each country is 
allocated a * .cf file for its network description. The countries are interconnected with 
cross-border transmission lines, which were inputted into PowerWorld manually. 
Among all these formats, IEEE CF (file affix * .ct) requires the simplest format 
descriptions, so it was chosen to input the testing network information. The complete 
description of IEEE CF text file can be found in [159]. As it doesn't support many of 
power system features like generator cost curves and multiple generators/loads in the 
same bus, the IEEE CF files are normally used only for inputting data instead of storing 
system descriptions. Further modifications on the testing network were done under 
PowerWorld Simulator after loading the CF file. Therefore, the final network data are 
stored in PowerWorld format (* .pwd). 
Another advantage with PowerWorld is that it provides one-line diagram editor, 
which allows us edit the network graphically. PowerWorld uses * .pwb file to store the 
one-line diagram information. That is to say, all the geographic information (including 
the locations of the buses and the adjacent countries) are stored in * .pwb file. 
6.6.2 DC or AC 
The major problem with PowerWorld Simulator (version 8.0) is the lack of DC 
power flow calculation function. In the latest release version 9.0, DC approximation 
calculation is supported, but majority of the network-creating work was done when the 
version 9.0 hadn't appeared yet. Thus the AC model was used to calculate the power 
flows. However, as only the active power flows are to be studied, operation limits like 
reactive power limits and bus voltages can be relaxed during calculation. 
AC calculation takes consideration of the reactive power, which is consumed on 
the transmission lines (pure reactance in the testing network for the reason of 
simplicity). The reactive power sources in this network are: 
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(1) Generators. All the generators are set as 'AVR=on'. That means the terminal 
voltages of all the generators are kept to their setpoints. Therefore the reactive 
power outputs will be controlled by A VRs (Automatic Voltage Regulators) 
instead of their inputted values. Note that by setting A VR=on, the generator is 
set as a PV node. In our network, all the generators are PV nodes except the only 
slack generator. 
(2) Loads. By setting the reactive component of a load as a negative value, the load 
is used as a reactive power source. This scheme resembles the local reactive 
compensation (e.g. capacitor banks in transformer substations). A substation bus 
with the fixed load is deemed as a PO node in the power flow calculation. 
The basic principles of AC power flow model can be expressed as the following 
equations: 
Suppose Vi = UiLbi , then for any PV node (e.g. a generator whose A VR=on), 
ps _ U. '" U . (G .. cos b .. + B .. sin b .. ) = M, = 0, where node J' is connected with node i 
I I L..J J IJ IJ IJ IJ I 
through a line/transformer, and the corresponding entry in the Y matrix is 
y. = G .. + JB ... The ps is the given active power injection at node i. 
IJ 1J IJ I 
For any PO node (e.g. the load bus with fixed real and reactive power injection), 
Q~ -U."'U .(G .. sin b .. -B .. cosbl·'J·) = fl.Q i = 0 I I L..J J IJ 1J 1J 
In the network we are studying, the conductance of each line is 0, thus all the Gij in 
the Y matrix are Os, and we can obtain the simplified equations: 
ps -U."'U .B .. sin b .. = 0 and Q.s +U."'U .B .. cosb .. = O. Therefore, by changing the 
I I L..J J IJ 1J I I ~ J IJ IJ 
reactive power injection Qt alone, the active power flow along the line from i to j 
P. = U.U .B .. sin b .. can also be changed, although the real nodal injection P; is kept 
IJ I J IJ IJ 
constant. 
We can see the influence of reactive power injection on active power flows in this 
simple three-node example. The parameters of the three transmission lines are: 
From bus To bus R X C 
1 2 0 0.2 0 
1 3 0 0.4 0 
2 3 0 0.4 0 
Table 6-7 Transmission Line Parameters 
In Figure 6-3 the active power injections at the three buses are set as 200MW, -
lOOMW and -lOOMW, respectively, and the reactive power at bus 2 and bus 3 are both 
zero. The resulting active power flows on the network are also shown in this figure. 
ZOOMW 
61 MVR 
~'-..... (C=)) 
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Figure 6-3 3-Bus System (Scenario 1) 
Angle 
Number PUVolt (Deg) 
1 1 0 
2 0.96061 -14.51 
3 0.94937 -19.62 
Table 6-8 Bus Status (Scenario 1) 
The voltage magnitude (in p.u) and power angle in each bus is shown in the above 
Table 6-8. 
Now we change the reactive power injection at bus 3 from 0 to -50MW (local 
reactive power compensation), and the resulting active power distribution is shown in 
Figure 6-4: 
149 
104M 
200MW 
11 MVR 
\
6MW 
.; 
4MW 
100MW 
-5 MVR 
'" 
Figure 6-4 3-Bus System (Scenario 2) 
The corresponding bus voltages and power angles are: 
Angle 
Number PUVolt (Deg) 
1 1 0 
2 1.00368 -13.68 
3 1.07042 -17.68 
Table 6-9 Bus Status (Scenario 2) 
Thus in AC power flow solution, active power flows are affected by both real and 
reactive nodal injections. However, as in high-voltage network the power angle 
difference between both ends of a transmission line is normally small, and the influence 
of reactive power on active power flows is generally not significant. 
6.6.3 Simulation Cases and Results 
The test network has 17 areas (each area stands for a country except for BiH and 
Croatia which were treated as one area) and 28 cross-border interfaces. For the countries 
outside the UCTE 1st synchronised area while having power exchanges with the 
member countries, generator/load buses are put at the borders to emulate the power 
injections/extractions. 
The finished testing network needs to be compared with real network on their 
cross-border power flows in the hope to get similar results. Modifications on the model 
network can be done only when the differences between the model and real network are 
discovered and analysed. 
The following three real scenarios were used to compare with the model network: 
( 1) UCTE 16 January 11am-winter peak load [160] 
(2) UCTE 16 January 3am-winter valley load [160] 
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(3 ) UCTE 21 August 11am-summer peak load [161] 
These three cases give the total demand and generation of each country at the 
specific time, and power flows on interfaces of neighbouring countries are also given. 
For each case, the testing network was set to have the same total demand/generation of 
each country as the real case, and the power flow calculation was carried out on the 
testing network. The resulting inter-area power flows on all the interfaces were 
compared with the real ones using the correlation factor. Among all the three scenarios, 
the 2002 winter peak load scenario was the most important one, because it has the 
highest demand and thus is related closely with the congestion management study. 
Generation and demands together with total cross-border power exchanges for the 
winter peak load 2002 are shown in Figure 6-5. For example 9491/9407 for Switzerland 
(CH) means that internal generation of Switzerland was 9491MW while internal 
demand was 9407. The number next to links between any two countries refers to the 
actual and calculated cross-border flows. For example 2086(-65) for the D-NL link 
means that the actual cross-border exchange was 2086 MW but the load flow result 
using the approximate network representation 2086 (-65) for the D-NL link means that 
the actual cross-border exchange was 2086 MW but the load flow result using the 
approximate network representation was 2086-65=2021MW. After modifications made 
on the model network, the correlation factor between real power flow data and the 
calculated data had satisfactory improvement from 83.7% to 99.28%. The 2002 winter 
night and summer cases were then used, in order to check whether the model network 
has the flexibility for different scenarios. The correlation factors for these two 
comparisons are also as high as 97.34% and 94.72% respectively, and their cross-border 
power flows were obtained simply by scaling up/down the generation/demand values at 
all the countries from the values in case 1 to those in case 2 and 3. Thus the model 
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network is suitable for analysing UCTE network performance in the sense of cross-
border power flows. 
It should be noted that UCTE data show only total cross-border exchanges between 
countries without breaking down into individual tie-lines. Hence a link between any two 
countries, which is shown as a single connection in Figure 6-5, in fact may consist of a 
number of tie-lines. Sometimes power may even flow in opposite directions in different 
tie-lines linking the neighbouring countries. 
6.6.4 Network modification 
Before modification, the power flow results obtained from the model network were 
already close to the real data in case 1, with the correlation factor between these two 
sets of data close to 90%. Considering the assumption that all nodal injections are 
proportional to their installed capacities, which is far from the reality, further 
modifications can be made to bring the testing network closer to the real system. 
Possible changes on the model can be: 
• Increasing! decreasing the generation within its generation limit. 
• Increasing! decreasing the load at certain place to make it fit the local population 
more precisely. 
Basically these increase and decrease on the nodal injections were done manually 
to make the cross-border power flows closer to the real values. When making 
modifications, care has to be taken to recognise the influence from transit power flows 
to avoid unnecessary adjustments. In order to illustrate the transit power flows let's have 
a look at the cross-border power flows in Figure 6-5 (the correlation factor between the 
real power flows and the calculated values in Figure 6-5 is 90%): 
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Figure 6-5 Cross-Border Power Flow 
The transit power flows can be easily detected in Figure 6-5. For example, Croatia 
(CR, on the bottom right of the map) is connected with both Hungary (H) and Slovenia 
(SV), and the power flow deviations on the interfaces (H~CR and CR~SV) should be 
-66.1MW and -69.9MW, respectively. From the map we can see that this is mainly 
caused by the transit power from Hungary to Slovenia. Thus, instead of adjusting the 
nodal injections within Croatia, we should adjust the injections in Hungary or Slovenia 
if we want to reduce the power flow deviations from real case. 
The adjustment on Slovenia can be done in the following procedure: 
(1) Find all the interfaces and their power flow deviations. Slovenia has three 
interfaces, they are: A~SV (48.2MW), SV~I (-21.9MW) and CRT~SV (-
69.9MW). 
(2) Find the border buses (Slovenia side) of the interfaces, and change their 
injections to reduce the power flow deviations. 
(3) In order to keep the total generation/demand within Slovenia unchanged, after 
the adjustments in step 2, the unbalanced generation/demand should be balanced 
by the other generators or loads in this country. 
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Similar adjustment work can be done for the other countries. As the UCfE network 
is a highly meshed network, the existence of loop flows make it impossible to achieve 
100% similarity by simply adjusting the nodal injections. However, the final correlation 
factor of 99.28% is sufficient for the cross-border congestion management analysis. 
Final results and the comparison with real case (case 1, winter peak 2002) are shown in 
Figure 6-6: 
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Figure 6-6 Cross-Border Power Flow (Modified) 
The "correlation coefficient" is used to check how strong the relationship between 
the expected power flow values and the calculated power flow values. The correlation 
coefficient between these two sets of data can be expressed as: 
Cov(X,Y) 
Px,Y = 
ax ·ay 
h 2 1 "" ( )2 and a y2 = ~ "" (Y/. - 1,--)2 are average square deviations of were ax = - L...J Xi - flx L...J r'Y 
n i n i 
the vectors, respectively. 
Cov(X, Y) = ~ L (Xi - fl x ). (Yi - fly ) is the covariance of X and Y. 
n . / 
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Therefore, -1:s PX,y :s 1, and if PX,y is close to 1, the two sets of data have strong 
relationship (that is, large values of one set are associated with large values of the 
other). In the case shown in Figure 6-6, the correlation factor is 99.28%. 
The comparison between calculated cross-border power flows and real ones are 
shown in Figure 6-7: 
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Figure 6-7 Power Flows on the interfaces 
In order to see how the high correlation factor is obtained, the power flows were 
listed in the order of magnitudes, and they can be split into two groups as shown in 
Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9. Although the calculated values in Figure 6-9 have noticeable 
discrepancy with the expected value, the values in Figure 6-8 agree with the expected 
power flows approximately. As the power flows on the interfaces CH-I through B-F are 
much larger than those on the interfaces CRT-H through A-H, the overall correlation 
factor is as high as 99.28%. 
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Power Flows on the interfaces CRT-H through A-U 
The details of how to build up the testing network are given in this chapter. Several 
assumptions are used to simplify the approach, while keeping the similarity with the real 
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network. The format of data in every procedure is given to facilitate further work. All 
the original data came from public accessible information resources. 
In Chapter 7, further validations are done on the testing network to check the 
similarity with the real UCTE network in the respect of cross-border power flows and 
PTDFs. 
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Chapter 7 PTDF Check and TLR Test 
7.1 Introduction 
In order to test further the applicability of the model network under various 
dispatch conditions, PTDF (Power Transfer Distribution Factor) check on the cross-
border interfaces were done, and the results were compared with the data from real 
system. Again the comparison was presented in the form of correlation factor, and it is 
94.48%. In this chapter the procedure of PTDF check is given, and the results are 
presented in the form of diagrams. Furthermore, TLR (Transmission Load Relief) tests 
are done to study the curtailment schemes in case of congestion. 
7.2 PTDF check 
PTDF factors are used to measure the impacts of a commercial transaction on the 
physical power flows on the studied transmission lines/interfaces. In congestion 
management, PTDF factors are very important because their values, together with the 
amounts of transactions, will determine whether a line will be overload. Due to the 
phenomenon of loop flows in a meshed network, PTDF factor calculation requires the 
full network information and thus can only be carried out by the TSOs. 
The power flow calculation in Chapter 6 was done by PowerWorld Simulator and 
was based on the following conditions: 
• DC power flow, i.e. only active power flows are studied. 
• The OPF (Optimal Power Flow) controls of all the areas were set as 'Off 
OPF'. That is to say, the nodal power injections were all fixed at the given 
levels. 
These two conditions were used to ensure the simulation of a specific scenario. 
with the focus on the real power flows on the cross-border tie-lines. 
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7.2.1 Modification on the model to facilitate PTDF calculation 
PowerWorld is able to calculate PTDF factors of transactions between areas, zones 
and buses. Given the Seller and the Buyer areas/zones, PowerWorld can compute the 
PTDFs by scaling up/down the output of all generators on AGC in the source/ sink areas 
in proportion to their relative participation factors [158]. 
From the user manual we can see two points about PTDF computation by 
PowerWorld Simulator: 
(1) The software obtains PTDF factors by calculating the unit increment scenario 
and comparing it with the present one. This is computational approximation and 
might introduce errors. Therefore, even under DC power flows where the PTDFs 
should be unchanged with the power flows, PowerWorld can still give slightly 
different values with the operating points. 
(2) PowerWorld cannot calculate PTDF factors if the participation factors of all the 
generators are set as 0 (by default). For PTDFs of transactions between areas or 
zones, the 'AGC Status' of the related areas/zones should also be set active. 
The participation factor is the sensitivity factor of how the real power output of a 
generator changes with the demand. Only when the generator is available for AGC and 
the area is on participation factor control can the participation factors take effect. 
In this model system, all the participation factors were defined in this way such that 
they are proportional to the capacities of these units (this is the default setting). 
After the above changes were made on the model network, the PowerWorld 
Simulator is now ready to compute PTDF factors. These values are to be compared with 
the published ones in the real system, to see their similarity. 
The published PTDF values of UCTE network were obtained from European 
Commission reports [152] and [162]. In order to get the PTDF values, a user can either 
specify the buyer, seller and the interface through the dialog box provided by 
PowerWorld, or input commands in the form of script language- a text-based 
command line interface to facilitate batch processing in PowerWorld. Script is 
especially useful when processing large number of similar calculations. 
PTDFs in PowerWorld were calculated and exported with the following two 
commands: 
CalculatePTDF([AREA i], [AREAj], DC); 
SaveData("ThePTDi j.aux", AUX,lnterface, 
[lntNum,FGPTDF,FGMW,FGLim,lntHasCTG,IntMonDir,FGLimA,FGLimB,FGLimC 
], [interfaceelement],); 
Where the i and j are selling area and buy area, respectively. The command 
'SaveData' was used to export the case description in the format of PowerWorld 
auxiliary file. If the file already exists, PowerWorld will append the new data. 
7.2.2 PTDF factors comparison with the real ones 
Table 7-1 gives the published[152] and calculated PTDFs of several transmission 
lines. 
Ipublished calculated 
albertville-piossasco 13 12.51 
Mettlen -lavorgo 10 4.6 
chippis-airolo 5.7 3.49 correlation 
lavorgo-roncovalgrande 15 5.41 0.515213 
Table 7-1 PTDFs Comparison of Several Lines 
Comparison on PTDF factors didn't appear satisfactory, as the correlation 
coefficient is only 51.52%. This is due to the scarcity of samples. PTDF factors of 
individual transmission lines are difficult to obtain from public resources, and the above 
4 values are all we can get from [152]. As all the 4 values are small (no greater than 
15%), any small deviations from them will result in a much lower correlation 
coefficient. 
Extensive searching for additional PTDF factors from public resources is not 
advisable, because it is time-consuming and not necessary. As our study is focused on 
the cross-border congestions instead of internal congestions, we can focus on the cross-
country interface PTDF factors instead of individual line PTDF factors. It should be 
160 
noted that the model network built up in the last chapter is not a replica of the UCfE 
network in all aspects. Emphasis has been always put on the similarity of cross-border 
power flows. 
The inter-area PTDF factors indicate the incremental distribution factors associated 
with power transfers between two different areas [158]. These values provide a 
linearised approximation of how the flows on the interfaces change in response to 
transaction between the Seller area (source) and the Buyer area (sink). The transaction 
for which the PTDFs are calculated is modelled by scaling the output of all generators 
on AGC (Automatic Generation Control) in the source and sink areas in proportion to 
their relative participation factors. Generators in the source area increase their output, 
while generators in the sink area decrease their output [158]. 
Figure 7-1, Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 give the PTDF factors (in %) on the cross-
border interfaces by the transactions from Belgium to Italy [88], North France to 
Netherlands and North France to Italy [162], respectively. The published PTDF data are 
listed on the interconnections followed by the calculated PTDF values in the braces. The 
correlation factor of the real PTDFs and the calculated PTDFs in Figure 7-1 is 97.20%. 
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Figure 7-1 PTDFs (%) Comparison for B~I Transaction 
The correlation factor in Figure 7-2 (on the next page) is 90.96%. 
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The correlation factor in Figure 7-3 is 94.93%. 
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From the above three tables we can see that the model network is very similar to 
real network in the sense of their PTDF values on the cross-border interfaces. 
7.3 TLR Test 
An interesting test on the model is the TLR test. TLR is used by FERC (the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission) to curtail submitted bilateral transactions if the 
transmission lines will get congested. Although it is widely criticised as a non market-
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based method, FERC insists that it is a necessary method to maintain system security 
[87]. TLR doesn't require any cost or price information, therefore it is the easiest 
method to be tested on the model network, which also lacks cost information. The TLR 
test validates the model network, as the results shows the power flows after TLR 
curtailments are similar to those in the real world. 
7.3.1 TLR algorithm 
Suppose two transactions have influence on the congested line, and their PTDF 
factors (PTDFs) are Al and A2 respectively (none is greater than 1). We suppose both 
Al and A2 are positive. Therefore, in the case of congestion both transactions are to be 
curtailed. We denote the submitted amounts of transactions as xOl +~1 and x02+~2 
respectively, where the ~1 and ~2 are the amount to be curtailed, and the X01 and X02 
are the transactions after curtailment. Now the TLR problem becomes: 
Given the total amounts (X01+~1) and (X02+~2), given PTDFs A1 and A2, we need 
to find Axl and Ax2 to satisfy: 
~ Axl + 112 Ax2 = M , where the ~F is overflow on the congested line. And 
~X01 + ~X02 = Fo' where the Fois the transmission limit of the line. 
We assume A1>A2 to facilitate our analysis. 
As the two equations are not linear independent, there exists more than one 
solutions. The question is: how to allocate the overflow to each user, so that fair and 
economic (small overall curtailment) allocation is achieved? 
NERC's TLR rule is one of the answers. Obviously PTDF factors should be taken 
into consideration in the relief procedure to avoid unnecessary curtailments. Besides, 
the submitted transaction amounts (i.e. (XOi+~i), i=l, ... ,n where n is the number of 
transactions to be curtailed) should also be considered in the effort to avoid 
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opportunistic behaviours from users. Therefore, the share of overflow should be 
Proportional to both the PTDF factor and the transaction amount of the user that is , , 
~i * Ai= ~F ( AiFi/I (AiFi) ), where Fi=(XOi +~i) * Ai is the share of physical power 
flow on the flowgate from ith submitted transaction. 
7.3.2 TLR curtailment calculation 
The TLR scheme is based on commercial transactions, while in the model network, 
only physical nodal injections were given. Therefore in order to execute the TLR 
curtailments, transactions should be calculated out first to fit with the physical power 
flows, then curtailments can be put on the transactions, and the resulting physical power 
flows can be obtained to check the congestion status on the flowgate. 
This procedure consists of the following modules in Figure 7-4: 
Read area records-get area inj ections 
" 
Read interface records-get PTDFs, power 
flows, transmission limits etc. 
~, 
Calculate transactions according to the PTDF 
matrix 
~, 
TLR curtailment 
~, 
Export the new transactions and area 
injections 
Figure 7-4 TLR Curtailment 
The interface being studied in this section is interface 8, that is the one between 
Switzerland and Italy. According to the EC report [152], this interface is often 
congested. 
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7.3.3 Obtain Bilateral Transactions from Physical Power Flows 
In the model network, the physical power flows, net area injections and PTDFs 
were already obtained, but the energy transactions agreed among market participants are 
unknown to us. In this circumstance we need to make assumption on energy transaction 
based on the actual power flow information, so that TLR can be carried out. 
Suppose the numbers of areas and interfaces in a network are nand m, respectively. 
The interfaces are physical connections between neighbouring areas. The number m 
could be either greater/ less than n, or equal to n. 
m=3. n=3 
m=2. n=3 m=5. n=4 
Figure 7-5 Examples of the Number of Areas and Interfaces 
A network with n nodes/areas can theoretically consist of C; = n(n -1) number of 
2! 
transactions. However, this number is unnecessarily large when the number of 
nodes/areas in a system increases. Suppose the total number of transactions is T, and the 
task in this section is to find a set of transactions, so that all the physical constraints are 
met. 
Generally the direction of an energy transaction is always from the lower price area 
to the higher price area. However, considering the high volatility of spot prices, we can 
arbitrarily specify the directions of transactions, and use positive or negative signs to 
indicate whether the real directions comply with their designated ones. 
The set of transactions in a network should be subject to the following two types of 
constraints: 
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• All the transactions starting/ending at a certain area should add up to the net 
injection of this area. (Losses are ignored. Positive injection stands for 
generation. ) 
• The impacts from all the transactions on a specific interface should result in the 
physical power flow on that interface. 
The first set of constraints can be expressed as the following equation: 
Where AT n-l is the incidence matrix indicating the relations between areas and 
, 
transactions. If the lth transaction starts at area i and ends at area j, the elements ali and 
alj in A matrix are 1 and -1 respectively. In this way we can create a T x n incidence 
matrix which is singular. By removing any column in this singular matrix we can obtain 
the AT,n-l in equation (7.1). 
tT =[11 t2 ... tT]' is the column vector indicating the amount of each transaction. 
b
n
- 1 =[bl b2 ... bn-l]' is the column vector indicating the injection of each area. 
T must be no less than (n-l) to satisfy this set of constraints. The minimum number (n-
1) occurs when there is a 'chain' of transactions from the first area to the nth area, i.e., 
T12, T23, T34, ... , T(n-l,n). 
The second set of constraints can be expressed as the following equation: 
(7.2) 
ptdf1,1:m 
Where PfDFT,m = ptdf2,1:m ,and ptdfl,l:m stands for the PTDF factors on all the m 
ptdfT,l:m 
interfaces on by the first transaction, T is the total number of transactions. Therefore, T 
must be no less than m in order to get a full expression of interface power flows. 
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1m =[11 12 ... 1m]' is the column vector indicating the physical power flows on all the 
interfaces. 
The number of independent equations among all the two sets determines the 
smallest possible value of T. 
A transaction between distant areas can be split into a set of transactions between 
neighbouring areas. Take the first network in Figure 1 as an example, the energy 
transaction from area A to area C (TAC) can be accomplished with a transaction from 
area A to B, and then one from area B to area C, both at the same amount as specified in 
TAC, i.e. TAC=TAB=TBC. In our study, both the distant transactions and the neighbouring 
transactions were studied. 
Interface Interface Interface Power Flow Power Flow Power Flow Power Flow 
Code Name Limit (MW) Before TLR (MW) Before TLR (%) IAfter TLR (MW) /After TLR (%) 
1 E-P 2275 0.4 0.02 0.4 0.02 
2E-F 2954 -856.7 -29 -856.7 -29 
3F-1 3413 2347.3 68.78 2255.6 66.09 
4B-F 2828 -1057.1 -37.38 -1136.2 -40.18 
5B-Lx 716 0 0 0 0 
6B-NL 5429 131.8 2.43 211 3.89 
7CH-F 7126 -876.2 -12.3 -837.4 -11.75 
8CH-1 2572 2800.5 108.88 2565.2 99.74 
9CH-D 1580 -1438.5 -91.05 -1342.5 -84.97 
10 I-SV 2042 -579.2 -28.36 -521.7 -25.55 
11 D-F 3436 -2004.5 -58.34 -2078.7 -60.5 
12 D-Lx 2676 61 2.28 61 2.28 
13 D-NL 12892 2008.1 15.58 1929 14.96 
14 D-DK 3620 -1681.9 -46.46 -1250.2 -34.54 
15 D-PL 6324 -129.9 -2.05 -148.8 -2.35 
16 A-CH 6362 402.5 6.33 323.9 5.09 
17 A-I 257 325.6 93.04 278.1 79.44 
18 A-D 11215 118.9 1.06 248.6 2.22 
19 A-CZ 2462 -884.2 -35.91 -854.9 -34.72 
20 A-H 4448 -22.8 -0.51 -27.9 -0.63 
21 A-SV 2151 379.6 17.65 346.1 16.09 
22 CZ-D 6576 1134.3 17.25 1168.3 17.77 
23 CZ-PL 2760 -1709.8 -61.95 -1688.8 -61.19 
24 CZ-SK 4190 424.4 10.13 398.6 9.51 
25 PL-SK 5736 247 4.31 237.7 4.14 
26 H-SK 1660 -1318.5 -79.43 -1283.4 -77.32 
27 CRT-H 1246 -759.6 -60.96 -719.9 -57.78 
28 CRT-SV 7191 94.8 1.32 65.5 0.91 
Table 7-2 Effect of TLR-Interface Power Flows (in MW and in %) before and after TLR 
Curtailments 
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All the independent equity constraints must be satisfied by the transaction vector 
t r , Therefore we can obtain the minimum value of T, T>max (m,n-l). 
PowerWorld uses an approximation to calculate out the PTDP factors. Thus we 
might get very small PTDP factors in some entries instead of the actual 0 values. This 
results in ill-conditioning when calculating the commercial transactions. 
In order to avoid this ill-conditioning, filters were used for the PTDP factors with 
the value of 0.5% and 5%, respectively. If the value of a certain entry is lower than the 
filter value (0.5% or 5% as the filter being used), it is set to 0 when calculating the 
transactions. 
The TLR curtailment is seen as a non market-based method to prevent congestions. 
In this case, 39 transactions are used, and the effect of TLR curtailments can be seen in 
Table 7-2. 
Prom Table 7-2 we can see, the TLR methodology was tested successfully on the 
testing network. Assuming there are 39 inter-country transactions altogether, without 
TLR the power flows on the interfaces will probably exceed the limit, as we can see on 
the 8th interface (Switzerland to Italy) in the fourth and fifth columns in Table 7-2. After 
the TLR curtailment, the resulting power flows are shown in the sixth and seventh 
columns, and the interface between Switzerland and Italy is now operating within its 
limit. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Further Work 
As power systems have special reliability requirements and power flows follow 
Kirchoff's laws, the use of a transmission network must be administrated by the system 
operator. The system operator might have to exert limits on the power flows passing 
through some network components to ensure the system operation security. In the case 
that power flows are limited by the scarce transmission capacities of those components, 
the components are said to be congested. As congestions reduce overall efficiency by 
restraining electricity from cheap generators going to the demand areas, congestion 
management is an important topic to study. 
In electricity markets, the electricity prices are expected to direct producers and 
customers into short-term efficient operation as well as long-run investments. The 
electricity prices can be deduced from a constrained optimal dispatch model, as 
described in Chapter 1. The resulting nodal marginal price contains price elements in 
association with the network losses, electricity generations and transmission 
congestions. Therefore, the short-term marginal transmission price is the price 
difference between the source and destination nodes, as explained in section 1.3.4. In a 
power system, the congestion rent often plays an important role in the overall 
transmission charge. 
Due to system uncertainties, real-time spot prices are highly volatile. Transmission 
rights can be used to hedge the price volatility and lead to optimal dispatch, and provide 
the incentives for system expansion in the long run (section 1.4). Transmission rights 
entitle the right holders to transfer electricity through the network even when congestion 
occurs. There are two major forms of transmission rights: the nodal-price-based rights 
proposed by Hogan [12], and the link-based rights proposed by Chao and Peck [17]. 
Each of them has its advantages and downsides, but they both conform to optimal 
economic pricing, and thus lead to the same optimal results if under perfect competition. 
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The congestion management across several different control areas under 
different system operators, namely the cross-border congestion management, gives rise 
to more challenges because close coordination among the system operators is required 
to achieve the overall efficiency while the data sharing should be restricted at the same 
time to ensure fair commercial operation. 
The European interconnected network has to accommodate various market 
mechanisms in different countries, and cross-border power trade and congestion 
management are among the main topics under discussions (section 2.1). Market-based 
congestion management methods are favoured over non market -based ones although the 
latter are still necessary in the current situation to ensure system security. In Chapter 2, 
several major market-based cross-border congestion management methods, including 
implicit auctioning, explicit auctioning/market splitting, counter-trade and re-dispatch 
were studied. Close coordination among the neighbouring system operators and markets 
are required for all the methods. Due to the diversity of member countries, a uniform 
method is unlikely to be adopted widely throughout the system because it might lead to 
distortions under different circumstances. For example, one of the reasons that the Nord 
Pool can apply the market-splitting is that because PXs (power exchanges) covers all 
the related areas. This is unlikely to be applied throughout European area. 
In contrast to Europe, the US is likely to follow a set of guidelines towards the 
standard market design (SMD) across all the states, although regional flexibilities are 
allowed. This uniform framework is mainly based on the successful PJM market rules, 
and it is aimed at solving the inconsistent rules in different states to facilitate cross-
border trade and lead to a healthier nationwide electricity market. 
The locational marginal pricing (LMP) requires that every trader must pay for the 
congestion, even it didn't cause the congestion. Under the merchandise surplus (MS) 
allocation suggested in Chapter 3, initial payments from traders are identical to those 
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under the LMP method, but the way the system operator (SO) deals with the MS is 
different. The SO refunds MS to all the traders according to their allocated share of 
usage of the congested lines. A trader is able to use its allocated share without paying 
for the related congestion fee -the congestion rent it paid to the SO will be fully 
refunded. 
This MS allocation method gives pure financial rights to users without capacity 
scheduling, therefore users cannot withhold such rights in the attempt to prevent other 
participants' use of the transmission grid. In order to increasing market liquidity, the 
rights may be tradable in a secondary market once allocated by the SO. 
Under Hogan's or Chao-Peek's transmission right mechanism, market participants 
must purchase in advance the transmission rights on the likely to be congested lines. 
Information inadequacy and the system operation uncertainties make it difficult to 
achieve the most effective allocation of rights in advance, so there is usually MS 
leftover. The method suggested in Chapter 3 can supplement the existing transmission 
rights and allocate 100% of transmission capacities to users, ensuring that the leftover 
MS be totally refunded to the users. Moreover, such allocation is based on congestion 
data which reflect the influences on the power flows (use of transmission network) from 
transmission users. The leftover MS is therefore shared by those who contributed to it. 
Thus the sharing is fair, and no windfall benefits are gained by other users who did not 
contribute towards congestion fees. 
Under the MS allocation method, the calculation of congested line usages is not too 
complicated. Besides, by setting correct capacity shares, users can be correctly signalled 
to use the power grid in the most efficient way. Users will pay a full marginal 
congestion costs for their increase in use of the congested line, and off-peak utilisation 
of the network is encouraged. 
171 
For cross-border congestion management, the decomposed optimal power flow 
(OPF) calculation is a challenging topic. Cadwalader and Hogan's method [125] takes 
the close relation between constraints and their shadow prices into consideration, and 
PTDF factors are used to help 'pricing out' the exterior congestions. A sub-gradient 
algorithm is used to solve the primal-dual problem. This method is easy to understand, 
but it does not have good convergence performance if appropriate estimation of the 
parameters is not given. Besides, it requires large amount of information exchange if 
used in nodal pricing model. It works fine in some examples [125] but require that the 
dualised constraints are convex [47]. Kim and Baldick [126] gave an innovative idea to 
decompose the interconnected system by putting a pair of 'dummy buses' in the middle 
of each tie line. This gives a good start for a number of later proposals, including the 
method suggested in this thesis. This method uses a series of sub-problems, and the 
parameters need to be tuned depending on the problems [137]. Aguado [127] suggested 
a barrier function method in which the enlarged KKT conditions are used. This makes 
the size of the unknown variables much bigger than an ordinary Newton OPF problem. 
Xie [128] proposed a barrier function method to solve the dynamic OPF problem, where 
the intertemporary coupling constraints are decomposed in the Newton search. 
However, the coordination among the decomposed problems is still a problem as the 
Hessian matrix contains full information of the sub-systems. 
To overcome some of these problems, a decomposition method was proposed in 
section 4.4. This method is based on the analysis of minimum number of variables to 
determine the influence from neighbouring areas, and it is applied on an improved 
barrier function method proposed in section 4.5.3. Unlike sub-gradient methods, this 
method doesn't require a series of OPF problems whose parameters are obtained from 
the result of the last OPF. Once the result converges it is the final global solution. 
Therefore the inter-area OPF calculation is much faster than those sub-gradient 
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methods. Besides, interior point methods are well known for their fast convergence 
performance and mathematical robustness. 
A simple 7 -bus system is used in Chapter 5 to test the above three methods. The 
test results proved the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 and suggested that the proposed 
method is quick in convergence. 
A model network of decent size and appropriate connection structure is necessary 
for simulation of congestion management methods. As true networks are not available 
to the public due to the commercial significance of the technical data, an approximate 
network is build up in Chapter 6 basing on public-accessible information. This model 
inheri ts the maj or characteristics of the original U CTE 1st synchronous area network, 
and the cross-border power flows were compared against the real ones. The comparison 
proved the similarities between the model and the real networks, and therefore the 
cross-border congestion management methods can be tested on the model to see the 
resulting power flows and financial settlements. 
The model network obtained in Chapter 6 bears similarities with the UCTE 
network, and the generation and demand levels are based on a typical UCTE network 
scenario. As the operations of a network always change, and the power injections and 
extractions can be very different from this specific scenario, so the model network needs 
further validations to see its applicability under various dispatch conditions. In Chapter 
7 the cross-border PTDF factors are calculated and compared with the real data. Good 
comparison was obtained with the correlation factor between these two sets of PTDFs 
being over 90%. This means that cross-border power flows calculated from the model 
will be similar to the real power flows even when the dispatch changes. 
Further work 
The proposed barrier function method requires that the objective function and 
constraints are second differentiable. How to apply this algorithm on OPF problems 
17J 
with discrete constraints, like tap-changing limits and unit-commitment model, needs 
future research. 
Due to the mechanism of IPM methods, the speed of converge is fast at the early 
stage but slower near optimal solutio~, because the changes in the values of the 
variables are small. Therefore, in order to reduce the computational effort, partial re-
linearisation of the KKT conditions may be applied in the later stage of the search, as 
suggested in [132]. However, how to choose the part of variables for re-linearisation 
needs further study. 
The proposed congestion management method as well as the OPF calculation 
method worked well on the examples in this thesis. However, further study is needed to 
extend them onto more complicated network, like the testing model network built in 
Chapter 6. 
This thesis was mainly focused on cross-border power flow calculation, congestion 
management methods and testing model. Although a benchmark model can help to 
check proposed methods, it is not enough to validate a method theoretically. In the 
future, a general mathematical model is needed which can quantify the influences on 
market performances from market rule designs. This model should ideally be able to be 
compatible with various market mechanisms as cross-border congestion management 
generally involves various mechanisms. 
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Appendix Barrier Function Method Applied in the 
Decomposed OPF 
1 The objective function 
The objective function can be total fuel cost or system active power losses. In a pool 
model, the total social welfare/cost can be obtained from the market participants' bids 
and act as the obj ective function. 
The Objective functions are normally expressed in a quadratic form. If the 'minimum 
social cost' objective is used, it can be expressed as: 
(A.l) for Va = 1,. ··,A as the area number. 
where nga and nda are the numbers of generators and demands in area a, respectively. P gi 
is the output of ith generator, and it is subject to the supply-price elasticity constraints: 
Similarly, the demand level of P dj is subject to the demand-price elasticity constraint: 
Here the Pi and P j are the nodal prices, ;i and £ j are the supply and demand price 
elasticity factors. P giroin is the minimum price at which the ith generator produce 
electricity, and P djrnax is the maximum demand of jth user. 
Generally the production bids curves are not continuous [9]. One way to treat this 
discontinuity is replacing these vertical edges with very steep but continuous slopes[9]. 
The total bid curve is obtained by putting together all the bid curves from market 
participants, and this will also help the continuity. 
In the real world, the short-term demand-price elasticity is normally small, i.e. users are 
not very sensitive to the price changes. Therefore in a simplified modeL the demands 
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can be treated as constant. However, taking customer response into consideration can 
reduce the effect of those discontinuities and help determine market clearing price[9]. 
2 Equality constraints 
In a constrained optimisation problem, the equality constraints, together with the 
binding inequality constraints (when the inequality constraints are binding they become 
equality constraints too), constitute the border of the feasible region for the solution set. 
The constraints can contain variables that appear in the cost function (decision 
variables) and variables only appear in the constraints (dependent variables). In the DC 
OPF problem, the most common equality constraints are the power balance constraints 
for all the buses. Considering the assumptions in DC power flow, the power balance 
constraints can be expressed as: 
For those buses with generators attached, 
nOa 
Pgi - Pdi - LBij sin(b i - b j )=0 for Vi = a1,",anga 
j=l 
where P gi : the generation at bus i 
P di : the load at bus i 
B .. : elements in the network admittance matrix. 
11 
(AA) 
The sinusoid item cannot be further simplified to b i - b j' because in modern 
J"( • • 
transmission systems this value can be even greater than 2" If proper voltage support IS 
given in the middle of the transmission line. Nonlinearity of sin(b i - b j ) has to be 
retained. 
For those buses without generators attached, 
no 
Pdi + IBij sin(bi - b j )=0 for Vi = al" ",an[)a 
j=! 
(A.S) 
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If line losses are taken into consideration, they can be modelled as the additional loads 
at both ends of a line: 
Pdli = Lij (1- COS(Oi - 0 j )), where the Lij is called loss coefficient of Line ij, 
In the full AC OPF problem, the real and reactive power balance can be expressed as: 
n" 
P gi - P di - V;! Vj /y:j! COS(Oi - OJ - Oij) (A. 6) 
j=l 
n" 
and qgi - qdi - V; !Vj !~j !sin(Oi - b j - Oij) (A.7) 
j=l 
where V;, Vj: the voltage magnitudes at bus i and j, respectively 
/y:j! : magnitude of the complex admittance matrix element. 
0ij : the phase angle of the complex admittance matrix element. 
P di and qdi :the active and reactive load at bus i. They are subject to power factor 
constraint. 
3 Inequality constraints 
Generation limit: P gi min :S P gi :S P gi max for Vi = al'· .. , ana (A.8) 
Load curtailment limit: Pdimin :S Pdi :S Pdimax for Vi = ap · ··,ana (A.9) 
line starting from node i to j is numbered as k, Vk = 1,···, ma (A.I0) 
The m is the number of transmission lines in system a. 
a 
For AC power flow problem, several more constraints are normally used [142]: 
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Some other technique constraints can be approximately converted to line flow 
constraints [10]. For example, the voltage constraints can be converted to interface 
active power flow limits [163], that is to determine under a fixed load demand, how 
much active power can flow through the interface lines without violating the voltage 
stability. 
The decision variables are the active generator outputs and loads. Because of the 
inclusion of customer response to prices under market environment, the loads become 
an important control on OPF [3]. 
4 Mathematical model of the barrier function method 
Given the problem described in section 4.5.1, and given the following notations: 
VL = (aL)T = I ~]T 
ax l aX j (A. 13) 
Vg = (ag)T = I agi]T 
ax l aX j (A. 14) 
Vh = (ah)T = I ahi ]T 
ax l aX j (A. 15) 
(A.16) 
VL = Vf + (Vg)A + (Vh)z = L(x,A,z )=0 (A.17) 
let Sand Z be the diagonal matrices that contain the elements of the vectors sand z, 
respectively. The optimality conditions with respect to s are: 
(A.18) 
5 Reduced-size Newton function 
In order to avoid ill-conditioning when some of the slack variables approach () because 
of the binding constraints, re-write the condition (A. 18) as: 
SZ=u (A.19) 
178 
And its increment equations are: 
(s + M Xz + M) = u u is the penalty vector (A.20) 
By neglecting the terms MM we obtain the increment of the dual variables: 
t:,z = S-lU - Z - S-lMz (A.21) 
Noticing the fact that Mz = ZAs (A. 22) 
(A.23) 
Taylor expansion of h(x)+s=D: 
V h T I1x + As = D - h - s = d1 -+ t1s = d1 - V h T I1x (A. 24) 
t:,z = S-l(U - ZdJ- z + S-lZVh T I1x (A.25) 
The increment equation of VL: (V 2L tUg = VL +HI1x + Vg~1i + Vh~ (A.26) 
P m 
where H = V2 f + Llik V 2g k + LZjV2hj (A.27) 
k=l j=l 
We can simply write: (V 2 L tUg = AI1x + V gV Ii + b = 0 (A.28) 
where A=H+ Vh(S-lZ fvh T is a block diagonal matrix. (A.29) 
and b = VL + Vh(S-l(U -ZdJ-z) (A.30) 
The linearised equations of the equality constraints are: 
(A.31) 
Combination of the two equations makes: 
(A.32) 
the (n+p) symmetric square matrix on the left can be easily inverted even for large n+p, 
where the numbers of primal variables and the dual variables for the equality constraints 
are nand p, respectively. 
Each component of u may be chosen differently to achieve the discriminative penalty. If 
there is no preference, one may choose the uniform penalty scheme. 
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6 Inter-area coordination 
Suppose the coupling constraints among the sub-areas are expressed as: 
My=O (A.33) 
where y is a vector containing variables in other systems. Also suppose the Lagrangian 
multipliers corresponding to the constraints can be expressed as a vector (f , then these 
constraints also appear in the Hessian matrices. Re-arrange Hessian matrices so that the 
coupling constraints are the last part of the Newton variables, we can get: 
Ak 1 0 0 r 1 ~ak 1 p~ 
0 0 (A.34) . - . 
0 0 Ak r A ~ak p~ A A 
rT 
1 
r T 
A 0 ~ak qk 
Where the r1 through rA are highly sparse constant matrices. For the 1st control area, 
the following equations hold: 
(A.35) 
This set of equations can be written as the block matrices like: 
x 0 X APk 0 /3; 
0 X X . ~t5k + X ~a= /3: (A.36) 
X X 0 ~rk 0 /3: 
Where the Xs are non-empty matrices. 
Therefore, the AP and ~r can be expressed as functions of ~t5 . Furthermore, ~t5 can 
be expressed as the function of ~a . 
In addition, the last set of equations 'Lr: ~a; = qk can be written as: 
APk 
L [0 ·x oJ- ~t5k =qk (A.37) 
~rk 
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As discussed above, ~c5 can be expressed as the function of ~a . By substituting the 
~c5 in equation (A.37) with functions of ~a, ~a can be obtained from the above 
equation. By back-substitution we can obtain ~c5, AI' and ~y . 
7 The specific OPF problem and its sparse structure 
For the DC OPF problem described in Chapter 1, the inequality constraints can be 
converted into equalities ones using slack variables: 
Sga + KPa - b a = 0, where Sga is a 2* nga slack vector. (A.38) 
K = [_EE] is a constant matrix, and E is a nga * nga diagonaillnity matrix. 
b [ 
P amax ] . 2 * . h l' . . 
a = _ . IS a constant nga vector stonng t e generator Imlts In area a. 
Pamm 
S&z +Nba -da =O,where Sm isa2*n&z slack vector. (A.39) 
N = [~E] is a constant matrix, and E is a nl!a * nl!a diagonaillnity matrix. 
da = [_Oam~ ] is a constant 2* n&z vector storing the power angle limits in area a. bamm 
1 
transmission line. Noticing that sin 2 () = 2 (1- cos 2(}) , then 
(A.40) 
where the Sis is a slack vector whose dimension is ma , b l is a diagonal matrix whose 
diagonal entry is the branch inductance bij , A is the incidence matrix of system a 
indicating the starting and ending nodes of each transmission line, and L~max is the 
modified transfer limit vector whose elements are (L i- jrnaX f for VLi _i · 
The slack variables must be nonnegative, i.e. Sga ~ ° and Sill ~ 0 
l~l 
Re-write the equality constraints as: 
(A.41) 
Coupling constraints: Mb=O (A.42) 
where b = [0 i "'0 ~ f is a vector containing variables in other systems. 
In order to make sure that the slack variables are nonnegative, the logarithm barrier 
function is added to the cost function: 
A A ka 
L(p:QaPa + b:Pa) - flLLlns i (A.43) 
a=1 a=l i=l 
In this OPF problem, the objective function (A.43) and the constraints equation (A.38) 
through equation (A.41) are all separable, but constraint equation (A.42) is a global 
coupling constraint. Suppose the Lagrangian for constraint equation (A.42) is (J, and 
the Lagrangian for constraints (A.41), (A.39), (A.38) and (A.40) are Aga' Zoa' Zga' Zla' 
respectively, and using convex dualisation, we can obtain the Lagrangian function for 
this OPF problem: 
A ka 
L(') = L[(p:QaPa + b:Pa) - J1 Llns j + z;a (Sga + KPa - ba) 
a~ j~ 
+Z~(Sta +llb l l1 2 -llbt l1 2 xcos2Ao a -2xL:max )+A;a(Pa -gga(Ba,oa)-PLa) 
+ A~a (gDa (Ba' 0a) + PLa) + z~ (Slil + NOa - da)] + (J TMo 
(A.44) 
(A.4S) 
Thus, given the global Lagrangian (J, the L(.) is a separable function. Therefore, by 
updating a we can obtain the optimum through parallel dispatches in all the sub-
systems. 
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The KKT condition for the primal-dual problem can be expressed as: J(u) = aL/au =0 
U 1 
u 2 
and J(o) = aL/ao =0, where u = is the set of local variables, and the local 
u' A 
rJ = [A~aA~az~z~azia Y is the Lagrange multiplier vector (dual variables), and 
x=[sias~as~p~a~ Y is the vector of control variables and state variables (primal 
variables). 
If we can find (u* ,0*) to make J(u) =0 and J(o) =0, then the optimum is found. 
Newton method can be used to solve the KKT conditions. 
For each area a, given ( Uk, Ok), the Newton method can be expressed as: 
(A.46) 
where the Hand J are Hessian and Jacobian matrices with respect to the Lagrangian 
function of the OPF problem .. 
rJk 
And the update procedure is [~:: J = ;: (A.47) 
where the a; and a; are the step sizes for the dual and primal variables respectively. 
In primal-dual interior point methods, the step size is chosen so that the new point is 
still within the f-l neighbourhood, so the choice does not depend on the specific OPF 
problem or experience. By enforcing f-lk ~ 0, the optimum can finally be found. 
written as: 
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Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk ADAD ADAg ADZ" ADZg ADZ/ ADs/ ADSg ADS" ADPa ADba 
(H1DAD r Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk AgAg AgZ" AgZg AgZ/ AgS/ AgSg AgSa AgP. i..gb. 
Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk zaza Z"Zg zaz/ z"s/ Z"Sg Z"S" z"p. z"b. 
Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk ZgZg Zgz/ zgs/ ZgSg zgs" zgPa zgb. 
Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk Hk 
z/z/ z/s/ z/Sg z/s" zIP. z/b. 
Hk Hk Hk 
S/S/ S/Sg s/s" 
Hk 
SIP. 
Hk 
sib. 
Hk Hk Hk Hk 
SgSg SgS" SgP. sgb. 
Hk 
s"s" 
Hk 
s"p. 
Hk 
saba 
Hk 
PaPa 
Hk 
Paba 
Hk 
b.ba 
(A.48) 
The lower triangle is the transposition of the upper triangle and is thus omitted. 
Both the Hessian and the Jacobian are sparse matrices as many of the entries are zero 
due to the relations between variables. The following equations give the nonzero entries 
in the Jacobian and Hessian according to the specific OPF problem we are studying: 
(A.49) 
[ J
T 
aL 1 T 
-- = -/1 - + Zga = 0(lx2n
a
) 
aSga Sga 
(A. 50) 
[ ]
T 
aL 1 T 
--= - /1 - + Z&z = 0(lx2n&,) 
as&z S&z 
(A.51) 
(A.52) 
aL = _a_~~ Ilblll~ . (_ cos 2Apuli O pull) + z~ (NOa) - A~a . g ga (Ba 'Oa) + A~a . g Da (B ll 'Oa) + aT M 
aOa aOa 
= iJ~ [fJ)+hJ)+lJ)]+z~N +OTMa=O(I .. ,) (A.S3) 
a 
where ala = Z ~ Ilbl 112 . [ : (-COS 2APull 0 Pull )] = 
aOa aUa 
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sin(2a1 J Pull) o 
* A ~ 1 x n6
a 
vector (A.54) 
o sine 2a m J Pull ) 
and a1 ••• am are the 1st. .. mth row vector in matrix APuli • A is the incidence matrix 
obtained by cutting off the sth column in matrix Apull ' where s is the slack bus number. 
bs1 cos(Js - J gl) T 
+ As = lL AgiOj J (A.55) 
bS6a COS{l\ - Onga ) 
where o. = 1 
{
lbi1 COS(Ji - JJ ... biS cos(Jj - JJ ... bjnoo COS(Oj - On ) 
- [bS1 cos(Js - OJ ... bSn6a cos(os - Jn6a)J 
is a Ix n&l vector. (A.56) 
J i = g l···g a' i ~ S 
l=S 
Note that only when the slack bus has generators attached does the multiplier As exist. 
The A is the vector storing the multipliers for all the generators within area a except ga 
the slack generator. 
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aL = [Sga + KPa - b a J = O(lx2n ) (A.60) ~ p 
ga 
(A. 62) 
aL ~T T ~ ~T T • • 
aa = u M = ~ U a M a = o (lxnT ), where nT IS the number of couplIng variables. 
(A.63) 
8 List of derivatives 
In this OPF problem, 
A 
f(') = I [(p:QaPa + b:Pa) 
a=1 
(A. 65) 
(A. 64) 
zT(h(')+s-D)=z~a(Sga +KPa -ba)+zl(s&z +No a -da) 
+ z~ (sla + IIb l 112 - IIb l //2 X cos2Ao a - 2 X L:max ) 
and the computation is as the following procedure: 
(A.66) 
(1) Given X:, and thus So = D - h(x:). Zo and Ao are functions of both fl and x:. 
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(5) A? ], thanks to the sparse structure 
OaOa 
of Vhk and Hk 
(6) Equation (A.34) thus becomes 
Tl 0 0 Ml ~Vl r1 
0 T2 0 M2 ~V2 r2 
= (A.67) 
0 0 
MT 
1 
MT 2 0 ~(f ra 
where the 
c 0 E 0 
0 HOa&lk 
_ agga I ag oa I 
A 0 Vg p 
ab k ab k 
PaPa a a 
T = 0 Ak Vg: = ET (- :~: rl. 0 0 (A.68), a o aOa Vg; Vg:lk 0 
(:~: )\ 0 0 0 
~pk 
~pk 
b k 
rk 
a Pa 
a ~bk Pa rk 
~V = ~b k a and r =- b k Oa , a=1,2, ... = = a a 
AA:a 
a Oa rk 
~')\/ g~ \a A~a rk Ana 
Only those matrices labelled with 'k' need to be updated at each iteration, and the 
others are constant. 
(7) The above matrix can be written as a set of equations: 
(A.69) 
(A.70) 
lS7 
(a
g Da JT, ~a k = rk (A.72) aa k a ADa 
a 
a 
From equation (A.69) we can get: ~A~a = r;a - CMak (A.74) 
From equation (A. 71) we can get: AP: = r).~ - (- :~7 r Ik M ~ (A. 75) 
Substitute (A.75) into (A.74) we can get: 
(A.76) 
By substituting (A.76) into (A.70), we get: 
H '~a k + (agga I Jc(- agga JT, ~a k + (agDa I } ~ 
o a& k a aa k aa k a aa k '1>a a a a (A.77) 
(A.78) 
k k ( agO' I ]( k C k ) And rA = rOa + aaa k rPa - rAg.. (A.79) 
Then (A.68) can be simplified as: 
Ak agDa , Ma ~a k rk A aa k a A a ~~a rk (A.80) (:~: r1k = ADa 0 0 ~(J ro 
Also from (A.77) through (A.79) we can get: 
(A.82) 
and IM: ~o a =r! (A.83) 
a 
By substituting (A.81) into (A.82) we get: 
(A. 84) 
Similarly by substituting (A.81) into (A.83) we get: 
and thus 
(considering that (A~)-1 is symmetric) 
k k L T( k)-1 k to = -ro + Ma AA rA 
a 
n
k 
1 0 0 B Dto I k AA~)1 t k 1 
0 nk 0 BDzO I k A~2 t k (A.85) 2 then 2 = 
0 0 
Bk 
1 
rk ~(Jk t k 0 
9 Newton directions 
H = !l . diag(~) ~ (rna X rna ) matrix (A.86) 
SlaSla 2 
Sla 
H = E = HT ~ (rn X rna) matrix (A.87) 
SlaZla ZlaSla a 
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H s s = f-l . diag( ~2 ) -7 ( 2na x 2na) matrix (A.88) 
ga ga S 
ga 
Hs z = E = H; s -7 ( 2na x 2na) matrix (A.89) 
ga ga ga ga 
(A.90) 
(A.92) 
sin(2a1 b Pull ) o 
*A 
o 
Zlalbit sin(2a1bpul ) 0 
a 
*2A = = 
aba 0 zlambl~ sin(2ambpull ) 
sin(2a1bpull ) T 
. diag(zta ). diag~lbtll~)· 2A 
sin(2amb Pull ) 
o 
(A.93) is a 
lYO 
+A . 
s 
bk1 sin(bk - b1 ) ~e: -EY : 
o 
(A. 95) 
sin(2a1 b Full ) o 
o 
[Ie: -E J+ bks sin(bk - 6 I )e{ 
bknoo sin(bk - bn£~J 
(A.94) 
o 
[Jet - E J+ bks sin(bk - 6I )e{ 
bknoo sin(bk - bn&7) 
(A.96) 
o sin(2am b Full ) 
is a no x rna matrix. (A. 97) 
a 
T . 
=H 0 -7 no x n matnx. Y ga a a ga (A.98) 
T . 
=H A 0 -7 no x nDa matnx. Da a a 
(A.99) 
-
a/Ill 
1 Y 1 
(A. 100) 
(A.lOl) 
H PaPa = 2Q~ ~ (na X na) matrix (A. 102) 
Hp z = KT = H~ P ~ (na x 2na) matrix 
a ga ga a (A. 103) 
H y = E = HyT P ~ (nga xnua ) matrix P a ga ga a 0 (A. 104) 
Thus for each system a, the Newton method can be expressed as: 
(A. 106) 
o 
= Hc5 a = H: (A. 107) 
a a 
d d 
where Hua=-Iu =- Is; 
a dA a da ~a 
I 
Zla 0 
and H aa=O (A. 108) 
H is a highly sparse symmetric matrix, 
UaU a 
[Hqq H~ 1 = [ 0 ~J (A. 109) and HUaUa = H Hxx L X7] 
H 0 0 SISI 
H SgSg 
(A.llO) where D = H SbSb 
H 
PaPa 
0 H IXlIXl 
0 0 0 0 Hk ADO. 
0 0 0 Hk AgP. Hk AgO. 
LT = 0 0 Hk z/js/j 0 Hk z/jo. (A.III) 
0 Hk ZgSg 0 Hk ZgP. 0 
Hk 
z/s/ 0 0 0 Hk Z/o. 
is a ((rna + 3na + l)x (rna + 3na + n& )) matrix. 
Substituting the constant entries into this matrix, we get: 
0 0 0 0 Hk ADO. 
0 0 0 E Hk AgO. 
LT = 0 0 E 0 Hk Z/jO. (A.112) 
0 E 0 K 0 
E 0 0 0 Hk Z/O. 
and the Hessian matrix can be written as: 
0 0 0 0 Hk ADO. 
0 0 0 E Hk A}(Oa 
0 0 0 E 0 NT 
0 E 0 K 0 
E 0 0 0 Hk ZIOa 
0 0 0 0 E Hk S/S/ 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 E 0 Hk 0 0 0 SgSg 
0 0 E 0 0 Hk 0 0 S15S15 
0 E 0 KT 0 0 Hk PaPa 0 
(H1g0a r (Hk y N 0 (Hk Y Hk ADOa Z/Oa °aba 
The full system Newton method can be expressed as: 
H 
UjUj 
0 0 HUla L\u1 J Ul 
0 0 (A.113) = -
0 0 H H uja L\uA J UA UAUA 
H~a H~a 0 L\a J a a 
through back-substituting L\u,. = H ~~i (- J Ui - H upflO) into the last equation, we get: 
_ f" = ±,(- H;'aH;'~J.,)+ ±,(- H;,,,H:'~, H ',a ~a 
i-I i-I 
(A.114) 
Therefore, the global variables 
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is obtained from the information of all the sub-systems. 
Where [0 0 0 H~aa]o 
o 
o 
o 
± (H~aH ~~iH uia)= ± (H~pH mmH bP)= [H ~a 
i=l i=l 
H 151151 0 
MT 
1 
=[M1 ... MA =M 
0 H bAbA MT A 
o 
o 
... HJa a 
H 151151 
0 
(A.IIS) 
(A.116) 
(A.117) 
(A.118) 
HbA 0 H b1 (1 
0 H bAbA Hb (1 A 
0 
MT (A.119) 
H bAbA 
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